Definitions.§ 39.01
Related court rules: Rule 8.210 Parties and participants · Rule 8.226 · Rule 8.250 · Rule 8.255 · Rule 8.310 · Rule 8.332 · Rule 8.347
779 opinions cite § 39.01
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O.I.C.L. v. Department of Children & Families 169 So. 3d 1244 · 4D15-53 · 4th DCA 2015
· cited by 19 in all courts
Denial of an immigrant teen's private dependency petition affirmed: his uncle was a capable caregiver, and remote or poverty-based neglect did not show dependency.
…... by [his] parent or parents or legal custodians”; and (2) that the Child has “no parent or legal custodians capable of providing supervision and care.” § 39.01(15)(a), (e), Fla. Stat. (2014). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition. A private petition for adjudication of…
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O.I.C.L. v. Department of Children & Families 205 So. 3d 575 · SC15-1570 · Florida Supreme Court 2016
· cited by 4 in all courts
Supreme Court dismissed review of a denied dependency petition as moot because the immigrant youth turned 18 and cannot be adjudicated dependent.
…of the Third District Court of Appeal in In re T.J., 59 So.3d 1187 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011), regarding the definition of a dependent child under section 39.01 (15)(e), Florida Statutes. 1 However, because the individual in the case under review is now an adult who cannot be adjudicated a dependent child under…
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In the Interest of: B.R.C.M., A Minor Child v. Department of Children & Families 215 So. 3d 1219 · SC16-179 · Florida Supreme Court 2017
· cited by 3 in all courts
Supreme Court held a private dependency petition by an immigrant child cannot be summarily denied for seeking immigration status; individualized findings are required.
…as a sponsor.1 After his arrival, a private petition was filed on behalf of B.R.C.M. alleging three grounds for adjudication of dependency under section 39.01(15), Florida Statutes (2014), which defines a dependent child as a child who is found by the court: “(a) [t]o have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the…
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In re B.R.C.M. 182 So. 3d 749 · 3D15-0962 · 3rd DCA 2015
· cited by 5 in all courts
Denial of an immigrant teen's private dependency petition affirmed because dependency law serves children in need, not immigration goals; a dissent urged a hearing.
…in Miami with her, - B.R.C.M. alleged that he is a “dependent child” under three separate criteria in the statutory definition of that term in section 39.01(15), Florida Statutes (2015): he has been abandoned and neglected by each of his parents under (15)(a); he has no parent or legal custodian capable of providing…
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Department of Children & Families v. A.R. 253 So. 3d 1158 · 3D17-2003 · 3rd DCA 2018
· cited by 8 in all courts
Court held the trial court misapplied the sexual abuse statutes as to the father, remanding for an abuse finding and best-interest findings; mother's dismissal affirmed.
…of the [c]hild.” § 39.806(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (2017). The parents purportedly “subjected the [c]hild to sexual battery or sexual abuse as defined in Section 39.01, or chronic abuse.” § 39.806(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (2017). In addition to the allegations of egregious conduct, sexual battery or sexual abuse, and…
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J.C. v. Department of Children & Family Services 937 So. 2d 184 · 3D05-1949 · 3rd DCA 2006
· cited by 13 in all courts
Dependency affirmed over a dissent: the father's drug sales near the home and an unsecured firearm placed the children at substantial risk of imminent harm.
…2005). In the instant case, the trial court applied the correct law, which includes the statutory definition of a dependent child, as provided in section 39.01(14), Florida Statutes (2004), the definition of neglect, as provided in section 39.01(45), Florida Statutes (2004), and the definition of abuse, as provided in…
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In re T.J. 59 So. 3d 1187 · 3D10-1111 · 3rd DCA 2011
· cited by 6 in all courts
Summary denial of an orphaned immigrant teen's dependency petition reversed, though a majority found the diligent search for her father insufficient.
…to T.J. We review the summary denial of the amended petition under a de novo standard. We reverse and remand the case on the basis of our analysis of section 39.01, Florida Statutes (2010), and persuasive decisions of the Fourth and Fifth District Courts of Appeal. [2] The issue before us is whether, in the case of an…
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In re S.A.R.D. 182 So. 3d 897 · 3D15-1472 · 3rd DCA 2016
· cited by 4 in all courts
Denial of an immigrant teen's private dependency petition affirmed because the father's abandonment was remote and the mother had not abandoned or neglected him.
…to subsidize his heeds. In 2014, he left his mother and Honduras and illegally entered the United States. He is seeking an order of dependency under section 39.01, Florida Statutes (2015), on the basis of abandonment by his father and neglect by his mother in order to become eligible for a Special Immigrant Juvenile…
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In the Interest of K.B.L v. a Minor 176 So. 3d 297 · 3D14-2746 · 3rd DCA 2015
· cited by 15 in all courts
Dismissal of an immigrant teen's private dependency petition affirmed because the father's abandonment was remote and the child lived safely with his mother.
… K.B.L.V. appeals the dismissal of his private petition for dependency in which he sought a finding of abandonment as to his father, pursuant to section 39.01(15), Florida Statutes (2013). We affirm because there is no evidence to support K.B.L.V.’s dependency adjudication as an abandoned child within the meaning of…
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In re L.C. 947 So. 2d 1240 · 2D06-43 · 2nd DCA 2007
Dependency reversed because the father's unsworn prior inconsistent statement was not substantive evidence, leaving no proof of violence or drug use affecting the children.
…for dependency [2] alleged that the children were at "substantial risk or imminent threat of harm o[r] abuse or neglect" from L.R. on four bases: violence, § 39.01(30)(i), Fla. Stat. (2005); failure to protect the children, § 39.01(30)(j); substance or alcohol abuse, § 39.01(30)(g); *1243 and abandonment, § 39.010(1). See §…
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In the Interest of L.C. v. Department of Children & Family Services 947 So. 2d 1240 · 2D06-43-2 · 2nd DCA 2007
· cited by 8 in all courts
Dependency reversed because the father's unsworn prior inconsistent statement was not substantive evidence, leaving no proof of violence or drug use affecting the children.
…for dependency 2 alleged that the children were at “substantial risk or imminent threat of harm o[r] abuse or neglect” from L.R. on four bases: violence, § 39.01(30)(i), Fla. Stat. (2005); failure to protect the children, § 39.01(30)®; substance or alcohol abuse, § 39.01(30)(g); *1243 and abandonment, § 39.010(1). See §…
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In Interest of Hutchins 345 So. 2d 703 · SC48306 · Florida Supreme Court 1977
· cited by 7 in all courts
…the statute and the validity of the first adjudication of ungovernability. The statute in question, Chapter 75-48, Section 15(11), now appears as Section 39.01(11), Florida Statutes, and provides: "`Ungovernable child' means a child who persistently disobeys the reasonable and lawful demands of his parents or other…
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C.J. v. Department of Children & Families 968 So. 2d 121 · 4D07-1496 · 4th DCA 2007
· cited by 7 in all courts
Dependency adjudication reversed for a new hearing because the court admitted hearsay under a blanket ruling, though the remaining evidence could support neglect.
…final hearing. Appellant is the child's father. The department alleges that C.J. is at substantial risk of imminent threat of harm, as defined in section 39.01(30), Florida Statutes, or imminent neglect, as defined in section 39.01(43), Florida Statutes, arising out of Appellant's history of domestic violence against the…
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In re S.T. 940 So. 2d 571 · 2D06-964 · 2nd DCA 2006
· cited by 5 in all courts
Dependency of four children reversed: one confrontation leaving a bruise and slight swelling was not abuse, and no nexus showed prospective abuse of siblings.
…appeal. The Department filed a Petition for Adjudication of Dependency alleging two counts against the Mother: (1) abuse against D.Y., pursuant to section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes; and (2) prospective abuse as to the other three children, pursuant to section 39.01(14)(f). [1] The trial court held an adjudicatory…
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D.M.L. v. State 694 So. 2d 782 · DCA96-4515 · District Court of Appeal 1997
· cited by 2 in all courts
…had *783 committed a delinquent act because section 39.061 does not proscribe escape from “low-risk residential” commitment facilities, as defined in section 39.01(59)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), or, if it does, its terms are unconstitutionally vague. We affirm. Section 39.061, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996), proscribes…
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In Interest of K.A.F. 442 So. 2d 365 · 5D81-1354 · 5th DCA 1983
· cited by 18 in all courts
…issue on appeal is whether the circuit court erred in severing the rights of the mother based on a finding of "abandonment" as that term is defined in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (1981). That statute provides: *366 39.01 Definitions. When used in this chapter: (1) "Abandoned" means a situation in which a…
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B.J. v. Department of Children & Families 190 So. 3d 191 · 3D15-2593 · 3rd DCA 2016
· cited by 5 in all courts
Dependency adjudication reversed because a sibling's SIDS death, occasional marijuana use and co-sleeping did not show abuse, neglect or imminent risk to the surviving child.
…to order the child dependent, but taken 4 together, show that the child “has been harmed,” as defined in §39.01(30)(k) and (l)3, and that the child is at “prospective risk of neglect,” pursuant to §39.01(44)4 as a result of the mother continuing to co-sleep with the child…
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In re O.C. 934 So. 2d 623 · 2D05-3123 · 2nd DCA 2006
Dependency of the incarcerated mother's child reversed: one unexplained bruise while with caregivers she chose did not show abuse, neglect, or fault by the mother.
…that this child had been abandoned and no competent, substantial evidence to support a finding that the child was a victim of "abuse" as defined in section 39.01(2) or "neglect" as defined in section 39.01(45). Pursuant to section 39.01(2), "abuse" of a child is "any willful act ... that results in any physical, mental,…
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L.M.C. v. Department of Children & Family Services 934 So. 2d 623 · 2D05-3123-2 · 2nd DCA 2006
· cited by 3 in all courts
Dependency of the incarcerated mother's child reversed: one unexplained bruise while with caregivers she chose did not show abuse, neglect, or fault by the mother.
…that this child had been abandoned and no competent, substantial evidence to support a finding that the child was a victim of “abuse” as defined in section 39.01(2) or “neglect” as defined in section 39.01(45). Pursuant to section 39.01(2), “abuse” of a child is “any willful act ... that results in any physical, mental,…
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In re D.A.D. II 903 So. 2d 1034 · 2D04-4623 · 2nd DCA 2005
Termination affirmed for the father's pattern of drug-fueled abuse, domestic violence and neglect, though the murder alone lacked a nexus to harm to the children.
…the Father's acts of domestic violenceboth directed at the children and at the Mother in the presence of the childrenwas abuse of the children. See § 39.01(2); [6] see also § 39.01(30)(a), (i); [7] D.D. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 773 So.2d 615 , 618 n. 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) ("The detrimental effect of…
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D.A.D. v. Department of Children & Family Services 903 So. 2d 1034 · 2D04-4623-2 · 2nd DCA 2005
· cited by 8 in all courts
Termination affirmed for the father's pattern of drug-fueled abuse, domestic violence and neglect, though the murder alone lacked a nexus to harm to the children.
…the Father’s acts of domestic violence — both directed at the children and at the Mother in the presence of the children — was abuse of the children. See § 39.01(2); 6 see also § 39.01(30)(a), (i); 7 D.D. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 773 So.2d 615 , 618 n. 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (“The detrimental effect of…
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P.D. v. Department of Children & Families 866 So. 2d 100 · 1D03-3044 · 1st DCA 2004
· cited by 6 in all courts
Dependency reversed because a positive cocaine test at birth, without a showing the newborn was demonstrably adversely affected, did not establish statutory harm.
…solely upon a finding that the mother and child tested positive for cocaine at the child's birth. Because we conclude that a finding of harm under section 39.01(30)(g)1., Florida Statutes (2002), requires some showing of an adverse effect resulting from the mother's use of controlled substances or alcohol, we must reverse. …
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J.V. v. State 516 So. 2d 1133 · 1D87-267 · 1st DCA 1987
…life and restore said child to good health." We find no abuse of discretion in the court's authorization of blood transfusions *1134 to the child. Section 39.01(30), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986), defining neglect, provides that a court may direct medical treatment to a minor child if a parent or guardian does not furnish…
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In the Interest of J.V. v. State 516 So. 2d 1133 · DCA87-267 · District Court of Appeal 1987
· cited by 2 in all courts
…life and restore said child to good health.” We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s authorization of blood transfu *1134 sions to the child. Section 39.01(30), Florida Statutes (Supp.1986), defining neglect, provides that a court may direct medical treatment to a minor child if a parent or guardian does not furnish…
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M.P.L. v. Department of Children & Families 211 So. 3d 258 · 4D16-1932 · 4th DCA 2017
Denial of an immigrant teen's dependency petition affirmed per O.I.C.L.; a dissent would find no capable parent or legal custodian.
…Appellant met her burden of establishing dependency based on being a child with “no parent or legal custodians capable of providing supervision and care.” § 39.01(15)(e), Fla. Stat. (2015). There was undisputed testimony that, before leaving her parents’ home in Guatemala, Appellant had been abused by her father and brother…
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L.T. ex rel. K.S.L. v. Department of Children & Families 48 So. 3d 928 · 5D10-2073 · 5th DCA 2010
· cited by 4 in all courts
Dismissal of an uncle's dependency petition reversed because an orphaned child with no legal custodian is dependent; jurisdiction, service and mootness objections failed.
…regarding his nephew, K.S.L. The petition stated that K.S.L.’s parents were both deceased, K.S.L. was dependent within the meaning and intent of section 39.01(1), (2), (14)(e), (45) or (63) of the Florida Statutes (2009), and the only relative who was able to care for K.S.L. was L.T. At the dependency hearing,…
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R.S. v. Department of Children & Family Services 16 So. 3d 948 · 3D08-825 · 3rd DCA 2009
Neglect adjudication reversed because the child did not live at the father's drug-dealing home; neglect by environment is limited to the child's actual residence.
SHEPHERD, J. This is a parents’ appeal of a trial court adjudication of dependency on the ground of neglect. See § 39.01 (14)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007). The applicable statutory definition of “neglect” upon which the Florida Department of Children and Families filed its petition and…
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In the Interest of L.C. v. Department of Children & Family Services 947 So. 2d 1246 · 2D06-219 · 2nd DCA 2007
· cited by 12 in all courts
Dependency reversed because the father's old violence against the mother, before the children were born, did not show imminent prospective abuse of them.
…2 alleged that the children were at “substantial risk or imminent threat of harm o[r] abuse or neglect” from J.C. on two bases — inadequate supervision, § 39.01(30)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. (2005); and violence, § 39.01(30)®. *1248 See § 39.01(14)(f). The circuit court dismissed the charge of inadequate supervision during the…
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In Interest of P.S. 825 So. 2d 530 · 2D01-4524 · 2nd DCA 2002
· cited by 11 in all courts
Dependency reversed: the father's six-year-old DUI arrest was irrelevant and did not show the child faced substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect.
…not demonstrate that the child was at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect as a result of the father's actions, we reverse. See § 39.01(14)(f), Fla. Stat. (1999). We observe first that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the father's prior DUI arrest and in considering…
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State v. E.D.P. 724 So. 2d 1144 · SC92345 · Florida Supreme Court 1998
· cited by 8 in all courts
…group programs, nonresidential marine programs, nonresidential training and rehabilitation centers, and other local community nonresidential programs. § 39.01(59)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996) (emphasis added). In the present case, the trial court complied with the statute's requirement to consider the DJJ's recommendation…
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State v. E.D.P. 724 So. 2d 1144 · SC92345-2 · Florida Supreme Court 1998
· cited by 5 in all courts
…group programs, nonresidential marine programs, nonresidential training and rehabilitation centers, and other local community nonresidential programs. § 39.01(59)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996) (emphasis added). In the present case, the trial court complied with the statute’s requirement to consider the DJJ’s recommendation…
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J.M.J. v. State 389 So. 2d 1208 · 1D00-48 · 1st DCA 1980
…in this case, rather than dependency, frustrates the plain legislative intent of chapter 39, designating truant and runaway behavior as dependency. § 39.01(9), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1978). [1] The state responds that a delinquency petition in substantial compliance with the pertinent statutes and rules was filed and…
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Department of Children & Families v. J.B. 2D23-1796 · 2nd DCA 2024
Certiorari granted, order quashed: Chapter 39 does not let a relative seeking placement and adoption intervene as a party; she may only be a participant.
…the department, the guardian ad litem or the representative of the guardian ad litem program when the program has been appointed, and the child." § 39.01(58), Fla. Stat. (2023); see also Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.210(a) ("For the purpose of these rules the terms 'party' and 'parties' shall include the petitioner, the…
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Department of Children & Families v. J.B. 2D2023-1796 · 2nd DCA 2024
Certiorari granted and the order quashed because a great aunt seeking to adopt is a participant, not a party, and cannot intervene as a party.
…the department, the guardian ad litem or the representative of the guardian ad litem program when the program has been appointed, and the child." § 39.01(58), Fla. Stat. (2023); see also Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.210(a) ("For the purpose of these rules the terms 'party' and 'parties' shall include the petitioner, the…
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In re F.J.G.M. 196 So. 3d 534 · 3D15-0546 · 3rd DCA 2016
· cited by 2 in all courts
Denial of a private dependency petition sought for immigration status affirmed; the father's abandonment was too remote and the mother cared for the child.
…mother”), who resides in Miami, Florida, filed a private petition, seeking an adjudication finding her minor son, F.J.G.M., dependent as defined in section 39.01(15) of the Florida Statutes. If adjudicated dependent, F.J.G.M. becomes eligible for a Special Immigrant Juvenile (“SIJ”) status visa under 8 U.S.C. §…
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In re B.Y.G.m, a Minor 176 So. 3d 290 · 3D14-2409 · 3rd DCA 2015
· cited by 14 in all courts
Denial of an immigrant teen's private dependency petition affirmed because the evidence showed no current abandonment or neglect; she lived safely with her mother.
…have no one there to care for her or protect her. The trial court denied the petition, holding that B.Y.G.M. was not dependent, pursuant to section 39.01(15)(e), Florida Statutes (2013). The court found that B.Y.G.M. has a parent, her mother, who is capable of providing B.Y.G.M. with supervision and care. …
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Burke v. State 48 So. 3d 943 · 2D08-6329 · 2nd DCA 2010
… See DuFresne v. State, 826 So.2d 272, 277-78 (Fla.2002); State v. McDonald, 785 So.2d 640, 646 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). “Abuse,” as defined in section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (2007), includes “any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely…
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E.A.R. v. State 4 So. 3d 614 · SC08-506 · Florida Supreme Court 2009
· cited by 1 in all courts
…F.S.; amend[ed] s. 39.001, F.S.; provid[ed] purpose; amend[ed] s. 39.002, F.S.; provid[ed] legislative purpose for the juvenile justice system; amend[ed] s. 39.01, F.S.; revising definitions ...; provid[ed] for medical, psychiatric, psychological, substance abuse, and educational examination and treatment; provid[ed]…
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E.A.R. v. State 4 So. 3d 614 · SC08-506-2 · Florida Supreme Court 2009
· cited by 136 in all courts
…F.S.; amend[ed] s. 39.001, F.S.; provid[ed] purpose; amend[ed] s. 39.002, F.S.; pro-vid[ed] legislative purpose for the juvenile justice system; amend[ed] s. 39.01, F.S.; revising definitions ...; provided] for medical, psychiatric, psychological, substance abuse, and educational examination and treatment; provid[ed] for…
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J.O. v. Department of Children & Family Services 970 So. 2d 395 · 3D07-595 · 3rd DCA 2007
· cited by 2 in all courts
Dependency adjudication affirmed because competent evidence showed the father sold drugs from the children's home, placing them at substantial risk of imminent harm.
…(Fla. 3d DCA 2005). In the case before us, the trial court applied the correct law using the statutory definition of a dependent child as defined in section 39.01(14), Florida Statutes (2004), which provides, in pertinent part: "Child who is found to be dependent" means a child who, pursuant to this chapter, is found by…
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B.M. v. Department of Children & Families 842 So. 2d 936 · 1D02-0880 · 1st DCA 2003
· cited by 2 in all courts
Dependency affirmed; a legal guardian is a participant, not a party, so needed no advocacy-services advisement, and the issue was unpreserved and harmless.
…as required by section 39.502(15), Florida Statutes (2000). B.M. is the legal guardian of D.M. and N.M. As such she is not a party as defined in section 39.01(51), but a participant as defined in section 39.01(50). It does not appear the legislature has extended the notice requirement of section 39.502(15) to…
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D.H. v. Department of Children & Families 769 So. 2d 424 · 4D00-203 · 4th DCA 2000
· cited by 33 in all courts
Dependency reversed: one kick to a half-sister and domestic violence the child never witnessed did not show substantial risk of imminent abuse to her.
…may be found to be "dependent" if the child has been "abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child's parent or parents, legal custodians, or caregivers." § 39.01(14)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). A child may also be found to be dependent where the court finds the child "to be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment,…
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M.W. v. Davis 756 So. 2d 90 · SC95443 · Florida Supreme Court 2000
· cited by 53 in all courts
Certified question answered no: neither Chapter 39 nor the constitution requires a Baker Act hearing before placing a dependent child in residential mental health treatment.
…As the temporary legal custodian of the dependent child, the Department has the statutory authority to obtain "ordinary" medical treatment pursuant to section 39.01(70), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), but that authority may be enlarged by a court order. See M.W., 722 So.2d at 969. Although the commitment of a child to a…
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D.T.H. v. State 348 So. 2d 1155 · SC50578 · Florida Supreme Court 1977
· cited by 2 in all courts
… This cause is before us on direct appeal to review an order of the Circuit Court, in and for Orange County, upholding the constitutional validity of Section 39.01(11), Florida Statutes, thereby vesting jurisdiction in this Court pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution. R.M. Highsmith, an official at…
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E.N. v. Department of Children & Families 224 So. 3d 900 · 2DCASE2D17-1066 · 2nd DCA 2017
· cited by 1 in all courts
Order starting reunification therapy with the father quashed because the court ignored the statutory reunification standard and its best-interest findings lacked evidentiary support.
…testimony at the evidentiary hearing concerning reunification established that I.N. lived with these children and referred to them as her siblings. See § 39.01(73), Fla. Stat. (2016). We will refer to them throughout this opinion as I.N.'s siblings. -2- visits with I.N.…
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S.S. v. Department of Children & Families 81 So. 3d 618 · 1D11-5977 · 1st DCA 2012
· cited by 10 in all courts
Dependency adjudication reversed; evidence of alcohol and drug abuse, domestic violence, dental neglect and self-harm was insufficient, and a drug test came in through hearsay.
…him or her, inter alia, “[t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians.” § 39.01(15)(f), Fla. Stat. (2011). “Abuse,” as defined in the statute, is any willful act or threatened act resulting in “physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm …
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K.S. v. Department of Children & Families 979 So. 2d 1182 · 4D07-3365 · 4th DCA 2008
Dependency reversed because nothing showed the mother knew her boyfriend might burn the child or that future abuse was imminent.
…dependent because "the mother neglected the [child] and the child is presently at substantial risk of imminent threat of harm as defined in Florida Statute 39.01(31); or imminent threat of physical/emotional abuse as defined in Florida Statute 39.01(2); or imminent neglect as defined in Florida Statute 39.01(43)." The…
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In the Interest of T.B. v. Department of Children & Family Services 939 So. 2d 1192 · 2D05-6206 · 2nd DCA 2006
· cited by 8 in all courts
Dependency reversed because several changes of residence did not show actual or imminent neglect, and the written order lacked specific supporting facts.
…concerning how the original written order should be altered, it appears that the intention was to delete any findings as to existing neglect, see § 39.01(14)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004), and retain findings as to prospective- neglect, see § 39.01(14)(f). However, to ensure a complete analysis, our discussion will address…
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In re C.R. 937 So. 2d 1257 · 2D05-1192 · 2nd DCA 2006
Dependency reversed for both parents: no proof the mother knew of risk from the stepfather's abuse, and no nexus showing prospective abuse of other children.
…is found to be dependent" is one found by the court "[t]o have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child's parent or parents or legal custodians[.]" § 39.01(14)(a). "`Abuse' means any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's…
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G.R. v. Department of Children & Family Services 937 So. 2d 1257 · 2D05-1192-2 · 2nd DCA 2006
· cited by 6 in all courts
Dependency reversed for both parents: no proof the mother knew of risk from the stepfather's abuse, and no nexus showing prospective abuse of other children.
…found to be dependent” is one found by the court “[t]o have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the. child’s parent or parents or legal custodians[.]” § 39.01(14)(a). “ ‘Abuse’ means any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the…
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State v. A.S. 622 So. 2d 1127 · DCA92-4330 · District Court of Appeal 1993
…declared the juvenile escape statute, section 39.061, Florida Statutes (Supp.1990), to be unconstitutional. The Court ruled that section 39.061 and section 39.01(61), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990), defining the term “restrictiveness level,” constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the Department of…
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In Interest of D.J.S. 563 So. 2d 655 · 1D88-141 · 1st DCA 1990
· cited by 37 in all courts
…that the evidence is clear and convincing is supported by the record and cannot be held to be unreasonable as a matter of law. CHILD ABUSE Section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes, [14] defines child abuse as "any willful act that results in any physical, mental or sexual injury that causes or is likely to cause the…
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A.O. v. State 456 So. 2d 1173 · SC63974 · Florida Supreme Court 1984
…State of Florida, F.S. Chapter 39," because he had violated the November 1981 court order, and was therefore "in contempt of Court pursuant to sections 39.412 and 39.01(8), Florida Statutes." A.O. pled nolo contendere and specifically reserved the right to appeal the question whether the continued truancy shown could support an…
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A.O. v. State 456 So. 2d 1173 · SC63974-2 · Florida Supreme Court 1984
· cited by 6 in all courts
…State of Flori-da, F.S. Chapter 39,” because he had violated the November 1981 court order, and was therefore “in contempt of Court pursuant to sections 39.412 and 39.01(8), Florida Statutes.” A.O. pled nolo contendere and specifically reserved the right to appeal the question whether the continued truancy shown could support an…
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T.H. v. Department of Children & Families 1D19-0894 · 1st DCA 2020
Dependency adjudication affirmed because competent evidence linked the mother's untreated mental illness to neglect or imminent neglect of her medically fragile young child.
…adjudication on a finding that T.H. had been, or was at substantial risk of imminently being, abused or neglected, and thus dependent pursuant to section 39.01(15), Florida Statutes (2018). T.H.’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by basing its findings of dependency on the mother having untreated…
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Interest of S.F.A.C. v. Department of Children & Families 182 So. 3d 745 · 3D15-2120 · 3rd DCA 2015
Denial of an immigrant teen's private dependency petition affirmed under controlling circuit precedent; a dissent would have required an evidentiary hearing and individualized findings.
…on behalf of an undocumented, sixteen-year-old immigrant from Honduras, seeks an adjudication of dependency based on three separate subsections of section 39.01(15), *746 Florida Statutes (2015), and as to each parent. The petition alleges that his parents were also born in Honduras and that they left him with an older…
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In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Report 2011-02 75 So. 3d 207 · SC11-463 · Florida Supreme Court 2011
· cited by 1 in all courts
…3, and 5. The Committee’s fourth proposal is to amend the instruction to include only the statutory definition of “mental injury,” which is found in section 39.01(42), Florida Statutes (2010). The Minority Report, by contrast, urges that the statutory definitions from chapter 39, Florida Statutes, for “abuse,” “harm,”…
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In re K.M. 978 So. 2d 211 · 2D07-1609 · 2nd DCA 2008
· cited by 6 in all courts
Grandmother's appeal of the child's placement with the father dismissed; legal custodians are participants, not parties, and lack standing to appeal.
…the department, the guardian ad litem or the representative of the guardian ad litem program when the program has been appointed, and the child. § 39.01(50). Rather, a legal custodian is included under the rubric of "participant," which is a status separate from that of "party." See § 39.01(49) (defining…
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E.M.A. v. Department of Children & Families 795 So. 2d 183 · 1D99-3590 · 1st DCA 2001
Dependency affirmed on the father's untreated bipolar disorder and marijuana use posing imminent risk, with remand to revise the written order to adjudicate dependency.
…abuse" of the children based on Appellant's mental-health condition. Appellant contends that the lower court misconstrued the findings required under section 39.01(14)(f), Florida Statutes (1999), and that the evidence does not support a finding of dependency. The pertinent statute defines a "[c]hild who is found to be…
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E.M.A. v. Department of Children & Families 795 So. 2d 183 · 1D99-3590-2 · 1st DCA 2001
· cited by 25 in all courts
Dependency affirmed on the father's untreated bipolar disorder and marijuana use posing imminent risk, with remand to revise the written order to adjudicate dependency.
…abuse” of the children based on Appellant’s mental-health condition. Appellant contends that the lower court misconstrued the findings required under section 39.01(14)(f), Florida Statutes (1999), and that the evidence does not support a finding of dependency. The pertinent statute defines a “[c]hild who is found to be…
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J.M. v. State 677 So. 2d 890 · 3D94-1160 · 3rd DCA 1996
…security classificationwhere, as here, the trial court selects a restrictiveness level other than one recommended by the Department. Id. §§ 39.052(3)(e)3, 39.01(61). Consequently this court has the power to review J.M.'s appeal of his assignment to the "low risk residential" restrictiveness level. However, J.M. completed…
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J.M. v. State 677 So. 2d 890 · 3D94-1160-2 · 3rd DCA 1996
…classification — where, as here, the trial court selects a restrictiveness level other than one recommended by the Department. Id. §§ 39.052(3)(e)3, 39.01(61). Consequently this court has the power to review J.M.’s appeal of his assignment to the “low risk residential” restrictiveness level. However, J.M. completed…
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A.A. v. Rolle 604 So. 2d 813 · SC78142 · Florida Supreme Court 1992
· cited by 33 in all courts
…defined by the legislature as "a physically restricting facility for the temporary care of children, pending delinquency adjudication or court disposition." § 39.01(45), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988). Thus, under section 39.0321, a juvenile could never be placed in secure detention for any of the reasons enumerated. More…
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Anderson v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 485 So. 2d 849 · DCABJ-285 · District Court of Appeal 1986
· cited by 2 in all courts
…standards for screening shall also ensure that the person has not been judicially determined [1] 1 to have committed abuse against a child as defined in s. 39.01(2) and (7), [2] to have a substantiated indicated report of abuse as defined in s. 415.503, or [3] to have committed an act which constitutes domestic violence…
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Division of Family Services v. State 319 So. 2d 72 · 1DX-102 · 1st DCA 1975
· cited by 15 in all courts
…petition is filed shall control the child and the case in accordance with this chapter." (Underlining added) Appellant seeks to rely on that portion of F.S. 39.01(9) which provides that: "An agency granted legal custody shall have the right to determine where and with whom the child shall live, but an individual granted…
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State v. Lindsay 284 So. 2d 377 · SC42829 · Florida Supreme Court 1973
· cited by 21 in all courts
…The aforestated statute provides that the definition for delinquent child should be derived from the general laws of Florida. Florida Statutes (1972), Section 39.01(11), [1] defines delinquent child, as follows: "(11) `Delinquent Child' means a child who commits a violation of law, regardless of where the violation…
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A.M. v. D.S. 1D19-1855 · 1st DCA 2021
Termination and permanent guardianship reversed because a Chapter 63 adoption-related case was decided under Chapter 39 without notice, violating the father's due process.
…“unless otherwise provided by law.” § 39.801(1), Fla. Stat. Both DCF and the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) program are parties in any chapter 39 proceedings. § 39.01(52), Fla. Stat.; cf. § 39.807(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (requiring trial court to “appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the best interest of the child in any…
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E.H. v. Department of Children & Families 3D20-1402 · 3rd DCA 2021
Dependency affirmed on other grounds, but the violent-behavior ground was reversed because the mother was the victim of the father's violence.
…of these grounds would warrant an adjudication of dependency. In this appeal, the Mother has challenged only two of the statutory grounds—(1) section 39.01(35)(g)2., which pertains to “harm” “to a child’s health or welfare” based on “[e]vidence of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of a controlled substance or alcohol…
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In the Interest of Y v. a Minor Child 160 So. 3d 576 · 1D14-5713 · 1st DCA 2015
· cited by 7 in all courts
Dismissal of a child's dependency petition reversed: abuse abroad can support dependency, an SIJ-status motive does not invalidate it, and no jurisdictional bar was shown.
…at risk even though they have been abused, abandoned, or left without a parent or legal custodian capable of caring for them while living elsewhere. Section 39.01 provides a lengthy list of purposes, the first of which is “[t]o provide for the care, safety, and protection of children.” § 39.001(1)(a), Fla. Stat.…
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J.P. v. Department of Children & Family Services 135 So. 3d 541 · 2D13-4135 · 2nd DCA 2014
Neglect adjudication reversed because police removed the unsecured gun, leaving no evidence of a continuing risk of harm to the children.
…or neglected by the child’s parent or parents” or one who is “at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents.” § 39.01(15)(a), (f), Fla. Stat. (2013). There being no evidence of actual harm to the children within the meaning of subsections 39.01(32)(f) 1 or (44) 2 , the adjudication…
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In re S.M. 997 So. 2d 513 · 2D07-4976 · 2nd DCA 2008
Dependency of the two older children affirmed because the mother stayed with the abuser; the infant's adjudication reversed on the department's concession of no evidence.
…proves by a *515 preponderance of the evidence that the child has been abused or neglected or is at substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect. See §§ 39.01(14)(a),(f), .507(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2006). "Abuse" is "any willful act" that results in "any ... mental ... injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the…
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C.M. v. Department of Children & Family Services 997 So. 2d 513 · 2D07-4976-2 · 2nd DCA 2008
· cited by 4 in all courts
Dependency of the two older children affirmed because the mother stayed with the abuser; the infant's adjudication reversed on the department's concession of no evidence.
…proves by a *515 preponderance of the evidence that the child has been abused or neglected or is at substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect. See §§ 39.01(14)(a),(f), .607(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2006). “Abuse” is “any willful act” that results in “any ... mental ... injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the…
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Baker v. State 980 So. 2d 616 · 4D06-4342 · 4th DCA 2008
· cited by 2 in all courts
…827.03 does not define “mental injury,” the supreme court, in DuFresne v. State, 826 So.2d 272, 278-79 (Fla.2002), held that the definition in section 39.01 could be used, as the two statutes should be read in pari materia. See also Zerbe v. State, 944 So.2d 1189, 1193 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); State v. Coleman,…
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A.W. v. Department of Children & Families 969 So. 2d 496 · 1D07-1724 · 1st DCA 2007
· cited by 12 in all courts
Termination affirmed because the developmentally disabled mother's technical case plan compliance did not remedy unsafe conditions or show parenting ability; limited post-termination letters were upheld.
…her ability to comprehend and implement the basic parenting skills and practices necessary to assure her child's health, safety, and well-being. See § 39.01(71), Fla. Stat. (2006) *498 (defining "substantial compliance" to mean "that the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been…
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C.A. v. Department of Children & Families 958 So. 2d 554 · 4D06-4415 · 4th DCA 2007
· cited by 13 in all courts
Dependency reversed because the mother's statements were wrongly admitted against the father and the evidence showed no neglect or imminent risk from his drug use.
…the department, the guardian ad litem or the representative of the guardian ad *557 litem program when the program has been appointed, and the child." § 39.01(50), Fla. Stat. An admission is made by a party to the litigation and it comes into evidence regardless of whether its maker is present at trial. Hunt v.…
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Czapla v. State 957 So. 2d 676 · 1D05-3090 · 1st DCA 2007
· cited by 8 in all courts
…in a prosecution for simple child abuse." Id. at 1020 . Corporal punishment or corporal discipline is not defined in chapter 827. However, section 39.01(30)(a)4, Florida Statutes (2004), provides: 4. Inappropriate or excessively harsh disciplinary action that is likely to result in physical injury, mental injury as…
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State v. Coleman 937 So. 2d 1226 · 1D05-2734 · 1st DCA 2006
· cited by 1 in all courts
…was unconstitutionally vague because it was not defined in chapter 827. The court found that "mental injury" was defined in a closely related statute, section 39.01(44), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), which under State v. Fuchs, 769 So.2d 1006, 1009 (Fla.2000), should be read in pari materia with chapter 827. Section…
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T.G. v. Department of Children & Families 927 So. 2d 104 · 1D05-5067 · 1st DCA 2006
· cited by 19 in all courts
Dependency of five children reversed: one instance of corporal discipline, one failed drug test and an accidental alcohol ingestion did not show abuse or risk.
…of a child by a parent or legal custodian for disciplinary purposes does not in itself constitute abuse when it does not result in harm to the child. § 39.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2005); see M.F., 770 So.2d at 1192 (explaining purposes of Florida Juvenile Justice Act); A.A. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 908…
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A.G. v. Department of Children & Family Services 913 So. 2d 1237 · 3D05-631 · 3rd DCA 2005
Dependency of two children reversed with directions to dismiss: a trivial incident of poor judgment showed no willful abuse or neglect; nothing concerned the brother.
…on the one hand, or the significant impairment of the health of the child, on the other, which are both required to support a finding of dependency. § 39.01(2), 2 (14)(a), 3 (45), 4 Fla. Stat. (2003); see G.C. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 791 So.2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), 5 mandamus denied by Guardian…
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P.C. v. Department of Children & Families 898 So. 2d 195 · 2D04-1794 · 2nd DCA 2005
· cited by 3 in all courts
Dependency reversed because evidence of abandonment, one thrown container, and some cocaine use showed no resulting harm to the children.
…is found "[t]o have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child's parent" or "[t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect." § 39.01(14)(a), (f), Fla. Stat. (2003). Abandonment is defined as "a situation in which the parent . . ., while being able, makes no provision for the child's support and…
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A.M.T. v. State 883 So. 2d 302 · 1D03-2830 · 1st DCA 2004
· cited by 5 in all courts
Shelter and dependency orders reversed: no sworn testimony supported sheltering, and leaving older children with caretakers during trips was not abuse, neglect or abandonment.
…or parents or legal custodians;... or (f) To be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians." § 39.01(14), Fla. Stat. (2003). These are not generic terms without meaning. Florida Statutes give these terms specific and distinct definitions. Therefore, we must…
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In re J.A.H. 876 So. 2d 647 · 2D03-2372 · 2nd DCA 2004
· cited by 5 in all courts
Dependency affirmed for the son struck by the grandfather the mother failed to supervise, but reversed for the daughter, who did not witness it.
…of the hearing he was no longer in her home. A child may be adjudicated dependent if the court finds that the child was "abandoned, abused, or neglected," § 39.01(14)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003), or that the child is "at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect," § 39.01(14)(f). We review the trial court's order…
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G.V. v. Department of Children & Families 795 So. 2d 1043 · 3D00-1147 · 3rd DCA 2001
· cited by 6 in all courts
Dependency affirmed because the mother exposed the infant to the father's abuse; the court also erred in striking the pediatrician's expert testimony on cross-appeal.
…are supported by competent substantial evidence. D.D. v. Department of Children and Families, 773 So.2d 615, 617 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Under section 39.01, Florida Statutes (1998), the definition of a dependent child includes one who has been abandoned, abused, or neglected by his or her parents, custodians or…
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Doe v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 563 So. 2d 655 · DCA88-141-2 · District Court of Appeal 1990
· cited by 5 in all courts
…that the evidence is clear and convincing is supported by the record and cannot be held to be unreasonable as a matter of law. CHILD ABUSE Section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes, 14 defines child abuse as “any willful act that results in any physical, mental or sexual injury that causes or is likely to cause the…
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In Interest of B.W. 479 So. 2d 740 · 5D84-844 · 5th DCA 1985
· cited by 8 in all courts
…1983) and the dissent in In the Interest of K.A.F., 442 So.2d 365 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). HRS relies on the statutory definition of abandonment in section 39.01(1), Fla. Stat., which describes "a situation in which a parent, who, while being able, makes no provision for the child's support and makes no effort to…
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J.M.J. v. State 389 So. 2d 1208 · DCA00-48 · District Court of Appeal 1980
· cited by 11 in all courts
…in this case, rather than dependency, frustrates the plain legislative intent of chapter 39, designating truant and runaway behavior as dependency. § 39.01(9), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1978). 1 The state responds that a delinquency petition in substantial compliance with the pertinent statutes and rules was filed and that…
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Guardian ad Litem Program v. T.M. 2D22-2501 · 2nd DCA 2022
Supplemental adjudication reversed because the trial court wrongly refused to consider on the merits the guardian ad litem's rule 8.270 challenge to a birth-certificate parent's status.
…T.M.—was A.L.'s biological father. Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes governs proceedings relating to children, including dependency. Section 39.01(56) defines "parent" in pertinent part as "a woman who gives birth to a child and a man whose consent to the adoption of the child would be required under s.…
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A.R. v. Department of Children & Families 2D20-2477-2 · 2nd DCA 2022
Order striking a biological sibling's filings and sibling-visitation motion was reversed because due process required notice and a hearing on whether her participation served the child's best interests.
…notice of all proceedings and hearings under that chapter be provided to certain identified persons and "all other parties and participants"); see also § 39.01(57), (58) (defining party and participant); Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.235(a) (providing for the filing of motions by a party). 6 …
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A.R. v. Department of Children & Families 2D20-2477 · 2nd DCA 2021
Order striking a sibling's filings seeking sibling visitation reversed because due process required notice and a hearing on whether her participation served the child's interests.
…a person must be either a participant or a party. The record is clear that A.R. does not qualify under the statutory definition of a party found in section 39.01(58), Florida 2 See § 39.502(17) (requiring reasonable notice of all proceedings and hearings under that chapter be provided to certain identified persons…
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W.B.A. v. v. Department of Children & Families 229 So. 3d 850 · 3D16-1448 · 3rd DCA 2016
Summary denial of four orphaned immigrant children's dependency petition affirmed under binding precedent; concurrence urges Supreme Court review and dissent would require an evidentiary hearing.
…twins M.V.A.V. and F.A.A.V. (each age 15 at that time), and J.E.A.V. (age seven at that time), petitioned for an adjudication of dependency under section 39.01(15)(e), Florida Statutes (2016). The petition was summarily denied “based on case law” following a brief non-evidentiary hearing.1 I would reverse and…
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Department of Children & Families v. Y.C. 82 So. 3d 1139 · 3D11-1899 · 3rd DCA 2012
· cited by 5 in all courts
Certiorari granted; the order forcing DCF to provide a case plan was invalid because it rested on a mother's default on her own dependency petition.
…to the point, a valid dependency determination rests on a finding by the *1143 court of one or more of the conditions enumerated in section 39.01(15), Florida Statutes (2010). 9 We reject the premise that the statutory obligation of a court to find that a child is dependent and make findings…
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State v. Nowlin 50 So. 3d 79 · 1D10-0172 · 1st DCA 2010
· cited by 4 in all courts
…in section 827.01(1) “does not encompass the seventeen (17) year old Defendant in this case.” Without articulating a reason, the court looked to section 39.01(47), Florida Statutes (2009), which for purposes of chapter 39 defines *82 “other person responsible for a child’s welfare” to include “an adult sitter ...…
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M.F. v. Department of Children & Families 975 So. 2d 622 · 4D07-3741 · 4th DCA 2008
· cited by 4 in all courts
Dependency adjudication reversed because DCF did not prove the father knew of the mother's drug use or that his own drug use endangered the children.
…failure to protect the children from the mother; and (3) the children are presently at risk of imminent neglect based upon the father's own drug use. See § 39.01(14)(a), (f), Fla. Stat. (2007); § 39.01(43), Fla. Stat. (2007). The department has the burden of proving that the children are dependent by a preponderance of the…
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M.M. v. Department of Children & Families 946 So. 2d 1287 · 4D06-1758 · 4th DCA 2007
· cited by 1 in all courts
Dependency reversed because domestic violence occurred outside the child's presence, the mother kept the father away, and evidence of his mental illness was scant.
…Mother had taken with regard to the referrals. Solely on Mother's and Richards' testimony, the trial court found the child dependent pursuant to sections 39.01(30) and 39.01(45), Florida Statutes (2005), based upon (1) the domestic violence incident in the garage; (2) the fact that Mother failed to appear for trial in…
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T.S. v. Department of Children & Families 935 So. 2d 626 · 1D06-0393 · 1st DCA 2006
· cited by 4 in all courts
Dependency affirmed: the mother knew her boyfriend, a prior child molester, repeatedly touched her daughter's breast area yet failed to protect her.
…includes a child who is found by the trial court "[t]o have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child's parent or parents or legal custodians" under § 39.01(14)(a), Florida Statutes (2005); or "[t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians." §…
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J.B. v. Department of Children & Families 928 So. 2d 392 · 1D05-3387 · 1st DCA 2006
· cited by 5 in all courts
Dependency reversed because small amounts of drugs in the home, without chronic severe use or demonstrated harm, did not show abuse, neglect or imminent risk.
…either: (1) abused, abandoned, or neglected by the parents; or (2) at imminent risk of being abused, abandoned, or neglected by the parents. See id. ; § 39.01(14)(a) & (f), Fla. Stat. (2004). Abuse An abused child is one who is subjected to "any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental,…
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R.S. v. Department of Children & Families 881 So. 2d 1130 · 4D03-4407 · 4th DCA 2004
· cited by 17 in all courts
Dependency reversed because parenting deficits, past drug use and anger problems did not show actual harm or substantial risk of imminent harm to the children.
…by a preponderance of the evidence that the child has been "abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child's parent or parents or legal custodians." § 39.01(14)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003). The court may also find a child to be dependent where the court finds the child "to be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment,…
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J.B.M. v. Department of Children & Families 870 So. 2d 946 · 1D03-2486 · 1st DCA 2004
· cited by 15 in all courts
Dependency reversed: the blood alcohol result lacked a proper records predicate, and the remaining evidence of drinking and 'beating' showed no harm to the child.
…abused, or neglected" by the parents, or a child who is found "[t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect" by the parents. See § 39.01(14)(a) & (f), Fla. Stat. (2002). Therefore, before we can affirm the trial court's adjudication of dependency, we *950 must either find: competent, substantial…
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B.C. v. Department of Children & Families 864 So. 2d 486 · 5D03-1680 · 5th DCA 2004
· cited by 18 in all courts
Written order must be conformed to the oral ruling withholding adjudication; dependency may rest on one parent, but a non-offending father gets placement absent danger.
…The written order stated that "[b]ased on the mother's consent, the Court finds the child(ren) to be dependent within the intent and meaning of Chapter 39.01(14)(a), Florida Statutes." Thus, the written order did not withhold adjudication of dependency, as had been agreed at the arraignment hearing. Where there is a…
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A.H. v. Department of Children & Family Services 846 So. 2d 636 · 2D02-1899 · 2nd DCA 2003
· cited by 4 in all courts
Dependency reversed because no competent evidence showed abandonment or abuse; the mother visited, called, supported the children living with grandparents, and used only ordinary discipline.
…law, and whether the trial court’s ruling is supported by competent, substantial evidence. See In re M.F., 770 So.2d 1189 , 1192 (Fla.2000). Section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2001), defines “abandoned” as follows: a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or…
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DuFresne v. State 826 So. 2d 272 · SC01-246 · Florida Supreme Court 2002
· cited by 34 in all courts
…on Fuchs , held that the term "mental injury," as used in section 827.03(1)(b), is not unconstitutionally vague since the term is defined in section 39.01(44), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998). See id. at 894. The Fourth District, however, certified the above question as one of great public importance. [1] Id. at…
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B.D. v. Department of Children & Families 797 So. 2d 1261 · 1D00-4229 · 1st DCA 2001
· cited by 4 in all courts
Dependency based on the mother's mental illness remanded for clarifying findings because the judge's oral remarks conflicted with the written adjudication.
…a sufficient nexus between Appellant's mental-health problems and the danger of significant impairment of the child's physical, mental, or emotional health. § 39.01(2),(14)(a), (14)(f), & (46), Fla. Stat. (1999); E.M.A. v. Department of Children & Families, 795 So.2d 183 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (revised opinion); Richmond…
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K.R. v. Department of Children & Families 784 So. 2d 594 · 4D00-2740 · 4th DCA 2001
· cited by 4 in all courts
Dependency adjudication reversed because verbal arguments between the parents, with no injury or witnessed violence, did not show neglect or harm to the child.
…of dependency, the trial court found: The minor child, is at risk of emotional abuse by the natural father, [K.R.], as *597 defined in Florida Statutes 39.01(46) in that while the parents were together, [K.R.] did in part cause and allow to exist a great deal of tension in the home environment which placed the child's…
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J.C. v. Department of Children & Families 773 So. 2d 1220 · 4D00-2322 · 4th DCA 2000
· cited by 16 in all courts
Dependency reversed because belt spankings with no proof of significant bruises, disfigurement, or likely future harm did not establish abuse.
…disorder and did not testify. The trial court found, based on the spankings with the belt, that the children were being abused by the father under section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (1999) which provides: "Abuse" means any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that…
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In Interest of G.D.H. 498 So. 2d 676 · 1DBL-446 · 1st DCA 1986
· cited by 22 in all courts
…and A.J.S., were legally dependent. We hold that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding of abuse and neglect under sections 39.01(2) and 39.01(27), Florida Statutes (1985), and reverse the trial court's determination of dependency. We further find that the trial court erred in its failure…
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State v. D.H. 340 So. 2d 1163 · SC47298 · Florida Supreme Court 1976
· cited by 15 in all courts
…of committing a crime applies to delinquency proceedings. The answer depends upon a construction of the term "delinquent child" as defined by Section 39.01(12), Florida Statutes: "`Delinquent child' means a child who commits a violation of law, regardless of where the violation occurs, except a child *1165 who…
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John Doe 1 v. Archdiocese of Miami 3D21-1463 · 3rd DCA 2023
…on abuse: (7) FOR INTENTIONAL TORTS BASED ON ABUSE.—An action founded on alleged abuse, as defined in s. 39.01, s. 415.102, or s. 984.03, or 7 This legislation garnered unanimous support and was signed into law by the Governor on May 11, 2010. See Ch. 2010-54, Laws…
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R.S. v. Department of Children & Families 3D20-0116 · 3rd DCA 2020
Dependency adjudication affirmed: the infant had leg fractures indicating abuse that the parents, the sole caregivers, could not explain.
…order, the trial court, relying on the testimony of the multiple medical experts who treated the child, found the child dependent pursuant to section 39.01(15)(a) of the Florida Statutes. Specifically, the trial court found that both child abuse and medical neglect occurred. See § 39.01(2), (35), (47), (50), Fla.…
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W.D. v. Archdiocese of Miami, Inc. Archdiocese of Miami 197 So. 3d 584 · 4D15-550 · 4th DCA 2016
· cited by 11 in all courts
…abuse. We agree with the Archdiocese and school. Section 95.11(7), Florida Statutes, provides: An action founded on alleged abuse, as defined in s. 39.01, s. 415.102, or s. 984.03, or incest, as defined in s. 826.04, may be commenced at any time within 7 years after the age of majority, or…
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Department of Children & Families v. S.A.E. 184 So. 3d 615 · 1D15-3624 · 1st DCA 2016
· cited by 1 in all courts
Dependency adjudication reversed because the father's abandonment twelve years earlier in Honduras posed no present threat; avoiding deportation is not a basis for dependency.
…Department of Children and Families appeals the final order of which adjudicated A.A.A.-E. dependent, on the ground that the trial court misapplied section 39.01(15)(a), Florida Statutes, to the undisputed facts of the case. We agree with DCF and reverse the final order. This case commenced when A.A.A.-E.’s mother,…
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A.S. v. Department of Children & Families 162 So. 3d 335 · 4D14-3571 · 4th DCA 2015
· cited by 4 in all courts
Termination reversed: a prospective parent cannot abandon a child before paternity is established, his later visits showed regular contact, and least restrictive means was unproven.
…trial court entered an order terminating A.S.’s parental rights, finding the evidence was clear and convincing that A.S. abandoned J.A. as defined in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2014), and within the meaning of section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2014).3 The trial court further concluded that termination was the…
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E.R. v. Department of Children & Families 143 So. 3d 1131 · 4D14-885 · 4th DCA 2014
· cited by 5 in all courts
Dependency adjudication reversed because homelessness and unemployment, and mistreatment of another child eighteen months earlier, did not show imminent risk of neglect or harm.
…a child dependent if the child is at substantial risk of imminent harm or neglect “based on the conduct of one parent, both parents, or a legal custodian.” §§ 39.01(15)(f); 39.507(7)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). “Harm” to a child’s health or welfare occurs when the child suffers “physical, mental, or emotional injury.” …
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J.E. v. Department of Children & Families 126 So. 3d 424 · 4D13-1191 · 4th DCA 2013
· cited by 26 in all courts
Termination affirmed: the father abandoned the child through sporadic visits and nonpayment, and failed his case plan, never testing negative for marijuana.
…reference to the findings set out above, there is clear and convincing evidence that the father abandoned the child as contemplated by sections 39.806(l)(b) and 39.01(1), Florida Statutes. 2 “Marginal efforts and incidental or token visits or communications are not sufficient to establish or maintain a substantial and…
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In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases—Report No. 2012-09 122 So. 3d 263 · SC12-2595 · Florida Supreme Court 2013
· cited by 13 in all courts
…you should find [him][her] guilty, if all of the elements of the charge have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Definitions, give as applicable. § 39.01(2), Florida Statutes? “Abuse” means any willful-acb or threatened act that results in- any-physical, mental, or sexual-injury abuse, injury, or harm that…
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S.T. v. Department of Children & Family Services 87 So. 3d 827 · 2D11-4544 · 2nd DCA 2012
· cited by 4 in all courts
Dependency adjudication as to the mother reversed because no competent evidence showed she would fail to protect the children from the father's drinking.
…allocation of the entire balance to the wife in equitably distributing this marital liability was an abuse of discretion). VI. Applicable Law Section 39.01(15)(f), Florida Statutes (2010), requires a dependency adjudication if the circuit court finds the children to be “at substantial risk of imminent abuse,…
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D.M. v. Department of Children & Family Services 62 So. 3d 1261 · 3D11-37 · 3rd DCA 2011
Dependency adjudication affirmed based on prospective harm from the mother's abuse of a half-sibling, with remand only to correct the order's mistaken reference to neglect.
…at significant risk of harm based on the mother’s physical abuse of D.O. and the previous dependency adjudication of D.O. for that harm. See § 39.01(15)(f), (32), Fla. Stat. (2009). At the hearing, the mother’s physical and emotional harm of D.O, the previous adjudication of dependency for that harm, and the…
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L.K. v. Department of Children & Families 62 So. 3d 1241 · 4D10-5124 · 4th DCA 2011
· cited by 2 in all courts
Abandonment termination reversed because the court excluded evidence of the incarcerated mother's case plan efforts, which bear on her intent.
… On April 30, 2010, the Department filed a petition for termination of parental rights. The Department alleged abandonment, pursuant to section 39.01(1) of the Florida Statutes, as its only ground for termination as to L.K. L.K. argued the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of her compliance with her…
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Mahmood v. Mahmood 15 So. 3d 1 · 4D08-4743 · 4th DCA 2009
· cited by 3 in all courts
…a presumption of detriment is that a parent “[h]as been the subject of a report to the child abuse hotline alleging sexual abuse of any child as defined in s. 39.01.” § 39.0139(3)(a)1, Fla. Stat. (2008). In this case, the wife contends that her report to a *4 hotline 1 triggered the presumption…
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L.P. v. Department of Children & Family Services 962 So. 2d 980 · 3D07-140 · 3rd DCA 2007
· cited by 4 in all courts
Adjudication reversed because the mother's cocaine use during pregnancy, without proof of harm or a nexus to neglect, did not show prospective neglect.
SHEPHERD, J. This is an appeal from an order adjudicating L.P.’s three children dependent as to her on the ground of prospective neglect under section 39.01(14)(f) of the Florida Statutes. The substance of the testimony on which L.P. was adjudicated was cocaine use during the last trimester of her third pregnancy and…
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E.K. v. Department of Children & Families 948 So. 2d 54 · 3D05-599 · 3rd DCA 2007
· cited by 5 in all courts
Dependency reversed because DCF failed to prove the father failed to protect the newborn from the mother's drug use or abandoned her.
…change by DCF in its legal and factual theories to achieve that result. Apparently concerned about the viability of its petition as filed, see section 39.01(12), Florida Statutes (2004) ("`[c]hild' or `youth' means any *56 unmarried person under the age of 18 years who has not been emancipated by order of the…
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L.M. v. Department of Children & Families 946 So. 2d 42 · 4D06-1968 · 4th DCA 2006
· cited by 4 in all courts
Dependency affirmed on evidence of the mother's mental illness, drugs, and squalid home; trial without the incompetent mother was allowed to protect the children's permanency.
…that adversely affected the children's care, exposed the children to illegal drugs in the home, and kept her home in a deplorable condition. Under section 39.01, Florida Statutes, the definition of a dependent child includes one who has been abandoned, abused, or neglected by his or her parents, custodians, or…
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In re K.B. 937 So. 2d 709 · 2D05-4612 · 2nd DCA 2006
· cited by 12 in all courts
Dependency reversed: one domestic violence incident witnessed by the children, with the parents now separated and no later incidents, showed no present threat of harm.
…abused, or neglected by his or her parents or one who is "at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents." § 39.01(14)(a), (f), Fla. Stat. (2004). "Abuse" is defined as "any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental or sexual injury or harm." § 39.01(2).…
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M.E. v. Department of Children & Families 919 So. 2d 637 · 3D05-197 · 3rd DCA 2006
· cited by 2 in all courts
Termination reversed: DCF stopped the cognitively impaired mother's therapy for seven months, and the record did not show further services would be futile.
…abandonment, or neglect; and 3) section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), which provides that the parent has abandoned the child as defined in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2004), if the parent, while being able, makes no provision for the support of the child and no effort to communicate with the child. [4] …
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F.L.M. v. Department of Children & Families 912 So. 2d 1264 · 4D04-3163 · 4th DCA 2005
· cited by 14 in all courts
Orphaned minor with no legal custodian was dependent, no Attorney General consent was needed, and the court must enter a nunc pro tunc dependency order.
…is part of the general background. Later in the petition, petitioner alleges that "the minor child is dependent within the intent and meaning of [section] 39.01, Florida Statutes." The trial court held a final hearing on the petition on November 13, 2003. At trial, evidence established that the boy was 17 years old,…
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A.A. v. Department of Children & Families 908 So. 2d 585 · 5D04-3674 · 5th DCA 2005
· cited by 13 in all courts
Dependency reversed because corporal discipline by the brother caused no significant bruises or disfigurement, so evidence of excessive discipline was lacking.
…mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired." § 39.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2004). The trial court found C.M. was abused because "the mother allowed corporal punishment to be administered on him at the hands of his…
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R.M. v. Department of Children & Families 886 So. 2d 329 · 5D03-3855 · 5th DCA 2004
· cited by 6 in all courts
Dependency adjudication affirmed because the father's violent propensity toward the mother posed a substantial risk of imminent harm to the child.
…swollen lip. Under chapter 39, a dependent child is one who has been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child's parent or parents or legal custodians. § 39.01(14)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002). A dependent *331 child is also one who is "at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or…
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S.H. v. Department of Children & Families 880 So. 2d 1279 · 4D04-293 · 4th DCA 2004
· cited by 6 in all courts
Denial of a teenager's dependency petition, sought for immigration status, affirmed because parents sending him to live with his uncle was not abandonment.
…has arisen before and will reoccur. Logan v. State, 846 So.2d 472 (Fla.2003). Abandonment, which is a ground for a finding of dependency under section 39.01(14), Florida Statutes (2003) is defined under section 39.01(1): “Abandoned” means a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the…
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B.C. v. Department of Children & Families 846 So. 2d 1273 · 4D02-3949 · 4th DCA 2003
· cited by 31 in all courts
Dependency reversed: domestic violence in the child's presence was too remote, and no evidence showed harm or imminent prospective harm from the father's substance use.
…abused, or neglected by his or her parents or one who is "at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents." § 39.01(14)(a), (f), Fla. Stat. (2002). "Abuse" is defined as "any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes…
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State v. Figarola 788 So. 2d 1109 · 3D00-1371 · 3rd DCA 2001
· cited by 2 in all courts
…us. The legislature has recognized three different levels of excessive corporal punishment of a child. The first is civil child *1111 abuse under section 39.01, Florida Statutes (1999). Abuse is defined in section 39.01(2) as "any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or…
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D.D. v. Department of Children & Families 773 So. 2d 615 · 5D00-1305 · 5th DCA 2000
· cited by 30 in all courts
Dependency adjudication affirmed: the child witnessing the father's abuse of the mother supported prospective neglect, and expert testimony was not required.
…(Fla. 2nd DCA 2000). An adjudication must be upheld if the trial court's findings of fact are supported by competent substantial evidence. Id. Section 39.01(46) of the Florida Statutes (1999) defines neglect for purposes of dependency proceedings as follows: 39.01 Definitions.When used in this chapter, unless the…
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In re M.F. 770 So. 2d 1189 · SC96883 · Florida Supreme Court 2000
· cited by 87 in all courts
Dependency upheld: a sex offense against one child does not alone prove siblings dependent, but the father's long imprisonment and other circumstances sufficed.
…this chapter, is found by the court: . . . . (f) To be at substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect by the parent or parents or the custodian. § 39.01, Fla. Stat. (1997) (emphasis added). "Abuse" and "neglect" are defined as follows: (2) "Abuse" means any willful act that results in any physical, mental,…
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A.S. v. State 667 So. 2d 994 · 3D94-3022 · 3rd DCA 1996
· cited by 1 in all courts
…was still very much in control of A.S. and had indeed imposed certain restrictions on A.S.'s activities in the aftermath of this incident. [2] Subsection 39.01(61), Florida Statutes (1993) (amended and renumbered 1994, see § 39.01(59), Fla.Stat. (1995)) defines "restrictiveness level" as "the level of custody provided…
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A.S. v. State 667 So. 2d 994 · DCA94-3022 · District Court of Appeal 1996
· cited by 30 in all courts
…was still very much in control of A.S. and had indeed imposed certain restrictions on A.S.'s activities in the aftermath of this incident. . Subsection 39.01(61), Florida Statutes (1993) (amended and renumbered 1994, see § 39.01(59), Fla.Stat. (1995)) defines "restrictiveness level” as "the level of custody provided…
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In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W. 658 So. 2d 961 · SC84819 · Florida Supreme Court 1995
· cited by 97 in all courts
…child. Id. at 744 (emphasis added). When this Court decided Doe, chapter 63 did not include a definition of abandonment. The Court looked to section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (1985), which defined abandonment *966 in juvenile proceedings. The definition in chapter 39 did not discuss a father's prebirth conduct,…
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G.W.B. v. J.S.W. 658 So. 2d 961 · SC84819-2 · Florida Supreme Court 1995
· cited by 12 in all courts
…child. Id. at 744 (emphasis added). When this Court decided Doe, chapter 63 did not include a definition of abandonment. The Court looked to section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (1985), which defined abandonment *966 in juvenile proceedings. The definition in chapter 39 did not discuss a father’s prebirth conduct,…
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Clock v. Clock 649 So. 2d 312 · 3D93-2399 · 3rd DCA 1995
· cited by 11 in all courts
…should therefore have been dismissed. We agree. A dependent child is one who has been abandoned, abused, or neglected by his parents or custodians. Sec. 39.01(10)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993); Hardy v. Department of H.R.S., 568 So.2d 1314, 1316 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Based upon the conclusions in support of the order of…
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Baby E.A.W. v. J.S.W. 647 So. 2d 918 · 4D93-3040 · 4th DCA 1994
…entitled "Proceedings related to juveniles," dealing with termination of parental rights. The problem with the statutory definition set forth in subsection 39.01(1), and subsequently engrafted by the legislature into subsection 63.032(14), is that the primary definition clearly envisions circumstances where the parent has…
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G.W.B. v. J.S.W. 647 So. 2d 918 · DCA93-3040 · District Court of Appeal 1994
…entitled “Proceedings related to juveniles,” dealing with termination of parental rights. The problem with the statutory definition set forth in subsection 39.01(1), and subsequently engrafted by the legislature into subsection 63.032(14), is that the primary definition clearly envisions circumstances where the parent has…
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B.H. v. State 645 So. 2d 987 · SC82361 · Florida Supreme Court 1994
· cited by 74 in all courts
…the individual child. Restrictiveness levels must be established by [HRS] *990 by rule, provided however that there shall be no more than eight levels. § 39.01(61), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990). In D.P., the First District concluded that these provisions improperly delegate legislative authority to HRS, in effect, to…
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Interest of V.C.F. v. State 569 So. 2d 1364 · DCA90-1404 · District Court of Appeal 1990
· cited by 4 in all courts
…officials.” V.C.F. then entered a plea of nolo contendere, specifically reserving her right to appeal the lower court’s denial of this motion. Section 39.01(51), Florida Statutes (1989), defines the term “taken into custody” for purposes of that chapter to mean “the status of a child immediately when temporary…
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State v. M.T.S. 408 So. 2d 662 · 3D81-325 · 3rd DCA 1981
…alleging as a basis for the dependency adjudication that the child was: (a) abandoned; (b) abused; or (c) neglected as those terms are defined by Section 39.01, Florida Statutes (1979). The initial hearing was continued because the mother was hospitalized due to her mental condition. At the second hearing, the…
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State v. M.T.S. 408 So. 2d 662 · DCA81-325 · District Court of Appeal 1981
· cited by 4 in all courts
…alleging as a basis for the dependency adjudication that the child was: (a) abandoned; (b) abused; or (c) neglected as those terms are defined by Section 39.01, Florida Statutes (1979). The initial hearing was continued because the mother was hospitalized due to her mental condition. At the second hearing, the…
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State v. In the Interest of C.B.K. 362 So. 2d 354 · 1DHH-300 · 1st DCA 1978
· cited by 3 in all courts
…of jurisdiction from the County Court to the Circuit Court in the case sub judice. ****** The Court having considered the aforesaid [Florida Statutes §§ 39.01(25); 39.02; 316.625, 316.045 (renumbered 316.630); 322.16; 322.39] and in addition thereto having considered the District Court Of Appeal, First District, Case…
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State ex rel. Watson v. Rogers 86 So. 2d 645 · CL1134057 · Florida Supreme Court 1956
· cited by 10 in all courts
…under any age specified by the Legislature" are involved, the legislature would have the power to classify them (minors) as dependent or delinquent. F.S. § 39.01(10), F.S.A., defines dependent child as one "who, for any reason, is destitute, homeless, dependent upon the public for support, or has not proper parental…
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M.M. v. Department of Children & Families 5D2026-0461 · 5th DCA 2026
Dependency adjudication affirmed because the serious domestic violence and the children's statements supported abuse or substantial risk of abuse; one judge dissented on evidence.
…petition for dependency arguing protection of the children was necessary in part because they had been abused, abandoned, or neglected as defined in section 39.01(15)(a), Florida Statutes (2025), and were at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect as contemplated by section 39.01(15)(f). In a thorough…
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Mojica v. State 3D2023-0911 · 3rd DCA 2026
…added in 2012. See Ch. 2012-155, § 9, Laws of Fla. Prior to the 2012 amendments, courts relied on the definition of “mental injury” set forth in section 39.01, Florida Statutes. See Zerbe v. State, 944 So. 2d 1189, 1193 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (relying on definition of “mental injury” in section 39.01, Florida…
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A.B. v. Department of Children & Families 3D2024-2320 · 3rd DCA 2026
Termination affirmed because the father, who delayed stepping forward, rarely visited and paid support once, abandoned the child; best interests and least restrictive means met.
…seeks to reverse the amended final judgment terminating his parental rights to the child (“C.B.”) on grounds of abandonment, pursuant to sections 39.01(1) and 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2023). We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). We affirm. BACKGROUND …
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Guardian ad Litem Program v. L.W. 5D2024-3420 · 5th DCA 2025
Order denying shelter reversed with directions to grant it; a child born during the mother's open dependency case without substantial compliance establishes probable cause.
… substantially complied with the case plan towards successful reunification or met the conditions for return of the children into the home. § 39.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2024). Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.305(b)(3) provides that “[t]he issue of probable cause must be determined in a nonadversarial…
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Guardian ad Litem Program v. S.S. 2D23-2529 · 2nd DCA 2024
Certiorari granted and order quashed because prospective adoptive parents are only participants, not parties, and cannot intervene as parties in a dependency case.
…for continuance, explaining that while GAL was not opposed to a brief continuance, the Prospective Parents were not a party to the action under section 39.01(58), Florida Statutes (2023), and thus lacked standing to motion the court. On July 26, 2023, the trial court granted GAL's motion to strike and continued the…
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Guardian ad Litem Program v. S.S. 2D2023-2529 · 2nd DCA 2024
Certiorari granted and the order quashed because prospective adoptive parents are participants, not parties, and the court wrongly let them intervene as parties.
…for continuance, explaining that while GAL was not opposed to a brief continuance, the Prospective Parents were not a party to the action under section 39.01(58), Florida Statutes (2023), and thus lacked standing to motion the court. On July 26, 2023, the trial court granted GAL's motion to strike and continued the…
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M.K. v. Department of Children & Families 4D2023-1044 · 4th DCA 2023
Denial of party status and intervention to a foster mother affirmed; her termination petition did not make her a party, and juvenile rules bar intervention.
… M.K. argues that she was entitled to party status in the pending dependency action by virtue of filing a TPR petition, making her a party pursuant to section 39.01(58), Florida Statutes (2022), and Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.210(a). Adoption Entity and GAL argue that M.K. did not become a party petitioner in the…
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Department of Children & Families v. J.J. 5D23-0655 · 5th DCA 2023
Denial of dependency reversed: judge refused to weigh child witnesses' credibility, required actual harm, and appeared partial; new hearing before a different judge.
…its investigation, DCF filed a shelter petition seeking to shelter the Children. It also filed Petitions for Dependency for the Children pursuant to section 39.01(14)(a), (e), and (f), Florida Statutes. The allegations included: domestic violence in the Children’s presence, excessive alcohol use, housing instability,…
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Department of Children & Families v. D.H.C. 5D23-0896 · 5th DCA 2023
Denial of shelter reversed because a newborn born during open sibling dependency cases, with return conditions unmet, is in imminent danger by statute.
… complied with the case plan towards successful reunification or met the conditions for return of the children into the home. § 39.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2022) (emphasis added). Based upon the clear and plain language 4 of section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes, the open dependency cases for…
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C.D.F. v. D.R. 2D21-0652 · 2nd DCA 2022
Dismissal of the permanent guardians' Chapter 63 termination petition was reversed because the dependency court's retained jurisdiction did not oust the domestic relations division.
…internal operation of the court system and the assignment of judges to various divisions does not limit a particular judge's jurisdiction."); see also § 39.01(19), .013(2); § 63.032(8), .087(1). The domestic relations division correctly recognized that, generally, it had jurisdiction over chapter 63 TPR petitions. …
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C.J. v. Department of Children & Families 3D20-1298 · 3rd DCA 2021
Dependency affirmed because the volatile, violent relationship between the parents created an unstable environment risking neglect of the infant.
…I.J. (“Child”), dependent. We affirm. The Father contends that the trial court reversibly erred when it found the Child dependent under sections 39.01(15)(a) or (f), Florida Statutes (2020), arguing that the Department failed to establish that the Child was neglected or at imminent risk of neglect as defined in…
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A.D. v. Department of Children & Families 3D19-1732 · 3rd DCA 2020
Dependency of the youngest child reversed: decade-old abuse of siblings and their missed medication showed no nexus to imminent risk to him.
…or legal custodians; . . . (f) [t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians[.]” § 39.01(15), Fla. Stat. The statute defines “abuse” as “any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual abuse, injury, or harm that…
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Department of Children & Families v. F.A.P. 4D19-2997 · 4th DCA 2020
After denying termination, the court had to consider dependency; remanded to adjudicate the child dependent given the parents' concession and the child's fractures.
…judgment, and the record supports a finding of dependency as evidenced by the child’s two fractures as well as the parents’ delay in seeking treatment. See § 39.01(15)(a), Fla. Stat. (defining a dependent child as one who has been abandoned, abused, or neglected); § 39.01(2) Fla. Stat. (defining abuse as including an act that…
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K.E. v. Department of Children & Families 2D19-1191 · 2nd DCA 2019
Dependency adjudication on remand reversed with instructions to dismiss because speculation about who injured the infant and stale minor lapses did not prove dependency.
…their -2- request and, without hearing any new evidence, adjudicated the Child dependent under sections 39.01(15)(a) and (f), Florida Statutes (2018), which define a dependent child as one who was abandoned, abused, or neglected or who is at substantial risk of…
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E.T. v. Department of Children & Families 268 So. 3d 821 · 2D18-2537 · 2nd DCA 2019
· cited by 1 in all courts
Findings that the father abused, abandoned and neglected the children affirmed, but disposition and case plan reversed for lack of notice and a separate hearing.
…the children dependent and finds that he engaged in conduct constituting abuse, abandonment, and neglect of the children within the meaning of section 39.01(15)(a), Florida Statutes (2017). We affirm the order without further comment insofar as it makes findings that the Father engaged in conduct that constitutes…
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C.H. v. Department of Children & Families 246 So. 3d 556 · 3D18-0291 · 3rd DCA 2018
Dependency reversed because leaving the child with an aunt who had a resolved prior DCF case, plus a gun discharge, showed no substantial imminent risk.
…in June 2017, DCF filed a verified petition for dependency, alleging, in part, as follows: (1) the mother abandoned L.W., as defined in section 39.01(1); and (2) L.W. is “at a substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect” based, in part, on the mother’s alleged use of illegal drugs and the…
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M.C. v. Department of Children & Families 206 So. 3d 798 · 3D16-1114 · 3rd DCA 2016
On remand after termination reversal, dependency affirmed for the child with untreated severe injuries but reversed for the sibling because neglect evidence was scant.
…presented in our prior opinion. On remand, without considering further evidence, the trial court adjudicated the children dependent under sections 39.01(41) and 39.01(44) of the Florida Statutes. We affirm the adjudication as to E.C., but reverse the adjudication as to G.C. We begin by noting that the…
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Department of Children & Families v. B.G. 192 So. 3d 1256 · 4D15-4793 · 4th DCA 2016
Dismissal of dependency petition reversed because a positive drug test at birth constitutes harm and states a prima facie case of dependency.
…Appellant’s dependency petition stated a prima facie case of dependency by alleging that the child tested positive for a controlled substance at birth. See § 39.01(2), (30)(g), Fla. Stat. (2015). Count II of the petition alleged, among other things, an imminent threat of abuse. A “substantial risk of imminent abuse” is…
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In re E.P.N. 180 So. 3d 249 · DCA15-0579 · District Court of Appeal 2015
Summary denial of an immigrant teen's private dependency petition affirmed per curiam under circuit precedent; a dissent would have remanded for individualized consideration.
…while B.R.C.M. was released to his godmother in Miami. E.P.N.’s petition alleged that she was abandoned by her father and thus dependent under section 39.01(15)(a), Florida Statutes (2015). She also alleged abuse by her mother and father within the past two years, when her parents left her with a relative who beat and…
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Graham v. State 169 So. 3d 123 · 3D13-0561 · 3rd DCA 2015
· cited by 2 in all courts
…order for Rilya that awarded Pamela non-relative, temporary custody of Rilya. In effect, Pamela and DCF became co-custodians of Rilya and Rodricka. See §§ 39.01(59), 39.521(1)(b)3., Fla. Stat. (2000). Pamela and Geralyn Graham agreed that, between the two of them, Geralyn Graham would care for Rilya and Rodricka…
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In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases—Report No. 2014-02 152 So. 3d 475 · SC14-364 · Florida Supreme Court 2014
· cited by 5 in all courts
… - 10 - Parental affirmative defense. Give if applicable. See Raford v. State, 828 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 2002). See § 39.01(49), Florida Statutes, if the defendant’s status as a parent is at issue. § 827.03 Fla. Stat. and case law are silent as to (1) which party bears…
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N.J. v. Department of Children & Families 143 So. 3d 1109 · 2D13-4877 · 2nd DCA 2014
· cited by 1 in all courts
Adjudication reversed: the only abuse opinion rested on the doctor's credibility doubts, not medical probability, and could not establish abuse over an accidental fall.
… -3- substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect." C.M. v. Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 997 So. 2d 513, 514-15 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); see also §§ 39.01(15)(a),(f), .507(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2013)). We give great deference to the trial court's findings of fact and its superior opportunity to judge the credibility of…
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W.R. v. Department of Children & Families 137 So. 3d 1078 · 4D13-3508 · 4th DCA 2014
Dependency affirmed as to the abused daughter but reversed as to the son: no harm to him and no findings on imminent risk.
…physical [or] mental ... injury, or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired.” § 39.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2013). “Harm” is defined as occurring “when any person ... [i]nflicts ... upon the child physical, mental, or emotional injury.” § 39.01(32)(a),…
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In re Amend. to the Fla. Family Law Forms 59 So. 3d 792 · SC08-2058 · Florida Supreme Court 2010
… ________________ _____ ______ _______________________________ 2. Verified allegations of child abuse or neglect as defined in sections 39.01(2) or (45), Florida Statutes, ( ) HAVE ( ) HAVE NOT been made in this case. 3. The matters before the Court regarding the minor child(ren) are ( )…
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In re J.B. 40 So. 3d 917 · 2D10-1195 · 2nd DCA 2010
Dependency adjudication affirmed on prospective neglect because evidence tied the mother's chronic marijuana use and anger problems to a substantial risk to the child.
…v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 9 So.3d 750, 754 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). The instant dependency determination was based on prospective neglect, § 39.01(15)(f), Fla. Stat. (2009), the circuit court finding that J.B. was "at grave, imminent risk of harm" and that the harm was highly predictable based on the mother's…
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R.M. v. Department of Children & Family Services 40 So. 3d 917 · 2D10-1195-2 · 2nd DCA 2010
· cited by 3 in all courts
Dependency adjudication affirmed on prospective neglect because evidence tied the mother's chronic marijuana use and anger problems to a substantial risk to the child.
…v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 9 So.3d 750, 754 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). The instant dependency determination was based on prospective neglect, § 39.01(15)(f), Fla. Stat. (2009), the circuit court finding that J.B. was “at grave, imminent risk of harm” and that the harm was highly predictable based on the mother’s…
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N.E.R. v. Department of Children & Family Services 11 So. 3d 1013 · 2D08-3563 · 2nd DCA 2009
· cited by 1 in all courts
Dependency finding with withheld adjudication, and the related treatment court order, reversed because DCF proved no abuse, neglect, imminent risk or harmful substance use.
…2000). The Mother argues, and the Department concedes, that the Department failed to prove abuse, abandonment or neglect, or imminent risk thereof. See § 39.01(14)(a), (f), Fla. Stat. (2007). The record supports the Department’s concession and that, it failed to prove the Mother’s “[cjontinued chronic and severe use of a…
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CW v. Department of Children & Families 10 So. 3d 136 · 1D08-1866 · 1st DCA 2009
· cited by 5 in all courts
Dependency adjudication reversed because nothing showed the three-month-old child was aware of or harmed by the parents' domestic violence incident or faced a current threat.
…dependent child is one who has been abused by *138 either or both parents, or who is at “substantial risk of imminent abuse” by the parents. § 39.01(14)(a), (f), Fla. Stat. (2007). An “abused” child is one who is subjected to “any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual…
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K.G. v. Department of Children & Families 10 So. 3d 166 · 3D08-2795 · 3rd DCA 2009
· cited by 1 in all courts
Termination affirmed because the mother failed to comply with three successive case plans and abandoned her newborn; a concurrence rested on abandonment alone.
…by the trial court. Affirmed. COPE, J. (specially concurring). I concur in affirming the judgment on the basis of "[a]bandonment as defined in s. 39.01(1), [Fla. Stat. (2007)] ...." § 39.806(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007). The evidence supports that part of the "abandoned" definition which states, "If the efforts of…
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Garrett v. State 978 So. 2d 214 · 5D07-1301 · 5th DCA 2008
· cited by 1 in all courts
…means asphyxiation, suffocation, or drowning." Ms. Garrett argues that it was fundamental error for the court to use that definition borrowed from section 39.01(30)(a)(4)e., Florida Statutes (2004). [1] We reject this contention. Section *216 39.01(30)(a)(4) should be read in pari materia with section 827.03(1) and is…
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C.M. v. Department of Children & Families 953 So. 2d 547 · 1D05-5351 · 1st DCA 2007
· cited by 13 in all courts
Termination affirmed, but commitment for adoption was remanded so the court can consider the paternal aunt as adoptive placement after her home study.
…requirements of the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act, effective July 1, 2006. See, e.g., Chap. 2006-86, §§ 1 & 19, Laws of Fla. (adding language in §§ 39.01(51) & 39.621(2), Fla. Stat. (2006), redefining "permanency goals" under this chapter and stating a preference for "[r]eunification" followed by, in descending…
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In re Adoption of Baby A. 944 So. 2d 380 · 2D05-3614 · 2nd DCA 2006
· cited by 6 in all courts
…has no definition of "mother" or "father." Rather, section 63.032(12) states that the word "parent" as used in chapter 63 "has the same meaning ascribed in s. 39.01." Section 39.01(49), Florida Statutes (2004), defines parent as follows: "Parent" means a woman who gives birth to a child and a man whose consent to the…
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State v. Christie 939 So. 2d 1078 · 3D04-1214 · 3rd DCA 2005
· cited by 2 in all courts
…she was not a section 827.03(3) "caregiver" or "other person responsible for a child's welfare" if that section was read in pari materia with section 39.01(47), Florida Statutes (2003). [1] The State responded that the Chapter 39 definition of "other person responsible for a child's welfare" did not need to be…
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In re C.S. 892 So. 2d 1155 · 2D04-1432 · 2nd DCA 2005
· cited by 1 in all courts
Dependency adjudication reversed because the father's weak contact did not amount to abandonment and no harm from past drug use was proved.
…children were "sporadic." Sometime before the hearing he began paying $24 per week to the paternal grandfather for child support arrearages he owed. Section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2003) defines abandonment as: [A] situation in which the parent ..., while being able, makes no provision for the child's support and…
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W.V. v. Department of Children & Families 840 So. 2d 430 · 5D02-1589 · 5th DCA 2003
· cited by 1 in all courts
Dependency adjudication affirmed because evidence of domestic violence in the child's presence and neglect of the child's dental care supported abuse and neglect findings.
…act that results in injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired. § 39.01(2), Fla. Stat. "Harm" includes engaging in violent behavior that demonstrates a wanton disregard for the presence of the child, section 39.01(30)(I), Florida…
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A.D. v. Department of Children & Families 837 So. 2d 1078 · 5D02-1068 · 5th DCA 2003
· cited by 6 in all courts
Dependency adjudication affirmed because evidence of the father's nonsupport, violence and ejecting the mother and child on a cold night supported neglect and abuse findings.
…& Families, Wildwood, for Appellee. *1079 THOMPSON, C.J. A.D., the father, appeals an order adjudicating his child dependent. We affirm. Section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes, defines "abuse" as: [A]ny willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is…
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Raford v. State 828 So. 2d 1012 · SC01-379 · Florida Supreme Court 2002
· cited by 23 in all courts
…39 that designates certain types of excessive corporal punishment as civil child abuse. Ch. 98-403, § 20, Laws of Fla. The definition of "abuse" in section 39.01(2) was amended to read: "Abuse" means any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely…
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C.D. v. Department of Children & Families 816 So. 2d 1229 · 5D01-1873 · 5th DCA 2002
· cited by 3 in all courts
Dependency of an infant affirmed because his teen mother, herself in foster care without income, could not care for him; a dissent saw only poverty.
…was sporadic and insufficient to allow the mother to support the child if she were not in foster care. Apart from prospective neglect, pursuant to section 39.01(14)(e), Florida Statutes (2001), a child can also be dependent if the child is found “to have no parent or legal custodians capable of providing supervision and…
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Department of Children & Families v. G.M. 816 So. 2d 830 · 5D02-1118 · 5th DCA 2002
Certiorari granted: surgery is not ordinary medical care, so DCF needs a court order before consenting to surgery for a dependent child.
…needed because, under the relevant statutes, DCF, as the legal custodian, is already authorized to consent to the surgery on L.B.'s behalf. Under section 39.01(70), Florida Statutes (2001), DCF has "the right ... to provide the child with ... ordinary medical... care ...." (emphasis added.) Further, section 39.407(13)…
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Department of Children & Family Services v. G.M. 816 So. 2d 830 · 5D02-1118-2 · 5th DCA 2002
· cited by 2 in all courts
Certiorari granted: surgery is not ordinary medical care, so DCF needs a court order before consenting to surgery for a dependent child.
…needed because, under the relevant statutes, DCF, as the legal custodian, is already authorized to consent to the surgery on L.B.’s behalf. Under section 39.01(70), Florida Statutes (2001), DCF has “the right ... to provide the child with ... ordinary medical ... care .... ” (emphasis added.) Further, section…
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D.P. v. Department of Children & Families 786 So. 2d 600 · 5D00-1290 · 5th DCA 2001
· cited by 1 in all courts
Denial of intervention affirmed because a step-grandparent is not a statutory relative, though the court said he should have been allowed participant status.
…paternity testing established that D.P.’s son was not the child’s father. After removal, D.P. filed a motion seeking participant status as defined in section 39.01(50) of the Florida Statutes (2000), a motion seeking visitation, and a motion to intervene as a party in the dependency proceeding. The motions were all denied.…
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In re Z.J.S. 787 So. 2d 875 · 2D00-545 · 2nd DCA 2001
Termination reversed because the case plan ground requires a reunification-goal plan, which was never offered; the cousins' placement appeal was dismissed as moot.
…his resumption of parenting responsibilities beginning in 1998 might well have precluded a finding of abandonment notwithstanding his earlier lapses. See § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat. (1999); In the Interest of M.R.L., 608 So.2d 548 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). See also M.S. v. D.C., 763 So.2d 1051 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…
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Smith v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 665 So. 2d 1153 · 5D94-2262 · 5th DCA 1996
· cited by 3 in all courts
…that results in any physical, mental or sexual injury that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental or emotional health to be impaired." § 39.01(2), Fla. Stat. (1993). A child may be found to be dependent because of "abuse" under several circumstances. §§ 39.01(10)(a)-(e), Fla. Stat. (1993). They include…
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C.J. v. Rolle 608 So. 2d 117 · DCA92-1169 · District Court of Appeal 1992
· cited by 3 in all courts
…detention. 2 C.J. asserts that subsection 2(d)3 does not authorize his detention. Relying on the definition of the term “disposition hearing,” in section 39.01(21), Florida Statutes (1991), 3 C.J. maintains that “awaiting final disposition” means the juvenile is awaiting the equivalent of sentencing following…
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A.A. v. State 605 So. 2d 106 · 1D92-315 · 1st DCA 1992
…in this case is appellant's challenge to the constitutionality of section 39.061, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990). We reverse. We recently held sections 39.061 and 39.01(61), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990), unconstitutional as an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to an administrative agency. D.P. v. State, 597 So.2d…
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D.P. v. State 597 So. 2d 952 · 1D91-2030 · 1st DCA 1992
… *954 escape within the intent and meaning of s. 944.40 and is a felony of the third degree. The term "restrictiveness level" is defined in Section 39.01(61), as follows: "Restrictiveness level" means the identification of broad custody categories for committed children, including nonresidential, residential, and…
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In the Interest of D.P. v. State 597 So. 2d 952 · DCA91-2030 · District Court of Appeal 1992
· cited by 53 in all courts
…*954 tutes escape within the intent and meaning of s. 944.40 and is a felony of the third degree. The term “restrictiveness level” is defined in Section 39.01(61), as follows: “Restrictiveness level” means the identification of broad custody categories for committed children, including nonresidential, residential, and…
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Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. State 599 So. 2d 123 · 5D91-2269TO91-2273 · 5th DCA 1992
· cited by 6 in all courts
… *127 a juvenile might be placed in detention based either on an allegation, or a finding, of contempt. § 39.032(5)(c), Fla. Stat. (1989). Compare § 39.01(9), Fla. Stat. (1989). The new contempt provision, section 39.044(10), Florida Statutes (1991) expressly provides that detention is appropriate for contempt, but…
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State v. F.T.H. 579 So. 2d 911 · 5D90-2138 · 5th DCA 1991
· cited by 3 in all courts
…occurred on April 19. Appellee’s contention that the encounter between ap-pellee and Officer Farrell constituted a “taking into custody” comes from section 39.01(51), Florida Statutes: “Taken into custody” means the status of a child immediately when temporary physical control over the child is attained by a person…
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In Interest of D.D. 564 So. 2d 1224 · 4D89-1942 · 4th DCA 1990
· cited by 8 in all courts
…of the serious juvenile habitual offender statute because its criteria were based merely on arrests. Finding that appellant met the criteria of section 39.01(46), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988), the trial court committed him under the terms of the program. This appeal followed. The dispositive question is whether…
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In re J.H. 535 So. 2d 669 · DCA88-1966 · District Court of Appeal 1988
· cited by 2 in all courts
…(Fla.1982). To adjudicate a child dependent, the court must find that the child has been abandoned, abused, or neglected by his parents or other custodians. § 39.01(9)(a). See also, § 39.01(1), (2), (27). As the mother contends and HRS concedes, the court did not find any of the foregoing contingencies and, therefore, it was…
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I.T. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 532 So. 2d 1085 · 3D87-2082 · 3rd DCA 1988
· cited by 20 in all courts
… rev. denied, 419 So.2d 1200 (Fla. 1982). An adjudication of dependency must be based upon a showing of abuse, abandonment, or neglect. Id. Section 39.01(27), Florida Statutes (1985), defines neglect as occurring when the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or legal custodian, the…
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T.S. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 471 So. 2d 543 · 1DBA-215 · 1st DCA 1985
· cited by 8 in all courts
…that appellant had abandoned or neglected T.S., nor did it set forth findings of fact which would constitute abandonment or neglect as defined in Sections 39.01(1) and 39.01(27), Florida Statutes (1983). [1] Furthermore, the final judgment merely implies that appellant failed to comply substantially with the performance…
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T.S. v. State 464 So. 2d 677 · 5D84-552 · 5th DCA 1985
…agreements and that the mother's small number of visits with the child in the foster home was sufficient evidence of abandonment as defined in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes. The trial court accepted the HRS argument and found that T.S. was a neglected child by virtue of the original adjudication; that the mother…
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In the Interest of T.S. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 464 So. 2d 677 · DCA84-552 · District Court of Appeal 1985
· cited by 14 in all courts
…agreements and that the mother’s small number of visits with the child in the foster home was sufficient evidence of abandonment as defined in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes. The trial court accepted the HRS argument and found that T.S. was a neglected child by virtue of the original adjudication; that the mother…
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In Interest of A.B. 444 So. 2d 981 · 1DAQ-331 · 1st DCA 1983
· cited by 20 in all courts
…attention, that finding is absent. To the extent that meeting those needs requires financial resources, Mrs. Brown must be found "financially able," § 39.01(26), through public assistance or otherwise, if her neglect of the child is to be predicated on her likely failure to meet those needs. A finding of neglect and…
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A.O. v. State 433 So. 2d 22 · 3D82-869 · 3rd DCA 1983
…of his dependency, R.M.P. v. Jones, 419 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1982), he contends that he may not be adjudicated delinquent. It is true that Section 39.01(9), Florida Statutes (1981) provides that truancy is a basis for a finding of dependency and Section 39.01(8), Florida Statutes (1981) does not describe it as a…
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A.O. v. State 433 So. 2d 22 · DCA82-869 · District Court of Appeal 1983
· cited by 5 in all courts
…of his dependency, R.M.P. v. Jones, 419 So.2d 618 (Fla.1982), he contends that he may not be adjudicated delinquent. It is true that Section 39.01(9), Florida Statutes (1981) provides that truancy is a basis for a finding of dependency and Section 39.01(8), Florida Statutes (1981) does not describe it as a…
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In Interest of J.L.P. 416 So. 2d 1250 · 4D81-1033 · 4th DCA 1982
· cited by 47 in all courts
…be prospective, and because she never had custody of the child, she could not have legally neglected him. We disagree. We also think abuse under section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980), [1] may be established prospectively. Section 39.41(1)(f) 1 a, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980), provides: When any child is…
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Wright v. State 409 So. 2d 1183 · 4D81-383 · 4th DCA 1982
· cited by 3 in all courts
… *1184 HERSEY, Judge. The natural mother appeals an order of the circuit court finding her minor child to be a dependent of the state pursuant to Section 39.01(9)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980). No useful purpose would be served by setting out the extensive history upon which the court's finding was based nor are the…
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P.A.C. v. State 391 So. 2d 364 · DCATT-149 · District Court of Appeal 1980
…to other portions of the enactment as well as to administrative usage prior and subsequent to the act. The legislative act creating § 39.112 also amended § 39.01(10), Florida Statutes, defining “community control” as a program “in lieu of commitment to the custody of the department in a training school, halfway house or…
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In Interest of D.A.H. 390 So. 2d 379 · 5D79-122/T4-372 · 5th DCA 1980
· cited by 15 in all courts
…He found the children to be abandoned and neglected "... as those terms are defined by F.S. section 39.11(1)(d) [(2)(d)] [sic] (1977) and F.S. section 39.01(1) and (2) [(27)] [sic] (1978)... ." Whatever the 1978 amendment does to the requirement for findings of abandonment or neglect in permanent commitment cases,…
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In Interest of J.F. 384 So. 2d 713 · 3D79-1223 · 3rd DCA 1980
· cited by 8 in all courts
…mother contends that the court should have applied Section 39.41(1)(d) Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978) and the definition of "abandoned" contained in Section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978) which became effective October 1, 1978. The appellant argues that by utilizing the former provisions of Section 39.11(1)(d),…
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L.C. v. Department of Children & Families 1D2025-3337 · 1st DCA 2026
Termination affirmed because the incarcerated father never wrote to or spoke with the children despite materials provided, supporting abandonment.
…by competent, substantial evidence. Section 39.806 lists the grounds for termination. Sub- subsection (1)(b) states that abandonment “as defined by s. 39.01(1)” is grounds for termination of parental rights. § 39.806(1)(b), Fla. Stat. Section 39.01(1), Florida Statues, defines “abandonment” as “a situation in which…
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S.C.T.A. v. Department of Children & Families 3D2026-0791 · 3rd DCA 2026
Motions to dismiss denied; the grandmother's appeal of the denial of her adoption review is not moot and she may appeal despite the finalized adoption.
…See Fla. Admin. Code R. 65C-16.002(5)(c) (eff. June 10, 2025) (“Relative. Consideration must be given to whether an applicant is a relative as defined in s. 39.01, F.S.”); § 39.01(76), Fla. Stat. (2025) (the term “relative” includes grandparents). 3 In November 2025,…
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Department of Children & Families v. K.W. 5D2025-0755 · 5th DCA 2025
Denial of dependency affirmed as to the mother but reversed and remanded as to the father for findings on his alleged failure to protect.
…the trial court to 3 make factual findings on the allegation that Father failed to protect the children pursuant to section 39.01(37)(j), Florida Statutes. In all other respects we affirm. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED. MAKAR and MACIVER, JJ., concur. Not final…
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B.D. v. C.D. 4D2024-1355-2 · 4th DCA 2025
Dismissal of grandparents' guardianship petitions affirmed because the ongoing dependency custody order takes precedence and grandparents have no due process right to custody.
…orders violated due process because the grandparents had no opportunity to be heard. As to the grandparents’ due process claim, we first note section 39.01(60), Florida Statutes (2024), allows the actual custodians of children (here, the grandparents) to be designated as “participants” in the dependency proceeding,…
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B.D. v. C.D. 4D2024-1493-2 · 4th DCA 2025
Dismissal of grandparents' guardianship petitions affirmed because the ongoing dependency custody order takes precedence and grandparents have no due process right to custody.
…orders violated due process because the grandparents had no opportunity to be heard. As to the grandparents’ due process claim, we first note section 39.01(60), Florida Statutes (2024), allows the actual custodians of children (here, the grandparents) to be designated as “participants” in the dependency proceeding,…
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O.M. v. Department of Children & Families 4D2023-3046 · 4th DCA 2024
Dependency adjudication reversed because DCF did not prove the father knew of the mother's drug use or that his own drug use harmed the child.
…been “abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child’s parent or parents,” or the child is “at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect.” § 39.01(14)(a), (f), Fla. Stat. (2023). To the extent “the evidence is conflicting or turns on credibility of the witnesses, all credence and presumption of correctness…
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J.F. v. Department of Children & Families 6D2024-0105 · 6th DCA 2024
Finding that the father contributed to dependency reversed; 'risk of abuse' is the wrong standard and old corporal discipline did not show substantial imminent risk.
…or neglected the child or engaged in conduct that placed the child at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect”), with § 39.01(14), Fla. Stat. (defining dependent child as, inter alia, “(a) . . . abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child’s parent” or “(f) . . . at substantial risk of…
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Department of Children & Families v. R.V. 5D23-1537 · 5th DCA 2023
Dismissal at the close of DCF's case reversed because evidence of the mother's drug abuse made a prima facie case of prospective abuse.
…review of the adjudicatory hearing transcript, we agree with the appellants that DCF presented prima facie evidence of prospective abuse under sections 39.01(2), 39.01(34)(g)2., and 39.507(7), Florida Statutes (2022). The uncontroverted evidence presented by DCF showed the following. This is the second time…
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B.W. v. Department of Children & Families 3D21-2409 · 3rd DCA 2023
Dependency adjudication reversed because there was no evidence the child was harmed by or aware of domestic incidents or faced imminent risk.
…substantial evidence the child was “abandoned, abused, or neglected,” or at “substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect” by the mother. § 39.01(14)(a), (f), Fla. Stat. (2021); see also C.W., 10 So. 3d at 138–39 (reversing trial court’s finding of dependency of three- month-old child where record contained…
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C.P. v. Department of Children & Families 4D21-0465 · 4th DCA 2021
Termination affirmed on abandonment because the incarcerated father made no effort to contact the children; the threat and case plan grounds were reversed.
…contribution to the child’s care and maintenance or has failed to establish or maintain a substantial and positive relationship with the child, or both.” § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2020). To “establish or maintain a substantial and positive relationship with the child” a parent must make “frequent and regular contact with…
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C.H., Sr. v. in the Adoption of: N.K. 2D20-1990 · 2nd DCA 2021
Dismissal of a grandfather's adoption petition affirmed because it was premature and filed in the wrong division, though he had standing to refile.
…and the emergency motion. In each of these motions to strike, the GALP argued that the Grandfather was not a party to the proceedings, citing section 39.01(58), Florida Statutes (2019), and Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure 8.210(a) and 8.235(a). The GALP also contended that the Grandfather could not "be made a…
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L.C. v. Department of Children & Families 3D19-1786 · 3rd DCA 2020
Order requiring a substance abuse evaluation in the case plan reversed for an evidentiary hearing because good cause was not shown on unsubstantiated allegations.
…and medical neglect. Specifically, the Mother consented to the findings in the Adjudication Order that the “children are dependent pursuant to Section 39.01(15)(a) and (f) and 39.01(50) in that the Mother failed to provide stable housing for the Children and did not comply with non-judicial intervention. The Children,…
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M.S. v. Department of Children & Families 2D19-1989 · 2nd DCA 2019
Dependency reversed as to the father because DCF showed no link between his delusional episode and likely future harm to the children.
… The definition of a dependent child includes a child who is "at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents." § 39.01(15)(f). Abuse is defined in part as "any willful act or threatened act that . . . is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be…
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Department of Children & Families v. S.M. 2D19-0459 · 2nd DCA 2019
Denial of shelter was reversed as a final appealable order; the judge wrongly required sexual motive, and probable cause of sexual abuse existed.
…mental, or sexual abuse, injury, or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired." § 39.01(2). Sexual abuse of a child is defined as "[t]he intentional touching of the genitals or intimate parts, including the breasts, genital area, groin, inner…
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Q.L. v. Department of Children & Families 4D19-0526 · 4th DCA 2019
Termination reversed because the mother completed all services and findings of ongoing domestic violence and housing instability were unsupported or stale.
…to the extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon the child's remaining with or being returned to the child’s parent.” § 39.01(77), Fla. Stat. (2016). The “circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan” include problems identified subsequent to the initial removal. C.B. v.…
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J.C. v. Department of Children & Families 264 So. 3d 973 · 4D18-2218 · 4th DCA 2019
· cited by 2 in all courts
Termination affirmed on incarceration because her fifteen-year sentence spans the children's minority; the abandonment finding was struck since she kept regular phone contact.
…alleged two statutory grounds for termination. First, pursuant to section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2017), it alleged abandonment as defined in section 39.01(1), in that the mother made no significant contribution to the children’s care and maintenance, or failed to establish or maintain a substantial and positive…
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P.R. v. Department of Children & Families 260 So. 3d 376 · 5D18-2467 · 5th DCA 2018
Termination affirmed on several grounds; the abandonment finding was struck because the father attended most visits and called the children.
…by competent, substantial evidence. Section 39.806(1)(b) permits termination of parental rights based on abandonment, which is *377 defined in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2017), as "a situation in which the parent ..., while being able, has made no significant contribution to the child's care and maintenance…
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C.R. v. Department of Children & Families 253 So. 3d 97 · 3D18-0046 · 3rd DCA 2018
Termination reversed because the Department failed to prove case plan noncompliance on either alleged ground; the mother had made significant progress.
…of financial resources or to the failure of the [D]epartment to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parent and child.” § 39.806(1)(e)1. Section 39.01(78), Florida Statutes (2017)8, provides that “‘substantial compliance’ means that the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been …
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B.F. v. Department of Children & Families 237 So. 3d 390 · 4D17-2986 · 4th DCA 2018
· cited by 3 in all courts
Abandonment ground reversed because the Department did not prove the incarcerated father was able to support the child or lacked a relationship; termination otherwise affirmed.
…or extended incarceration of a parent, legal custodian, or caregiver responsible for a child’s welfare may support a finding of abandonment. § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) (emphasis added). “The qualifying phrase ‘while being able’ excludes involuntary abandonment.” T.S. ex rel. D.H. v. Dep’t of Children…
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J.R-P. v. Department of Children & Families 228 So. 3d 628 · 2DCASE2D16-5598 · 2nd DCA 2017
· cited by 2 in all courts
Order disestablishing the legal father's paternity affirmed; the biological father had standing to challenge paternity in the dependency case, with the child's best interest controlling.
…. . . Participants may be granted leave by the court to be heard without the necessity of filing a motion to intervene. § 39.01(50), Fla. Stat. (2013). The trial court granted O.R. participant status, determined that O.R. had standing to challenge paternity, and found that it was in…
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Guardian ad Litem Program v. C.H. 204 So. 3d 122 · 2D16-2200 · 2nd DCA 2016
· cited by 1 in all courts
Denial of dependency for two siblings reversed because the infant's unexplained rib fractures created a substantial risk of harm to identically situated siblings.
…the evidence that the child is abused, abandoned, or neglected or that the child is "at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect." See § 39.01(15)(a), (f), Fla. Stat. (2015). We review a dependency adjudication as a mixed question of law and fact and will affirm the trial court's findings if they are…
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V.L. v. Department of Children & Families 201 So. 3d 1288 · 2D16-1862 · 2nd DCA 2016
Dependency reversed because noncompliance with a case plan for older siblings, alone, did not show the child faced substantial risk of imminent harm.
…failed to present competent substantial evidence that N.L. was "at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect" by the father. See § 39.01(15)(f), Fla. Stat. (2015); see also § 39.01(2) (defining "abuse" as any willful act that results in any harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's…
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M.D. v. Department of Children & Families 187 So. 3d 1275 · 4D15-3858 · 4th DCA 2016
· cited by 10 in all courts
Termination affirmed for abandonment because the incarcerated father sent only two letters in two years, and the court found his contrary testimony not credible.
…Department”) petitioned for termination of each parent’s parental rights.1 The petition alleged that the Father abandoned the child as defined in section 39.01, Florida Statutes, in that he has failed to maintain a substantial and positive relationship with 1 A consent default was entered for the Mother, who is not…
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E.H. v. Department of Children & Families 147 So. 3d 616 · 4D14-551 · 4th DCA 2014
· cited by 3 in all courts
Dependency adjudication affirmed: the mother's untreated mood disorder, prior removal of another child, and ongoing domestic violence showed substantial risk of imminent abuse.
… This appeal followed. The mother argues no competent, substantial evidence existed to show that the child was “at substantial risk of imminent abuse.” § 39.01(15)(f), Fla. Stat. (2013). The Department responds competent, substantial evidence existed to show that the child was at substantial risk of imminent abuse based on…
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H.C. v. Department of Children & Family Services 141 So. 3d 243 · 3D14-348 · 3rd DCA 2014
Dependency adjudication reversed because no evidence showed the father inflicted or allowed the toddler's bruises and loop mark.
…appeals an order adjudicating his children, H.C.(l) and H.C.(2) (collectively, “the Children”), dependent based on a finding of “abuse” as defined in section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (2013). We reverse. In December 2013, the Department of Children and Family Services (“the Department”) filed a verified petition for…
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J.V. v. Department of Children & Family Services 99 So. 3d 578 · 2D12-1561 · 2nd DCA 2012
Dependency as to the father reversed because gang tattoos and past conduct did not clearly predict future abuse, given his current support and visitation.
…tattoos that the Father currently has” and that the evidence was “an insufficient predicate for the court’s finding of dependency.” We agree. “Under section 39.01(14)(f), a child may be found dependent if the court finds the child to be ‘at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or…
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A.J. v. Department of Children & Families 97 So. 3d 985 · 4D12-463 · 4th DCA 2012
· cited by 4 in all courts
Termination affirmed as to the sexually abused daughters but reversed as to the sons, for lack of evidence they were harmed or at risk.
…the daughters by digitally penetrating the daughters to check for sexual activity. Because there was sufficient evidence of sexual abuse as defined by section 39.01, Florida Statutes (2010), and evidence that, under the totality of the circumstances, all the girls were at substantial risk of significant harm, we affirm…
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Doe ex rel. Mother v. Sinrod 90 So. 3d 852 · 4D11-557 · 4th DCA 2012
· cited by 6 in all courts
…against Sinrod, who is not a party to this appeal, were intentional torts. Doe argues that because she was abused under the definition provided by section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes, 2 section 95.11(7) governs her claims. The School Board contends that a state agency can only be sued to the extent that sovereign…
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A.F. v. Department of Children & Family Services 86 So. 3d 1144 · 3D11-1784 · 3rd DCA 2012
· cited by 1 in all courts
Dependency adjudication reversed because the order did not specify the facts supporting the finding as rule 8.332(a) and section 39.507(6) require.
…if a child is found by the court “[t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians.” § 39.01(15)(f), Fla. Stat. (2011). The order in this case purports to find that D.F. was “neglected” within the meaning of section 39.01 of the Florida Statutes (2011).…
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G.U. v. Department of Children & Families 81 So. 3d 585 · 3D11-2557 · 3rd DCA 2012
Dependency adjudication affirmed because the mother's refusal to believe the children's abuse allegations or seek therapy emotionally harmed them and risked the father's return.
…and/or neglected pursuant to Florida Statute Chapter 39.” 1 We conclude there is competent, substantial evidence to support this finding under sections 39.01(15)(a) and (32)(f), Florida Statutes (2009). The mother admitted at the hearing that she does not believe her husband abused their daughters and does not believe…
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Department of Children & Families v. P.F. 107 So. 3d 1123 · 5D12-4296 · 5th DCA 2012
Certiorari granted: the court re-decided probable cause instead of applying the Keeping Children Safe Act presumption against a grandfather accused of sexual abuse.
…is created when ... a court of competent jurisdiction has found probable cause exists that a parent or caregiver has sexually abused a child as defined in 39.01.” The court correctly explained that in a KCSA hearing pursuant to section 39.0139, Florida Statutes, a person seeking contact must present clear and…
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In re A.M.M. 63 So. 3d 910 · 2D10-2646 · 2nd DCA 2011
· cited by 1 in all courts
…as defined in chapter 39." The grandmother's petition made no allegations that the mother abused or neglected the child, as those terms are defined in section 39.01(2) and (44), Florida Statutes (2009). Some of the petition's assertions might be read to mean that the mother abandoned the child. See § 39.01(1). But the…
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I.D. v. Department of Children & Families 13 So. 3d 1117 · 3D08-3307 · 3rd DCA 2009
· cited by 6 in all courts
Termination affirmed on egregious conduct and sexual abuse based on the child's credible testimony; the unsupported abandonment ground was struck.
…the father’s parental rights for engaging in egregious conduct, § 39.806(l)(f), sexual abuse pursuant to section 39.806(l)(g), as defined in section 39.01(67); aggravated child abuse, as defined in section 827.03, sexual battery or sexual abuse, as defined in section 39.01 or chronic abuse, § 39.806(l)(g); and for…
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In re D.J. 9 So. 3d 750 · 2D08-793 · 2nd DCA 2009
· cited by 14 in all courts
Dependency adjudication affirmed because the mother lacked training and equipment for the infant's medical needs; unpleaded medical neglect was tried by consent despite DCF's misconduct.
…for the trial court was whether D.J. was "at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians." § 39.01(14)(f) (defining what constitutes a dependent child). "`Neglect' occurs when a child is deprived of, or is allowed to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing,…
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T.G. v. Department of Children & Families 8 So. 3d 1198 · 4D08-2198 · 4th DCA 2009
· cited by 4 in all courts
Termination affirmed; the mother stopped visiting her children for over a year and her communication efforts were marginal, supporting abandonment.
…issue. Section 39.806(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2006), authorizes termination of parental rights for abandonment. “Abandonment” is defined in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2006). Under the statutory definition, a child is abandoned when the parent “while being able, makes no provision for the child’s support…
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In re G.C. 6 So. 3d 643 · 2D08-1409 · 2nd DCA 2009
Termination reversed: case plan noncompliance did not show continuing harm, and DCF proved neither a threat to the children nor that services would be futile.
…ha[d] completed his or her case plan." The court explained that to determine whether the parents were in "substantial compliance," as defined in section 39.01(71), it had to determine whether the problems which caused the case to be filed had been ameliorated. The circuit court found that the children were removed from…
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J.C. v. Department of Children & Family Services 6 So. 3d 643 · 2D08-1409-2 · 2nd DCA 2009
· cited by 8 in all courts
Termination reversed: the parents largely complied with their case plans, and the department did not prove domestic violence or mental illness threatened the children.
…ha[d] completed his or her case plan.” The court explained that to determine whether the parents were in “substantial compliance,” as defined in section 39.01(71), it had to determine whether the problems which caused the case to be filed had been ameliorated. The circuit court found that the children were removed from…
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Moore v. Pattin 983 So. 2d 663 · 4D07-4850 · 4th DCA 2008
· cited by 4 in all courts
…of a child by a parent or legal custodian for disciplinary purposes does not in itself constitute abuse when it does not result in harm to the child." § 39.01(2), Fla. Stat. Under the definition of harm, the legislature explained that corporal discipline is "excessively *665 harsh" if it "is likely to result in…
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In re D.G. 970 So. 2d 486 · 2D07-1969 · 2nd DCA 2007
· cited by 4 in all courts
Certiorari denied; the court properly ordered chemotherapy and radiation for the child despite short notice, and the mother's other arguments were unpreserved.
…we see no departure from the essential requirements of law, much less fundamental error. According to DCF, D.G. suffered from medical neglect. Section 39.01(31), Florida Statutes (2006), provides: "Harm" to a child's health or welfare can occur when any person: . . . . (f) Neglects the child. Within the context…
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J.W.H. v. Department of Children & Family Services 956 So. 2d 1210 · 2D06-3715 · 2nd DCA 2007
Dependency reversed because evidence of an underweight child did not show the parents neglected her food or medical care.
…2006, the Department filed a dependency petition alleging that the parents neglected J.H. by depriving her of necessary food and medical treatment. 2 See § 39.01(43), Fla. Stat. (2006). At the hearing on the petition in mid-June 2006, the Department presented the testimony of the second child protection investigator, who…
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T.P. v. Department of Children & Families 954 So. 2d 677 · 5D06-1562 · 5th DCA 2007
· cited by 1 in all courts
Dependency affirmed because the mother's excessive corporal discipline harmed the children; remanded only to clarify supervised versus unsupervised visitation.
…in A.A., the common law principle of reasonable corporal punishment has been incorporated into Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes. Specifically, section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (2005), provides, “Corporal discipline of a child by a parent or legal custodian for disciplinary purposes does not in itself constitute…
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S.G. v. Department of Children & Family Services 946 So. 2d 650 · 2D06-3136 · 2nd DCA 2007
· cited by 2 in all courts
Dependency reversed because the mother's relationship with a recently released felon did not cause the children's harm when he shot into her home.
…abused, or neglected by the child’s parent” or that the child is “at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent.” §§ 39.01(14)(a), (f); 39.507(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005). “ ‘Neglect’ occurs when a child is deprived of, or is allowed to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or…
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In Interest of K.V. 939 So. 2d 200 · 2D06-533 · 2nd DCA 2006
· cited by 9 in all courts
Dependency reversed because nothing showed the child knew of the alleged violence against the grandmother, was injured, or faced a current threat from the father.
…was present during the incident. The trial court found the Father and the grandmother's testimony to not be credible and adjudicated K.V. dependent. Section 39.01(14), Florida Statutes (2005), in pertinent part, provides: "Child who is found to be dependent" means a child who . . . is found by the court: (a) To have…
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Y.P. v. Department of Children & Family Services 939 So. 2d 1118 · 3D05-2099 · 3rd DCA 2006
· cited by 8 in all courts
Dependency adjudication affirmed because the father's violent outbursts and domestic violence in or near the children's presence put them at substantial risk of harm.
…appeal was affirmed by this Court. R.V. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 932 So.2d 205 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (table). [2] Pursuant to section 39.01(30)(i), Florida Statutes (2005), "harm" can occur when a parent "[e]ngages in violent behavior that demonstrates a wanton disregard for the presence of a child and…
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Morcroft v. J.H. 935 So. 2d 588 · 5D05-3102 · 5th DCA 2006
Dismissal of dependency against the father reversed: no expert is needed to show harm from witnessing a brutal attack on the mother.
…abandoned, abused or neglected by his or her parents or one who is “at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment or neglect by the parent or parents.” § 39.01 (14)(a)(f), Fla. Stat. (2005). “Abuse” is defined as “any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that…
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J.S. v. Department of Children & Families 933 So. 2d 1223 · 1D06-0224 · 1st DCA 2006
…or neglect for either parent; or, that the children’s life, safety, or health would be threatened by continued interaction with the mother. See §§ 39.01(1), 39.01(45), 39.806(l)(c), and 39.806(l)(e), Fla. Stat. (2005). The record also lacks competent, substantial evidence that the Department of Children and…
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Department of Children & Families v. H.G. 922 So. 2d 1072 · 5D05-119 · 5th DCA 2006
Section 57.105 fee award against DCF reversed because the aunt and uncle were mere participants, not parties, and so could not be prevailing parties.
…program. By order entered in late May, the court determined that the appellees were not parties, but merely participants to the proceeding under section 39.01(50), Florida Statutes (2002). H.G. and J.G. contend that they were required to attend several arraignments to allow DCF to file an amended petition, and to…
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S.J.C. v. State 906 So. 2d 1115 · 2D04-1714 · 2nd DCA 2005
· cited by 8 in all courts
…in conjunction with case law and dependency statutes acknowledging that corporal punishment by parents is lawful unless it crosses the line to abuse. § 39.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2003); Raford v. State, 828 So.2d 1012 (Fla.2002). It combines these two propositions to conclude that because a person may protect himself…
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J.L. v. Department of Children & Families 899 So. 2d 1254 · 4D04-3479 · 4th DCA 2005
· cited by 3 in all courts
Dependency affirmed because repeated belt beatings of a naked child, with stated intent to continue, showed excessive discipline and substantial risk of further abuse.
…dependency may be based upon evidence that the child is at a substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or legal custodian. § 39.01(14)(f), Fla. Stat. (2002). "Abuse" means any willful act or threatened act that results in physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to…
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P.P. v. Department of Children & Families 889 So. 2d 91 · 1D04-907 · 1st DCA 2004
· cited by 2 in all courts
Termination reversed because twelve months of noncompliance had not elapsed after removal, and nothing showed termination was the least restrictive means.
…of the [Appellants], [they have] continued to neglect, abuse and abandon the children for the past twelve months or more pursuant to § 39.806(1)(e) and § 39.01(1) and (45), Florida Statutes (2003)." Further, the court found that Appellants "abandoned [their] children within the meaning of § 39.806(1)(b) and § 39.01(1),…
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Nussbaumer v. State 882 So. 2d 1067 · 2D03-5573 · 2nd DCA 2004
· cited by 28 in all courts
…mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired." § 39.01(2). "Child" is defined as "any unmarried person under the age of 18 years who has not been emancipated by order of the court." § 39.01(12). Chapter 39 provides…
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C.B. v. Department of Children & Families 874 So. 2d 1246 · 4D03-4395 · 4th DCA 2004
· cited by 18 in all courts
Termination reversed: incarceration alone was not abandonment since the mother kept asking about the child, and the finding that services would be futile was speculation.
…August 3, 2000. She was released on December 23, 2003. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that DCF established abandonment, as defined in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (1999). The trial court also found that DCF established that the mother's continuing involvement with the child threatens the child's well…
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N.S. v. Department of Children & Families 857 So. 2d 1000 · 5D02-1571 · 5th DCA 2003
· cited by 4 in all courts
Dependency of the younger children reversed because a stepchild's abuse was not linked to risk to them; grandparents' participant status and case plan affirmed.
…grandparents were the legal guardians and actual custodians of M.M. and the younger children, they were "participants" in the proceedings pursuant to section 39.01(50), Florida Statutes (2001). [5] Under that section, a participant may be granted leave by the court to be heard without filing a motion to intervene. See also…
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J.B.P.F. v. Department of Children & Families 837 So. 2d 1108 · 4D01-5028 · 4th DCA 2003
· cited by 3 in all courts
Adjudication reversed because abuse of a troubled brother showed no nexus to risk for this child; remanded to consider domestic-violence exposure.
…the two." The court subsequently entered an order finding A.P. was at substantial risk of imminent abuse and neglect and adjudicated A.P. dependent. See § 39.01(14), Fla. Stat. (2001). The Mother fought the adjudication proceedings below, and continues to do so on appeal. Upon review of the record, it appears the lower…
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S.B. v. Department of Children & Family Services 835 So. 2d 381 · 2D02-2566 · 2nd DCA 2003
Termination reversed because the new case plan had not run twelve months; court also ordered review of the youngest child's dependency and doubted best interests.
…at least twelve months). On remand, we require the trial court to immediately address whether the youngest child, S.B., is a dependent child. *384 See § 39.01(14), Fla. Stat. (2002) (defining dependent child, in part, as one who was abandoned, abused, or neglected or is at substantial risk of imminent abuse,…
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In re E.B. 834 So. 2d 415 · 2D02-426 · 2nd DCA 2003
· cited by 6 in all courts
Dependency adjudication reversed because no evidence showed the child saw domestic violence, and frequent moves and missed support did not amount to neglect or abandonment.
…We reverse. A child may be found dependent if the child has been "abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child's parent or parents or legal custodians." § 39.01(14)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001). "[T]he trial court's findings as to abuse, abandonment, or neglect will be sustained if they are supported by competent substantial…
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F.R. v. Department of Children & Families 826 So. 2d 449 · 5D02-282 · 5th DCA 2002
· cited by 13 in all courts
Dependency affirmed; a pattern of domestic violence against the mother in the children's presence, even without injury, frightened them and supported a finding of abuse.
…placed them in the custody of the Department of Children and Family Services. [1] He argues there was insufficient evidence of "abuse" as defined by section 39.01(2) to support the trial court's finding that F.R. committed domestic violence against his wife, the children's mother, in the presence of the children and that…
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In re J.L. 824 So. 2d 1023 · 2D01-4793 · 2nd DCA 2002
· cited by 14 in all courts
Dependency order reversed because the father's own health problems, without evidence he would neglect the child, did not show imminent prospective neglect.
…who has been abandoned, abused, or neglected by his parents, or who is at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by his parents. See § 39.01(14)(a), (f), Fla. Stat. (2001). The trial court did not find that the father had actually abused, abandoned, or neglected J.L. Rather, the basis of the trial court's…
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D.E. v. Department of Children & Families 823 So. 2d 864 · 5D01-3105 · 5th DCA 2002
Termination of the father's rights affirmed without opinion over a partial dissent questioning best interests and the unconsidered grandmother placement.
…parental care, contact, concern, supervision and support. B. Pursuant to F.S. 39.806(l)(b), the parent(s) have abandoned the child as defined in F.S. 39.01(1) or the identity or location of the father is unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent search within sixty (60) days. C. Pursuant to F.S. 39.806(l)(c),…
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D. v. Department of Children & Family Services 820 So. 2d 980 · 4D01-1644 · 4th DCA 2002
· cited by 7 in all courts
Dependency of all three children affirmed over a dissent: unexplained anal trauma to the infant in an intact home justified adjudicating both parents and siblings.
…completed, and DNA analysis was done. They revealed nothing. Nevertheless, the injury to the anus itself would constitute harm within the meaning of section 39.01(30)(b), Florida Statutes (2000). Although the medical director of the Child Protection Team testified that there was a low risk of further abuse of this child, the…
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M.A. v. Department of Children & Families 814 So. 2d 1244 · 5D01-2545 · 5th DCA 2002
· cited by 8 in all courts
Termination affirmed on abandonment for sporadic visits and no support, though the case plan ground failed because the children were never adjudicated dependent as to him.
…because he did not willfully reject his parental obligations. Section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), allows TPR based on abandonment, as defined in s. 39.01(1). Section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2001), states: "Abandoned" means a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a…
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C.W. v. Department of Children & Families 814 So. 2d 488 · 1D01-1710 · 1st DCA 2002
· cited by 7 in all courts
Termination affirmed: prior sibling terminations and failure to protect a sibling from abuse supported it; counsel's consent to judge viewing videotapes waived objection.
…trial court explicitly found that C.W. and the father had "abandoned or neglected and have continued to abandon or neglect their children pursuant to Section 39.01(1) and (36), and Section 39.464(1)(f) and (c), Florida Statutes (1997)." Subsequently, C.W. pled nolo contendere and was adjudicated guilty of two counts of…
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J.R.S. v. Department of Children & Families 787 So. 2d 875 · 2D00-545-2 · 2nd DCA 2001
· cited by 12 in all courts
Termination reversed because the case plan ground requires a reunification-goal plan, which was never offered; the cousins' placement appeal was dismissed as moot.
…and V.R. lacked standing to appeal the order denying placement of the child with them after the termination because they were merely "participants.” See § 39.01(37), (38), Fla. Stat. (1999); Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.210(b). See also § 39.473, Fla. Stat. (1999). A review of the record, however, reveals the trial court…
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F.R. v. Department of Children & Families 763 So. 2d 478 · 5D99-1278 · 5th DCA 2000
· cited by 3 in all courts
Dependency with adjudication withheld affirmed: proof of a sibling's fatal abuse supported dependency while the child stayed with the mother under supervision.
… 613 So.2d 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Under Chapter 39, a child may be found dependent in a number of circumstances. There are two provisions of Section 39.01 that apply to this case: "Child who is found to be dependent" means a child who, pursuant to this chapter, is found by the court: *480 (a) To have been…
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State v. Fuchs 751 So. 2d 603 · 5D98-2508 · 5th DCA 1999
· cited by 7 in all courts
…Statutes, F.S.A., there is but one place in the statutes of this State where the words `delinquent child' are delimited. That is to be found in section 39.01, Florida Statutes ... Id. at 492 (emphasis added). The trial court held Section 828.19, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. unconstitutionally vague and…
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Brown v. Feaver 726 So. 2d 322 · 3D98-227 · 3rd DCA 1999
· cited by 7 in all courts
…does not constitute abuse, neglect, or abandonment unless the Department offers services to the homeless custodian and those services are rejected. See § 39.01, Fla. Stat. (1997); K.H. v. State, Department of HRS, 527 So.2d 230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). When services are offered and rejected by a homeless custodian,…
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A.G. v. Department of Children & Family Services 716 So. 2d 792 · 4D97-4231 · 4th DCA 1998
· cited by 4 in all courts
…court retains jurisdiction to order appropriate supervision, treatment and services as necessary. § 39.41, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994). Furthermore, section 39.01(21) defines a disposition hearing as one in which "the court determines the most appropriate dispositional services in the least restrictive available setting." §…
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Department of Children & Families v. A.A. 706 So. 2d 367 · 5D97-1086 · 5th DCA 1998
· cited by 4 in all courts
…of the child's attorney or state attorney must, stay all proceedings and order an evaluation of the child's mental condition. (Emphasis added). Subsection 39.01(75), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996) gives the terms *368 "violation of law" and "delinquent act" the same meaning, at least for the purposes of Chapter 39,…
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J.M. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 646 So. 2d 793 · DCA94-1163 · District Court of Appeal 1994
· cited by 1 in all courts
… Florida Statutes. B. The natural parents of [C.F.] have demonstrated abandonment, neglect, and prospective abuses and neglect, as defined in Section 39.01(1), (2), and (37), Florida Statutes. C. The natural parents of [C.F.] have demonstrated severe or continuing abuse or neglect as defined in Section…
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State v. C.S. 636 So. 2d 109 · DCA93-2274 · District Court of Appeal 1994
…19, 1993; the State appeals. The trial court erred in dismissing the petition. C.S. had not been “taken into custody” on May 4 within the meaning of section 39.01(51), Florida Statutes (1993). “Taken into custody means the status of a child immediately when temporary physical control over the child is attained by a person…
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J.Y. v. State 635 So. 2d 34 · 1D92-1381 · 1st DCA 1993
· cited by 1 in all courts
…to a state agency unguided discretion to define what the restrietiveness levels are from which an unauthorized departure may constitute a crime. See § 39.061 and 39.01(61), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1990). This same statutory scheme was in effect when J.Y. escaped and was adjudicated. 4 Although not mentioned in Judge Miner’s opinion…
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In re Petition of Florida Bar 589 So. 2d 818 · SC76669 · Florida Supreme Court 1991
· cited by 12 in all courts
…age at the time of the commission of the current offense and who was adjudicated and has been committed in this proceeding, meets the criteria in subsection 39.01(46), Florida Statutes, for serious or habitual juvenile offender placement in that said child was: ____ Adjudicated or had adjudication withheld on the…
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In the Interest of M.L. v. State 578 So. 2d 464 · DCA90-2566 · District Court of Appeal 1991
…activities or privileges; or other appropriate restraints on the child’s liberty. (Emphasis supplied.) “Community control” is defined in section 39.01(12), Florida Statutes (1989), as: ... the legal status of probation created by law and court order in cases involving a child who has been found to have…
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Fredrick v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 523 So. 2d 1164 · 5D87-172 · 5th DCA 1988
· cited by 10 in all courts
…an allegation that the mother allegedly failed to visit and support the child who was in foster care cannot support a finding of statutory neglect, section 39.01(30), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986). There is no showing that the mother was able to provide support, or that she had a legal duty to pay H.R.S. for custodial…
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Fitzpatrick v. State 515 So. 2d 319 · 3D86-942 · 3rd DCA 1987
· cited by 8 in all courts
…for dependency. From the petition itself, it is unclear whether HRS was proceeding on a theory of abandonment, abuse, or neglect as defined in sections 39.01(1), 39.01(2), 39.01(27), Florida Statutes (1985). The record also lacks the HRS report upon which the trial court based its conclusion. Without the benefit of…
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In Interest of B.W. 498 So. 2d 946 · SC68192 · Florida Supreme Court 1986
· cited by 22 in all courts
…manifestly in the best interests of the child to do so, and: a. If the court finds that the parent has abandoned, abused, or neglected the child. Section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (1983) defines abandonment as a situation in which a parent who, while being able, makes no provision for the child's support and makes…
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Wirsing v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 498 So. 2d 946 · SC68192-2 · Florida Supreme Court 1986
· cited by 3 in all courts
…manifestly in the best interests of the child to do so, and: a. If the court finds that the parent has abandoned, abused, or neglected the child. Section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (1983) defines abandonment as a situation in which a parent who, while being able, makes no provision for the child’s support and makes…
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In Interest of I.B.J. 497 So. 2d 1265 · 5D86-8 · 5th DCA 1986
· cited by 4 in all courts
…P.A., Orlando, for appellee. DAUKSCH, Judge. This is an appeal from the natural mother from an order finding her child dependent, as defined by section 39.01(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), and permanently committing the child to a licensed child-placing agency for the purpose of subsequent adoption. § 39.41(1)(f), Fla.…
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In re D.W.K. 492 So. 2d 1360 · 5DBJ-17 · 5th DCA 1986
· cited by 1 in all courts
…of what was required of him before he could be reunited with his child, but simply did not comply with those requirements. Abandonment within the meaning of § 39.01(1), Fla.Stat. was conclusively demonstrated. There is also overwhelming evidence in the record of the necessity for an immediate resolution of this case in order…
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Anderson v. Dept. of H & R. Services 482 So. 2d 491 · 1DBJ-285 · 1st DCA 1986
· cited by 6 in all courts
… Such standards for screening shall also ensure that the person has not been judicially determined to have committed abuse against a child as defined in s. 39.01(2) and (7) or to have a substantiated indicated report of abuse as defined in s. 415.503 or to have committed an act which constitutes domestic violence as…
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In the Interest of B.E.C. v. State 481 So. 2d 962 · DCABE-197 · District Court of Appeal 1986
…specific conditions causing the child’s truancy, and (4) investigations by designated school officials of the source of the child’s truancy. Sections 39.01(34)(a)-(d), and 232.19(3)(a), (b), Florida Statutes (1984 Supp.). Here, the uncontradicted testimony of appellants’ witness was that no person associated with the…
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J.H. v. State 480 So. 2d 680 · 1DBE-229 · 1st DCA 1985
…fulfill the terms of the agreement, HRS filed three separate petitions for dependency, alleging that appellant had neglected the children pursuant to section 39.01(26), Florida Statutes (1983) [1] . As grounds for the alleged neglect, each of the petitions stated the following: [T]he mother entered into a voluntary…
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In the Interest of J.H. v. State 480 So. 2d 680 · DCABE-229 · District Court of Appeal 1985
· cited by 9 in all courts
…fulfill the terms of the agreement, HRS filed three separate petitions for dependency, alleging that appellant had neglected the children pursuant to section 39.01(26), Florida Statutes (1983) 1 . As grounds for the alleged neglect, each of the petitions stated the following: [T]he mother entered into a voluntary…
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In re A.G.N. 460 So. 2d 498 · DCAAX-147 · District Court of Appeal 1984
· cited by 1 in all courts
…Christian Family Services, Inc., for subsequent adoption. The crux of the issue before us is whether A.G.N., Jr., is a dependent child as defined by section 39.01(9). Cognizant of the outstanding purposes of chapter 39, those being the preservation and strengthening of the child’s family ties, and the safeguarding of the…
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Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services ex rel. M.H. v. State 447 So. 2d 359 · 3DAV-237 · 3rd DCA 1984
· cited by 3 in all courts
…held that since certain acts (such as those committed by M.H.) are specifically designated as acts of dependency under Florida’s Juvenile Justice Act (Section 39.01(9)), they should be consistently treated as acts of dependency, not delinquency, the provisions of Section 39.01(8) notwithstanding. *361 In J.M.J., this…
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In Interest of C.M.H. 413 So. 2d 418 · 1DAE-88 · 1st DCA 1982
· cited by 22 in all courts
…of dependency filed on 2/23/76, alleging "said child's parents are unable to provide a stable home environment at this time" (Exhibit 3 in evidence). Section 39.01(10), F.S., 1975, defines a "dependent child" under subsection (c) as one who "has not proper parental support, maintenance, care or guardianship" and under…
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Office of the Public Defender of the Ninth Judicial Circuit v. Baker 371 So. 2d 684 · DCA78-2444 · District Court of Appeal 1979
· cited by 1 in all courts
…a hearing on the evidence, said child be adjudicated and be dealt with according to law. This charge is within the definitions contained in Section 39.01(9) of the 1978 Florida Juvenile Justice Act. The charge of dependency covers some acts which were formerly characterized as “ungovernable” under previous…
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F.B. v. State 319 So. 2d 77 · 1DX-39 · 1st DCA 1975
… supra, is equally applicable here. In that case the appellant based its statutory claim to exclusive authority on F.S. 39.11(2)(c), which incorporated F.S. 39.01(9). We there held that a careful reading of that provision, in context with the rest of the chapter, clearly reveals that it was the legislative intent to grant…
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F.B. v. State 319 So. 2d 77 · DCAX-39 · District Court of Appeal 1975
· cited by 7 in all courts
… supra, is equally applicable here. In that case the appellant based its statutory claim to exclusive authority on F.S. 39.-11(2) (c), which incorporated F.S. 39.01(9). We there held that a careful reading of that provision, in context with the rest of the chapter, clearly reveals that it was the legislative intent to grant…
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In re R.J.C. 300 So. 2d 54 · 1DU-338 · 1st DCA 1974
…be awarded custody? We answer both of these questions in the affirmative. As to the first issue, Chapter 73-231, Section 2, Laws of Florida, which amends § 39.01(10), Florida Statutes, defines a "dependent child", inter alia, as a child who "is surrendered to the division of family services or a licensed child placing…
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State ex rel. Hendricks v. Hunt 70 So. 2d 301 · CL1710911 · Florida Supreme Court 1954
· cited by 13 in all courts
…thereby to deal with dependent children "as defined in Chapter 415, Laws of Florida," section 3, Chapter 26880, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1951, F.S.A. § 39.01 note, specifically repealed that section of Chapter 415, namely section 415.01(1), Florida Statutes 1949, that defined the term "dependent children." Under…
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R.M. v. Department of Children & Families 5D2026-1081 · 5th DCA 2026
Termination for abandonment affirmed because the incarcerated father did not challenge the finding he made almost no effort; one judge dissented.
…being able, has made no contribution to the child’s care or has failed to establish or maintain a substantial and positive relationship with the child. See § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2025); In Interest of B.W., 498 So. 2d 946, 947–48 (Fla. 1986) (“Section 39.01(1) . . . does not provide for the termination of parental rights…
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Guardian ad Litem Program v. J.G. 5D2025-3210 · 5th DCA 2026
Denial of termination reversed as to the mother's egregious conduct and the father's abandonment and incarceration; remanded for best-interest and least-restrictive findings.
…to the child[ren]’s care and maintenance or failed to establish and maintain a substantial and positive relationship with the child[ren], or both.” § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat. Establishing or maintaining a substantial and positive relationship with his Children, “includes, but is not limited to, frequent and regular…
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B.D. v. C.D. 4D2024-1493 · 4th DCA 2025
Dismissal of grandparents' guardianship petitions affirmed because the dependency court's custody order took precedence, and grandparents, who never sought party status, had no due process right.
…Stat. (2024). Thus, dismissal of the guardianship petitions was proper. As to the grandparents’ claim they were denied due process, we first note section 39.01(60), Florida Statutes (2024), allows the actual custodians of children (i.e., the grandparents) to be designated as “participants” in the dependency proceeding,…
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B.D. v. C.D. 4D2024-1355 · 4th DCA 2025
Dismissal of grandparents' guardianship petitions affirmed because the dependency court's custody order took precedence, and grandparents, who never sought party status, had no due process right.
…Stat. (2024). Thus, dismissal of the guardianship petitions was proper. As to the grandparents’ claim they were denied due process, we first note section 39.01(60), Florida Statutes (2024), allows the actual custodians of children (i.e., the grandparents) to be designated as “participants” in the dependency proceeding,…
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S.B. v. Department of Children & Families 3D2024-1573 · 3rd DCA 2025
Adjudication of dependency affirmed; the court kept jurisdiction after ruling orally on rehearing, and an infant sibling's neglect-related death supported imminent risk to the children.
…moved for rehearing on July 30, 2024 on the ground that the order failed to contain sufficient findings of imminent harm, as required by section 39.01(15)(f), Florida Statutes. The trial court held a hearing on the Father’s motion for rehearing on August 1, 2024. At the hearing, the Mother joined the motion and…
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Department of Children & Families v. Foster Parents of K.J. 3D2024-1958 · 3rd DCA 2025
Order granting foster caregivers limited party status quashed; they lacked the section 39.522(3) presumption because the move would unite the child with a sibling.
…Fla. Stat.). We have jurisdiction. Turning to the merits, Chapter 39 excludes caregivers from party status, with limited exceptions. See, e.g., § 39.01(58), Fla. Stat. (2023).1 The limited exception at issue in this matter occurs in subsection (3) of section 39.522. Section 39.522 establishes processes for…
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K.M.G. v. Heart of Adoptions, Inc. 2D2023-2771 · 2nd DCA 2024
Order transferring placement to an adoption entity quashed because the court took no evidence on the child's best interests as section 63.082 requires.
…guide, and discipline the child and to provide him or her with food, shelter, education, and ordinary medical, dental, psychiatric, and psychological care." § 39.01(39); see § 63.032(11) (incorporating by reference the definition of legal custody from section 39.01). Indeed, the motion to intervene asked the court to modify…
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Guardian ad Litem Program v. Department of Children & Families 5D23-0279 · 5th DCA 2023
Certiorari granted in part: birth parents with a proper interest may see dependency records, but grandparents may not see records solely about the other child.
…records in case number 2019-DP- 168 regarding R.W. III. We find no error in this ruling. The paternal grandparents legally adopted R.W. III. Under section 39.01(56), Florida Statutes (2021), if a child is legally adopted, the term “parent” means the adoptive mother or father of the child. 2 Section 39.0132(3) names…
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Matos v. State 4D22-0775 · 4th DCA 2023
…forcing a child to: 1. Solicit for or engage in prostitution; . . . or 3. Participate in the trade of human trafficking as provided in s. 787.06(3)(g).” See § 39.01(77)(g), Fla. Stat. (2018). 1 Moreover, section 787.06 provides a definition for exploitation, by the examples of human trafficking that are prohibited in…
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K.N. v. Department of Children & Families 4D22-2273 · 4th DCA 2023
Denial of intervention to former foster parents affirmed since they were only participants; their appeal of the placement change was dismissed for lack of standing.
…of filing a motion to intervene and shall have no other rights of a party except as provided by law. Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.210 (emphasis added); see also § 39.01(57), (58), Fla. Stat. (2022). With respect to post-disposition changes of custody, Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.345 was amended to conform to section…
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Department of Children & Families v. S.T. 5D22-0536 · 5th DCA 2022
Certiorari granted and order quashed because a paternal aunt and grandfather are not parties under the statute and rule and cannot intervene as parties.
…department, and the guardian ad litem or the representative of the guardian ad litem program, when the program has been appointed." Additionally, section 39.01(58), Florida Statutes (2021), defines the term "party" as "the parent or parents of the child, the petitioner, the department, the guardian ad litem or…
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T.R.-B. v. Department of Children & Families 3D21-1716 · 3rd DCA 2022
Denial of the grandmother's motion to intervene reversed; as long-time caregiver seeking adoption she had a direct interest and needed party status.
…the parent(s) of the child, the department, and the guardian ad litem . . . when the program has been appointed.” Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.210(a); see also § 39.01(58), Fla. Stat. (2021). Participants are defined as “any person who is not a party but who should receive notice of hearings involving the child.” Fla. R. Juv.…
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M.K. v. Department of Children & Families 4D20-1930 · 4th DCA 2021
Termination affirmed; the rule 8.235(c) sworn motion to dismiss does not apply to termination petitions, and evidence showed case plan noncompliance.
…remedied[.]’” Q.L. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 280 So. 3d 2 107, 116 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (quoting § 39.01(77), Fla. Stat. (2016)).1 Applying that definition, the court’s determination that appellant failed to comply with his case plan is amply supported by the…
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A.W. v. Department of Children & Families 3D19-0748 · 3rd DCA 2020
Adjudication of dependency affirmed because competent substantial evidence showed a substantial risk of neglect; the unsupported substance-misuse finding must be removed on remand.
…of adjudication of dependency and determination that the mother, A.W., has exposed the children to a substantial risk of imminent neglect, see sections 39.01(15)(f) and 39.01(50), Florida Statutes (2016), by her failure to provide a proper and safe home environment for her children and failure to comply with…
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L.J. v. Department of Children & Families 273 So. 3d 1123 · 3D18-2026 · 3rd DCA 2019
· cited by 1 in all courts
Dependency affirmed on neglect because the homeless mother twice refused shelter services, though the mental health and substance abuse findings were unsupported.
…law, a child is dependent if the child is found “to have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child’s parent or parents or legal custodians.” § 39.01(15), Fla. Stat. (2017). “Neglect,” in turn, encompasses a child who “is deprived of, or is allowed to be deprived of . . . shelter . . . .” § 39.01(50), Fla.…
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W.K. v. Department of Children & Families 230 So. 3d 905 · 4D17-1549 · 4th DCA 2017
· cited by 4 in all courts
Foster parents lacked standing to appeal; transfer of the child to the mother's chosen adoptive parents affirmed as supported by the best-interest factors.
…or the appropriate state agency as provided by law.” The foster parents were not parties to the proceedings below, but rather were simply participants. See § 39.01(51), (52), Fla. Stat. (2017). See also C.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 981 So. 2d 1272, 1272 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); D.C. v. J.M., 133 So. 3d 1080, 1081-82…
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W.K. v. Department of Children & Families 4D17-1549-2 · 4th DCA 2017
Foster parents lacked standing to appeal; transfer of the child to the mother's chosen adoptive parents affirmed as supported by the best-interest factors.
…or the appropriate state agency as provided by law.” The foster parents were not parties to the proceedings below, but rather were simply participants. See § 39.01(51), (52), Fla. Stat. (2017). See also C.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 981 So. 2d 1272, 1272 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); D.C. v. J.M., 133 So. 3d 1080, 1081-82…
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T.H. v. Department of Children & Families 226 So. 3d 915 · 4D17-1217AND4D17-1218 · 4th DCA 2017
· cited by 2 in all courts
Termination reversed as to the younger child because the pleaded case plan ground was invalid, but affirmed as to the older child on abandonment.
…best interests. We disagree on all points. Section 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes, permits termination in cases of “[a]bandonment as defined in s. 39.01(1) or when the identity or location of the parent or parents is unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent search within 60 days.” “Abandonment” is defined as…
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M.S. v. Department of Children & Families 5D16-3860 · 5th DCA 2017
Dependency adjudication reversed because the father's drug-related arrests, without evidence of circumstances or harm to the children, were insufficient.
…TORPY and EVANDER, JJ., concur. 1 There was no evidence that the father had been incarcerated as a result of his arrests. 2 Section 39.01(30)(g), Florida Statutes (2016), provides that “harm” to a child’s health or welfare can occur where a person exposes a child to a controlled substance or alcohol.…
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M.S. v. Department of Children & Families 208 So. 3d 1276 · 5D16-3860-2 · 5th DCA 2017
Dependency adjudication reversed because the father's drug-related arrests, without evidence of circumstances or harm to the children, were insufficient.
… SAWAYA, TORPY and EVANDER, JJ., concur. . There was no evidence that the father had been incarcerated as a result of his arrests. . Section 39.01(30)(g), Florida Statutes (2016), provides that "harm” to a child’s health or welfare can occur where a person exposes a child to a controlled substance or alcohol.…
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R.M. v. Department of Children & Families 202 So. 3d 949 · 4D16-1156 · 4th DCA 2016
Dependency affirmed on neglect due to a rat-infested home, but findings of abuse and imminent risk struck for lack of evidence.
…proved that the children were living in an environment which caused the children’s physical health to be in danger of being significantly impaired. See § 39.01(44), Fla. Stat. (2015); A.W. ex rel. B.W. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 969 So.2d 496, 498-502 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (affirming termination of parental…
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C.B. v. Department of Children & Families 199 So. 3d 528 · 5D16-1147-2 · 5th DCA 2016
· cited by 1 in all courts
Termination affirmed on case plan noncompliance, but the abandonment finding struck because the mother regularly visited and brought gifts; order remanded for modification.
…clothing items for the child, and the child appeared happy to see C.B. during the scheduled visits, we reverse as to the finding of abandonment under sections 39.01(1) and 39.806(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2015), and remand for modification of the order. See J.L. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 143 So.3d 1158, 1158 (Fla. 5th…
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C.B. v. Department of Children & Families 5D16-1147 · 5th DCA 2016
Termination affirmed on case plan noncompliance, but the abandonment finding struck because the mother regularly visited and brought gifts; order remanded for modification.
…items for the child, and the child appeared happy to see C.B. during the scheduled visits, we reverse as to the finding of abandonment under sections 39.01(1) and 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2015), and remand for modification of the order. See J.L. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 143 So. 3d 1158, 1158 (Fla. 5th…
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Department of Children & Families v. J.D. 198 So. 3d 960 · 5D16-1739-2 · 5th DCA 2016
Dismissal of DCF's child-abuse injunction petition for lack of jurisdiction reversed; the dependency court may hear section 39.504 injunctions without an open dependency case.
…the legislature directs that “ ‘[c]ourt,’ unless otherwise expressly stated, means the circuit court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under this chapter.” § 39.01(20) Fla. Stat. (2016). Under the circumstances here, we conclude that the trial judge abused his discretion by attempting to send this petition “downtown” for one…
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Department of Children & Families v. J.D. 5D16-1739 · 5th DCA 2016
Dismissal of DCF's child-abuse injunction petition for lack of jurisdiction reversed; the dependency court may hear section 39.504 injunctions without an open dependency case.
…Denied.” 1Sexual assault and sexual battery constitute both “domestic violence” and child “abuse.” See § 741.28(2), Fla. Stat. (2016); § 39.01(3), Fla. Stat. (2016). 2 The trial court may have been referring to proceedings and remedies available under Chapter 741, Florida Statutes. …
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F.G. v. Department of Children & Families 192 So. 3d 1250 · 3D15-2432-2 · 3rd DCA 2016
· cited by 1 in all courts
After the mother's separate appeal succeeded, the court vacated its earlier affirmance and reversed the father's dependency adjudication following a sibling's death and marijuana use.
…filed a verified petition for dependency as to A.G. charging both B.J. and F.G. based on a substantial risk of imminent neglect and abuse (section 39.01(15)(f), Florida Statutes (2015)) and harm (section 39.01(30)(1)). The petition was heard over the course of two days in September 2015. After hearing all of the…
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F.G. v. Department of Children & Families 3D15-2432 · 3rd DCA 2016
After the mother's separate appeal succeeded, the court vacated its earlier affirmance and reversed the father's dependency adjudication following a sibling's death and marijuana use.
…filed a verified petition for dependency as to A.G. charging both B.J. and F.G. based on a substantial risk of imminent neglect and abuse (section 39.01(15)(f), Florida Statutes (2015)) and harm (section 39.01(30)(1)). The petition was heard over the course of two days in September 2015. After hearing all of the…
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In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Report No. 2015-04 190 So. 3d 614 · SC15-1172 · Florida Supreme Court 2016
· cited by 4 in all courts
…behavior as supported by expert testimony. Parental affirmative defense. Give if applicable. See Raford v. State, 828 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 2002). See § 39.01(49), Florida Statutes, if the defendant’s status as a parent is at issue. § 827.03, Fla. Stat., and case law are silent as to (1) which party bears…
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R.J. v. Department of Children & Families 187 So. 3d 362 · 4D15-4026 · 4th DCA 2016
· cited by 1 in all courts
After a private dependency petition by a teen, court wrongly thought it could not place him in DCF custody; reversed and remanded for reconsideration.
…or who is “at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians” via dependency proceedings. §§ 39.01(15)(a),(f); 39.501, Fla. Stat. (2014). In most cases, DCF is the party responsible for bringing a dependency action. However, section 39.501(1) provides that…
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J. v. Department of Children & Families 175 So. 3d 944 · 1D15-2544 · 1st DCA 2015
Dependency affirmed after the mother's physical altercation injured two children; one judge would reverse as to the five siblings for lack of imminent risk.
…finding'that the other five' children are at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect is, in my view, not supported by the evidence. See § 39.01(15)(f), Fla. Stat. (2014). The last verified report of physical abuse involving the .mother (before the present case) antedated the physical altercation with I.L.…
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A.D. v. Department of Children & Families 200 So. 3d 90 · 5D15-1794 · 5th DCA 2015
Termination reversed: DCF conceded no abandonment, and the father substantially completed his only case plan task, a batterers program, so noncompliance was not proven.
…of Children and Families (“the Department”) concedes that the record does not support a finding that A.D. abandoned the child. Abandonment, under section 39.01, Florida Statutes, is defined in pertinent part as follows: (1) “Abandoned” or “abandonment” means a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a…
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Seilkop v. Barker 148 So. 3d 865 · 1D14-560 · 1st DCA 2014
· cited by 1 in all courts
…treatment or a child is permitted to live in an environment [that] causes the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired.” § 39.01(44), Fla. Stat. (2013); see also K.R. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 784 So.2d 594, 598 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (explaining that “[a]n impairment is an…
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D.C. v. J.M. 133 So. 3d 1080 · 3D13-3158 · 3rd DCA 2014
· cited by 7 in all courts
Certiorari granted, quashing an order giving foster parents unfettered access to all dependency court files, which violated the privacy of the parents and siblings.
…cases relating to J.K. and D.D., and that they had a right to intervene and become parties rather than remain mere “participants” as defined by section 39.01(50), Florida Statutes (2013). The trial court granted the foster parents’ motion in part, ordering that the foster parents be provided the “unfettered right to…
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Chew v. Roberts 122 So. 3d 493 · 5D13-2697 · 5th DCA 2013
· cited by 5 in all courts
Certiorari granted, quashing an order consolidating relatives' adoption case with the termination case because the foster parents got no notice.
…by clear and convincing evidence, the court shall, by order, ■place the child in the custody of the department for the purpose of adoption. . Section 39.01(51), Florida Statutes (2012), defines a "party” as: *496 [T]he parent or parents of the child, the petitioner, the department, the guardian ad litem or the…
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Feil v. Pollock 98 So. 3d 160 · 1D11-5102 · 1st DCA 2012
…v. Reeves, 97 So.2d 18, 20 (Fla.1957). In making this assessment, a trial court must apply the definition of “abandoned” or “abandonment” in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes, that was in effect at the time the petition was filed. State v. J.C.H., 680 So.2d 606, 607 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); State v. Greenberg, …
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A.H. v. Department of Children & Family Services 85 So. 3d 1213 · 1D11-4454 · 1st DCA 2012
· cited by 5 in all courts
Termination reversed because none of the five grounds was proven; the father did not knowingly fail to protect his son from the mother's abuse.
…to the extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon the child’s remaining with or being returned to the child’s parent.” § 39.01(73), Fla. Stat. (2009). “ ‘[T]he “substantially comply” language contained in section [39.806] ... is a term of art [that] requires more than just a…
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D.A. v. Department of Children & Families 84 So. 3d 1136 · 3D11-2540 · 3rd DCA 2012
· cited by 10 in all courts
Dependency adjudication affirmed; the father's untreated bipolar disorder and cocaine use risked imminent neglect, and prospective risk suffices for a second parent.
…by competent substantial evidence. Id.; A.B. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Family *1139 Servs., 901 So.2d 324, 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). Section 39.01(15)(a),(f), Florida Statutes (2011), defines a dependent child as one who "is found by the court: (a) To have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child's…
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In the Interest of N.F. v. Department of Children & Family Services 82 So. 3d 1188 · 2D11-2320 · 2nd DCA 2012
· cited by 10 in all courts
Termination reversed because the mother completed her case plan and no evidence showed she failed to substantially comply or posed prospective neglect.
…to the extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon the child’s remaining with or being returned to the child’s parent.” § 39.01(73); see also R.F. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 22 So.3d 650, 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); E.R. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 937 So.2d…
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LW v. Department of Children & Families 71 So. 3d 221 · 4D11-1352 · 4th DCA 2011
· cited by 5 in all courts
Termination affirmed for abandonment after nearly four years without contact or support; no case plan was needed given the absence of any bond.
…961, 967 (Fla.1995)). Abandonment is a sufficient ground for terminating parental rights. See § 39.806(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011). Section 39.01(1) defines abandonment as: “a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child ... while being able, makes no provision for the child’s support and…
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In re J.D. 42 So. 3d 938 · 2D10-1717 · 2nd DCA 2010
· cited by 3 in all courts
Dependency adjudication reversed because the order lacked findings and evidence of the father's domestic violence was speculative, with no showing it affected the child.
…child and could reasonably result in serious injury to the child," or if the violence actually results in "physical, mental or sexual injury" to the child. § 39.01(32)(i), (j), Fla. Stat. (2009). Here, the only evidence of domestic violence was the child protective investigator's opinion as to the cause of the scratching and…
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N.S. v. Department of Children & Families 36 So. 3d 776 · 3D09-2019 · 3rd DCA 2010
· cited by 11 in all courts
Termination affirmed: the father ignored his case plan, and the mother's intellectual limits meant she could never safely parent despite services; partial dissent.
…of more services. Appellant's acts and omissions simply did not square with the Florida Legislature's definition of "substantial compliance." See § 39.01(71), Fla. Stat. (2006). A.W., 969 So.2d at 503. We agree with the trial court that, should the children remain in her care, there is risk of prospective harm…
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J.S. v. Department of Children & Families 18 So. 3d 1170 · 1D09-1046 · 1st DCA 2009
· cited by 9 in all courts
Single-parent termination of the mother reversed for lack of evidence of a prior involuntary termination; the father's non-termination reversed for inadequate best-interest and compliance findings.
…of understanding of her role in the relationship. Because of the permanent guardianship, neither parent will be acting in a parental role. See § 39.01(54) (defining permanent guardianship as “a legal relationship that a court creates ... which is intended to be permanent and self-sustaining through the transfer…
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In re J.P. 12 So. 3d 253 · 2D08-5486 · 2nd DCA 2009
· cited by 12 in all courts
Certiorari granted and order quashed because a grandparent cannot intervene as a party in a dependency case, only as a participant.
…petitioner, the department, the guardian ad litem or the representative of the guardian ad litem program when the program has been appointed, and the child. 39.01(50), Fla. Stat. (2007); see also Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.210(a). The plain language of the statute does not include grandparents within the definition of a party.…
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C.A.T. v. Department of Children & Families 10 So. 3d 682 · 5D08-2350 · 5th DCA 2009
· cited by 8 in all courts
Termination for abandonment reversed: DCF never offered the father a case plan or proved services would fail, so termination was not the least restrictive means.
…She is not a party to these proceedings. As to the first issue, the father contends that the definition of “abandonment” contained in section 39.01, Florida Statutes (2007), which is cited in section 39.806(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2007), as a ground for termination of parental rights, is…
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R.S. v. Department of Children & Family Services 10 So. 3d 186 · 3D08-701 · 3rd DCA 2009
Termination affirmed because competent evidence showed the mother, who refused or skipped visits and gave no support, abandoned her two children.
…was filed the next month. Section- 39.806(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2007), authorizes termination of parental rights through abandonment. Section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2007), defines abandonment as follows: “Abandoned” means a situation in which the parent ... of a child ... while being able, makes…
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J.R. v. Department of Children & Families 995 So. 2d 611 · 4D08-1031 · 4th DCA 2008
· cited by 2 in all courts
Dependency adjudication reversed because it rested on an uncorroborated hearsay hotline report, and the department conceded.
…that the DCF failed to present witnesses with firsthand knowledge of the allegations to support a finding of dependency based upon abandonment under section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes, or neglect under section 39.01(43), Florida Statutes. The only direct testimony came from the mother. The only substantive evidence…
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M.C. v. Department of Children & Families 993 So. 2d 1123 · 5D08-696 · 5th DCA 2008
Dependency reversed because the department showed no link between the mother's apparent mental illness and any risk of harm to the children.
…if they were released to M.C. This finding of dependency could only be based upon a substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect as provided for in section 39.01(14)(f), Florida Statutes (2007), because there was no evidence that M.C. abandoned, abused, or neglected her children. Undoubtedly, the court does not need to wait…
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In re T.S. 979 So. 2d 1202 · 2D07-888 · 2nd DCA 2008
· cited by 2 in all courts
Dependency of three children reversed because the order's findings were nearly nonexistent and the record did not show inadequate supervision.
…filing a petition seeking dependency, alleging that they have been abused, abandoned, or neglected by the Mother, constituting dependency pursuant to section 39.01(14)(a), Florida Statutes (2006), and that each child was at risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect, constituting dependency pursuant to section…
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In re T.H. 979 So. 2d 1075 · 2D07-2869 · 2nd DCA 2008
Termination reversed: an incarcerated father who wrote letters and sent cards had not abandoned his son, and DCF proved no other ground.
… Section 39.806(1)(b) permits the trial court to terminate a parent's rights when the parent has "abandoned" the child, as that term is defined in section 39.01(1). Section 39.01(1) defines "abandoned" as a situation in which the parent, . . . while being able, makes no provision for the child's support and makes no…
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T.H. v. Department of Children & Family Services 979 So. 2d 1075 · 2D07-2869-2 · 2nd DCA 2008
· cited by 28 in all courts
Termination reversed: an incarcerated father who wrote letters and sent cards had not abandoned his son, and DCF proved no other ground.
… Section 39.806(l)(b) permits the trial court to terminate a parent’s rights when the parent has “abandoned” the child, as that term is defined in section 39.01(1). Section 39.01(1) defines “abandoned” as a situation in which the parent, ... while being able, makes no provision for the child’s support and makes no…
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State v. Grayson 965 So. 2d 334 · 5D06-3131 · 5th DCA 2007
…information against Grayson, alleging that on October 14, 2004, Grayson "knowingly and willfully" made a false report of child abuse in violation of sections 39.01(27) and 39.205(6), Florida Statutes (2004). Grayson moved to dismiss *335 the information on the ground that the Department of Children and Family Services…
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Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A. 963 So. 2d 189 · SC07-738 · Florida Supreme Court 2007
· cited by 114 in all courts
…Fla. Stat. (2005). "Parent" is defined in pertinent part as "a man whose consent to the adoption of the child would be required under s. 63.062(1)." § 39.01(49), Fla. Stat. (2005). [4] Further, HOA served J.A. with a summons, notice of petition, and notice of hearing to terminate parental rights pending adoption.…
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S.K. v. Department of Children & Families 959 So. 2d 1209 · 4D06-3830 · 4th DCA 2007
· cited by 4 in all courts
Dependency affirmed; an incompetent incarcerated father already had counsel, no attorney ad litem for parents exists, and the case need not await his competency.
…mirrored the prior order of adjudication and included the following findings: The father, [S.K.], has abandoned the child as defined in Florida Statute 39.01(1) in that the father, while being able, has made no provision for the child's support and makes no effort to communicate with the child, which situation is…
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L.A.G. v. Department of Children & Family Services 963 So. 2d 725 · 3D06-1065 · 3rd DCA 2007
· cited by 8 in all courts
Termination reversed because it rested on an unpleaded ground and the mother substantially complied with her case plan; dependency of the youngest child was unsupported.
…to the extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon the child’s remaining with or being returned to the child’s parent.” § 39.01(71), Fla. Stat. (2006). The termination hearing is replete with evidence that the mother did substantially comply with her case plan. She successfully completed…
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S.H. v. Department of Children & Families 949 So. 2d 356 · 4D05-4835 · 4th DCA 2007
Dependency adjudication reversed because the father's unstable housing and employment stemmed from financial inability and no services were offered and rejected.
…to live in an environment when such deprivation or environment causes the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired." See § 39.01(43), Fla. Stat. (2005). However, "the foregoing circumstances shall not be considered neglect if caused primarily by financial inability unless actual services…
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V.J. v. Department of Children & Families 949 So. 2d 1128 · 3D06-1123 · 3rd DCA 2007
· cited by 5 in all courts
Termination affirmed on abandonment because the incarcerated father had no contact with or support for the child for years and only marginal efforts.
…Florida Statutes, provides for termination of parental rights in the case of abandonment, citing the definition of abandonment contained in section 39.01(1). See § 39.806(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004). That section defines abandonment as: a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the…
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S.M. v. Department of Children & Family Services 944 So. 2d 1171 · 3D05-1953 · 3rd DCA 2006
Dependency reversed because a single incident of corporal discipline without significant bruising or other harm was insufficient to show abuse.
…104 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). At best, the record in this case demonstrates a single incident of corporal discipline, as testified to by the child. Section 39.01(30)(a)4, Florida Statutes (2005), states that corporal discipline may be considered excessive or abusive when it results in a physical injury, including “temporary…
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M.L. v. Department of Children & Families 942 So. 2d 977 · 4D06-2136 · 4th DCA 2006
Shelter order reversed: no probable cause showed the older child, safely living with the grandmother, was endangered by the mother's drug use.
…physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired." 39.01(2), Fla. Stat. Exposing a child to a controlled substance constitutes "harm" only when a mother's use of a controlled substance during her pregnancy demonstrably…
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C.C. v. Department of Children & Families 946 So. 2d 548 · 5D06-1272 · 5th DCA 2006
Dependency reversed because no evidence showed the father's domestic violence occurred in the child's presence; remanded for possible further evidence or a disposition hearing.
…mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired.” § 39.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). Domestic violence between parents may constitute abuse if the parent “[ejngages in violent behavior that demonstrates a wanton disregard…
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T.S. v. Department of Children & Families 944 So. 2d 1049 · 4D06-181 · 4th DCA 2006
Finding of imminent risk, with adjudication withheld, reversed because evidence did not establish an act of domestic violence or an ongoing pattern supporting prospective harm.
…the children. In Count III, DCF alleged *1050 that "the children are presently at substantial risk of imminent threat of harm as defined in Florida Statute 39.01(30)." In both counts, DCF made the following allegations: The father, [T.S.], neglected the minor children . . . as defined in Florida Statute 39.01(45) in that…
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Morcroft v. Department of Children & Families 929 So. 2d 51 · 5D05-2804 · 5th DCA 2006
Dependency against the custodian affirmed: the court had jurisdiction despite the foreign mother not being joined, though DCF must address the child's immigration status.
…of dependency because the mother was not properly notified and joined as a party to the proceedings. Her argument is based upon the provisions of section 39.01(49)-(51), Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.210, which define “parent,” “participant,” and “party,” and the provisions of sections…
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Contreras v. State 910 So. 2d 901 · 4D03-1683 · 4th DCA 2005
· cited by 11 in all courts
…a statute has established the CPT as part of the Department of Children and Families for the express purpose of "process[ing] child abuse cases. " [e.s.] § 39.01(13), Fla. Stat. (2004). The statute explicitly states that a purpose of child protection teams is to provide "expert medical, psychological, and related…
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Department of Children & Family Services v. Ad 904 So. 2d 480 · 1D04-1632 · 1st DCA 2005
· cited by 7 in all courts
Denial of termination reversed because the trial court's own findings contradicted its conclusions on case plan compliance and best interests; termination directed.
…by the evidence and was not in the child's best interest. See Dep't of Children & Families v. C.F., 788 So.2d 988, 988-89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). Section 39.01 defines "substantial compliance" as meaning that "the circumstances [that] caused the creation of the case plan have been significantly remedied to the extent…
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Department of Children & Families v. J.J.E. 901 So. 2d 215 · 5D05-364 · 5th DCA 2005
· cited by 3 in all courts
Prohibition granted: a father's claim that his termination was void for lack of service belongs in the original termination court, not a separate habeas judge.
…have exclusive original jurisdiction and shall retain jurisdiction of a child until the child's eighteenth birthday or unless relinquished by that court. §§ 39.01(16) and (18); 39.013(2), Florida Statutes (2004). 3. We agree with DCF that were we to deny the petitioner's request for a writ of prohibition and remand to the…
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D.S. v. Department of Children & Families 900 So. 2d 628 · 5D04-739 · 5th DCA 2005
· cited by 9 in all courts
Closing the case with permanent custody to the fathers reversed; the mother substantially complied and got no time to complete an added evaluation.
…the inception of this case. Moreover, it nullifies those statutes in Chapter 39 which otherwise provide for reunification with the mother. [5] Section 39.01(17) defines comprehensive assessment: "Comprehensive assessment" or "assessment" means the gathering of information for the evaluation of a child's and…
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King v. State 903 So. 2d 954 · 2D03-93 · 2nd DCA 2005
· cited by 7 in all courts
…extent of the student's injuries in this case was nothing more than "significant bruises or welts," and there was no corresponding mental injury under section 39.01(43), Florida Statutes (2001). [2] Accordingly, the spanking did not constitute felony child abuse as a matter of law, and the trial court erred in denying King's…
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State v. J.P. 907 So. 2d 1101 · SC02-2288 · Florida Supreme Court 2004
…certain threshold level of care under its child neglect statutes. See, e.g., § 39.001(3), Fla. Stat. (2002) (outlining general protections for children); § 39.01, Fla. Stat. (2002) (defining abuse and abandonment). Parents must ensure that their children are educated, see § 1003.21(1)(a)1, Fla. Stat. (2003)…
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T.R. v. Department of Children & Families 864 So. 2d 1278 · 5D03-977 · 5th DCA 2004
· cited by 10 in all courts
Dependency affirmed in a close case: the teens were aware of a knife-involved domestic violence incident, creating risk of emotional harm.
…children are at risk of being "harmed"impaired mentally and emotionallyif they remain in the custody of the abusive parents, within the meaning of section 39.01(30)(i), Florida Statutes (2002). [2] See D.D. v. Department of Children and Families, 773 So.2d 615 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). See also D.W.G. v. Department of…
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L.F. v. Department of Children & Family Services 837 So. 2d 1098 · 4D01-4152 · 4th DCA 2003
· cited by 2 in all courts
Order leaving both children in the father's permanent custody reversed because a stepfather is not a parent or relative and no noncompliance was found.
…not the natural son of the father, further complicates this case. Under the dependency statutes, a stepfather is neither a "parent" nor a "relative." See § 39.01(49), (60), Fla. Stat. (2002). Therefore, the foregoing statutory options were unavailable to determine custody for N.R. Instead, N.R.'s placement with the father…
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M.N. v. Department of Children & Families 826 So. 2d 445 · 5D01-3663 · 5th DCA 2002
· cited by 10 in all courts
Dependency reversed: one incident of abuse of the mother's other child showed no nexus to a substantial risk of imminent abuse of the infant.
…DCF has the burden of establishing that the current child is at "substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents...." § 39.01(14)(f), Fla. Stat. (2001); Eddy v. Department of Children & Family Servs., 704 So.2d 734 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). A trial court's decision that a child is…
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C.M. v. Department of Children & Families 823 So. 2d 182 · 5D01-3748 · 5th DCA 2002
· cited by 4 in all courts
Dependency affirmed as to the mother on her inconsistent account and medical testimony, but reversed as to the father, whom no evidence connected to injuries.
…and the testimony of Dr. Kessler about the nature of the injuries to the child were sufficient to meet the statutory definition of abuse. *183 See § 39.01(2), Fla. Stat.; see also In Interest of D.J.S., 563 So.2d 655, 663 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (affirming dependency order where child sustained beating,…
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O.S. v. Department of Children & Families 821 So. 2d 1145 · 4D01-3948 · 4th DCA 2002
· cited by 15 in all courts
Dependency of both daughters affirmed: the mother's severe beating of one child was abuse, and her pattern of punishment put the sibling at imminent risk.
…A finding of dependency may be found upon evidence that the child is at a "substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment or neglect by the parent." § 39.01(14)(f), Fla. Stat. (2000). Based upon this provision, the supreme court has held that a trial court can find children who have not been abused to be dependent…
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F.G. v. Department of Children & Families 820 So. 2d 1027 · 4D01-3946 · 4th DCA 2002
· cited by 4 in all courts
Dependency affirmed; the father's ten-year incarceration plus the mother's abuse of another child showed neglect and abandonment; Eighth Amendment cruel-punishment claim rejected.
…In addition, the father, has been incarcerated since October of 1998 for armed cocaine trafficking." This order was signed on September 7, 2001. Section 39.01(45), Florida Statutes (1999), explains that "neglect" occurs when a child is deprived of, or is allowed to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or…
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A.R. v. Department of Children & Families 784 So. 2d 622 · 5D00-2675 · 5th DCA 2001
· cited by 4 in all courts
Dependency reversed because nothing showed the mother knew the baby's father was dangerous or that her other children faced substantial risk of imminent abuse.
…evidence to support the dependency finding, we reverse. The trial court did not find that K.A.R. or L.T.R. had been abused, abandoned or neglected. See § 39.01(14)(a), Fla.Stat. (1999). Rather, the trial court's finding is based upon the mother's purported "poor judgment" in leaving her youngest child, Franklin, with…
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State v. McDonald 785 So. 2d 640 · 2D00-1179 · 2nd DCA 2001
· cited by 16 in all courts
…39 that designates certain types of excessive corporal punishment as civil child abuse. Ch. 98-403, § 20, Laws of Fla. The definition of "abuse" in section 39.01(2) was amended to read: *646 "Abuse" means any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or…
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State v. DuFresne 782 So. 2d 888 · 4D99-1375 · 4th DCA 2001
· cited by 5 in all courts
…involving reporting, investigating, and preventing child abuse, and moved to Chapter 415. The definition was moved from section 415.503(8) to section 39.01(44) in 1998. See ch. 98-403, § 19, Laws of Fla. [2] Fuchs In our original opinion, we concluded that "mental injury" as used in section 827.03 was…
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In re Interest of F.C. 780 So. 2d 159 · 2D00-16 · 2nd DCA 2001
Termination reversed: the father substantially complied with his case plan, resumed visits undercut abandonment, and best interests alone cannot support termination.
…of the court, only marginal efforts that do not evince a settled purpose to assume all parental duties, the court may declare the child to be abandoned. § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). We first note that the evidence in this case did not prove that F.C. had failed to substantially comply with a case plan. See §…
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F.C. v. Department of Children & Families 780 So. 2d 159 · 2D00-16-2 · 2nd DCA 2001
· cited by 9 in all courts
Termination reversed: the father substantially complied with his case plan, resumed visits undercut abandonment, and best interests alone cannot support termination.
…of the court, only marginal efforts that do not evince a settled purpose to assume all parental duties, the court may declare the child to be abandoned. § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). We first note that the evidence in this p case did not prove that F .C. had failed to substantially comply with a case plan. See §…
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Brennan v. State 754 So. 2d 1 · SC90 · Florida Supreme Court 1999
· cited by 28 in all courts
…years of age, was removed from criminal courts and placed in either juvenile courts or county courts in those counties where no juvenile court existed. §§ 39.01, .02, Fla.Stat. (1951). Section 39.02(6), Florida Statutes (1951), granted discretion to the juvenile court to transfer felony charges against children…
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M.W. v. Davis 722 So. 2d 966 · 4D98-3547 · 4th DCA 1999
· cited by 1 in all courts
…a legal custodian." § 39.508(9)(a)7, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). The rights and responsibilities of the Department as custodian are explained in section *969 39.01(70), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), which provides: "Temporary legal custody" means the relationship that a juvenile court creates between a child and an adult…
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Avatar Development Corp. v. State 723 So. 2d 199 · SC91-2 · Florida Supreme Court 1998
· cited by 13 in all courts
…of HRS to establish by rule. The only guidance given by the Legislature to HRS was that "there shall be no more than eight levels." Id. at 989-90 (quoting § 39.01(61), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1990)). Based on this statute, HRS created four restrictiveness levels, dividing them by even numbers: level 2 (nonresidential); level 4…
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McGillis v. Department of Children & Family Services 719 So. 2d 967 · DCA98-663 · District Court of Appeal 1998
· cited by 2 in all courts
…the order denying Mr. MeGillis’ motion to intervene as a party in a termination and dependency proceeding as he does not fall within the parameters of section 39.01(39), Florida Statutes (1997). See also J.L. v. G.M., 687 So.2d 977 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)(Fla.R. Juv. P. 8.210(a) limits parties in juvenile proceeding). We…
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Department of Children & Families v. M.B. 717 So. 2d 607 · 4D98-1261 · 4th DCA 1998
· cited by 1 in all courts
…The department asserts that the trial court's recognition that the children were at risk of emotional harm is equivalent to a dependency finding under section 39.01(36), Florida Statutes, which defines neglect, as a basis for dependency, as "Neglect" occurs when the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of…
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Q.L.J. v. State 714 So. 2d 628 · 1D97-4851 · 1st DCA 1998
…finding that a high-risk placement was the more appropriate means of ensuring such protection is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Section 39.01(59)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), states that moderate-risk residential facilities are intended for children who "do not need placement in facilities that are…
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Q.L.J. v. State 714 So. 2d 628 · DCA97-4851 · District Court of Appeal 1998
· cited by 14 in all courts
…finding that a high-risk placement was the more appropriate means of- ensuring such protection is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Section 39.01(59)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), states that moderate-risk residential facilities are intended for children who “do not need placement in facilities that are…
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F.A.T. v. State 690 So. 2d 1347 · 1D96-742 · 1st DCA 1997
… Resolution of this issue demands a close examination of several related statutory provisions under Chapter 39 governing juvenile proceedings. First, section 39.01(28), Florida Statutes (1995), defines disposition hearing as a hearing in which the court determines the most appropriate dispositional services in the least…
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F.A.T. v. State 690 So. 2d 1347 · DCA96-742 · District Court of Appeal 1997
· cited by 4 in all courts
… Resolution of this issue demands a close examination of several related statutory provisions under Chapter 39 governing juvenile proceedings. First, section 39.01(28), Florida Statutes (1995), defines disposition hearing as a hearing in which the court determines the most appropriate dispositional services in the least…
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Hroncich v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 667 So. 2d 804 · 5D95-761 · 5th DCA 1996
· cited by 6 in all courts
…of T.D., 537 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). In this case we do not think the state sufficiently proved Veronica was neglected by Hroncich. Section 39.01(37) provides a description of neglect. `Neglect' occurs when the parent or legal custodian of a child ... deprives a child of, or allows a child to be deprived…
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Denson v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 661 So. 2d 934 · 5D94-2735 · 5th DCA 1995
· cited by 18 in all courts
…abuse," that is, they were at risk because Denson had sexually abused T.D. We reverse. A child may be found to be dependent under several circumstances. §§ 39.01(10)(a)-(e), Fla. Stat. (1993). Two of these circumstances include a child who is found: 2(a) To have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by [the] parents or other…
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Department of HRS v. P.H. 659 So. 2d 1375 · 1D94-2200 · 1st DCA 1995
· cited by 3 in all courts
…proof of current or prospective abuse, neglect or abandonment as to each parent, the court reluctantly dismissed the petition for dependency. Section 39.01(10), Florida Statutes (1993), defining "dependent child," states in part: (1) "Child who is found to be dependent" means a child who, pursuant to this chapter,…
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Richmond v. Dept 658 So. 2d 176 · 5D94-2848 · 5th DCA 1995
· cited by 20 in all courts
…an adjudication of dependency without evidence of past abuse or neglect. We disagree. A child may be found to be dependent under several circumstances. §§ 39.01(10) (a)-(e), Fla. Stat. (1993). Two of these circumstances include a child who is found: (a) To have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by [the] parents or…
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Griffith v. State 654 So. 2d 936 · 4D91-0297 · 4th DCA 1995
· cited by 9 in all courts
…1985, we conclude that chapter 39, Florida Statutes (1983), supplies the governing statutory provisions. We begin with the definition of "child" in section 39.01(7): "(7) `Child' means any unmarried person under the age of 18 alleged to be dependent or any married or unmarried *939 person who is charged with a…
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Gelrod v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 648 So. 2d 862 · DCA94-1621 · District Court of Appeal 1995
· cited by 1 in all courts
…We affirm. The mother contends that the evidence of neglect is legally insufficient to support an adjudication of dependency in accordance with section 39.01(37), Florida Statutes (1993). We disagree. “An adjudication of dependency must be based upon a showing of abuse, abandonment, or neglect.” I.T. v. Department…
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In re A.L.O. 637 So. 2d 15 · 5D93-1966 · 5th DCA 1994
· cited by 1 in all courts
… (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); In the Interest ofR.V.F., 437 So.2d 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); In the Interest of C.M.H., 413 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); § 39.01(1), (37), Fla.Stat. (1993). DELL, C.J., and HERSEY and STONE, JJ., concur.
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State v. Varela 636 So. 2d 559 · 5D93-2795 · 5th DCA 1994
· cited by 2 in all courts
…care of children, pending adjudication, disposition, or placement or an escape from any moderate or high risk residential commitment facility defined in s. 39.01(61)(c) and (d), maintained for the custody, treatment, or rehabilitation of children found to have committed delinquent acts or violations of law constitutes escape…
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State v. F.G. 630 So. 2d 581 · 3D92-1440 · 3rd DCA 1993
…of the provisions of Chapter 39, particularly with respect to dispositional alternatives, is expressed at various points in the Chapter. In Section 39.01(21) "Disposition hearing" is defined as "a hearing in which the Court determines the most appropriate dispositional services in the least restrictive available…
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State v. F.G. 630 So. 2d 581 · 3D92-1440-2 · 3rd DCA 1993
· cited by 20 in all courts
…of the provisions of Chapter 39, particularly with respect to dispositional alternatives, is expressed at various points in the Chapter. In Section 39.01(21) "Disposition hearing” is defined as "a hearing in which the Court determines the most appropriate dispositional services in the least restrictive available…
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In Interest of D.M. 616 So. 2d 1192 · 4D92-2718 · 4th DCA 1993
· cited by 2 in all courts
…v. State, Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 443 So.2d 1083 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), the court rejected the natural mother's argument that section 39.01(26), Florida Statutes (1981), under which her child was adjudicated dependent, was unconstitutional because it provided "a facially vague standard." The statute…
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Interest of A.A. v. State 605 So. 2d 106 · DCA92-315 · District Court of Appeal 1992
· cited by 4 in all courts
…could not lawfully delegate to an agency of the executive branch the power to classify the levels of restrictiveness based upon, as stated in section 39.01(61), “the risk and needs of the individual child.” If unlawful delegation involves simply the power to make a law rather than the authority to execute it, …
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Brown v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 582 So. 2d 113 · 3D90-1918 · 3rd DCA 1991
· cited by 14 in all courts
…was examined and evaluated at Jackson Memorial Hospital by Dr. Montana who diagnosed said child as being malnourished and developmentally delayed. Section 39.01(37), Florida Statutes (1989), specifically defines neglect as "[occurring] when the parent ... deprives a child of necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical…
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K.A.N. v. State 582 So. 2d 57 · 1D90-3539 · 1st DCA 1991
…delinquent acts or violations of law constitutes escape within the intent and meaning of s. 944.40 and is a felony of the third degree. [2] Section 39.01(61) defines "restrictiveness level" as: the identification of broad custody categories for committed children including nonresidential, residential, and secure…
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K.A.N. v. State 582 So. 2d 57 · DCA90-3539 · District Court of Appeal 1991
· cited by 15 in all courts
…committed delinquent acts or violations of law constitutes escape within the intent and meaning of s. 944.40 and is a felony of the third degree. 2 Section 39.01(61) defines “restrictiveness level” as: the identification of broad custody categories for committed children including nonresidential, residential, and secure…
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In re S.W. 581 So. 2d 234 · 4D89-2962 · 4th DCA 1991
· cited by 6 in all courts
… A mother appeals an order adjudicating her three children dependent, the dependency order having been based on a finding of abuse pursuant to section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (1991). We reverse. The dependency petition was based on one incident of alleged abuse. The evidence showed that on one day the mother…
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Hardy v. Dept. of HRS 568 So. 2d 1314 · 5D89-1735 · 5th DCA 1990
· cited by 11 in all courts
…he was 22 months old and weighed 18 pounds. *1316 A dependent child is one who has been abandoned, abused, or neglected by his parents or custodians. § 39.01(10)(a), Fla. Stat. (1987). The trial court found no evidence of abandonment or abuse. Neglect is defined in section 39.01(27), Florida Statutes, which provides in…
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Williams v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 568 So. 2d 995 · 5D89-1822 · 5th DCA 1990
· cited by 12 in all courts
…required the court to determine whether, through excessive means of corporal punishment, the parents abused their child within the definitions of sections 39.01(2) and 39.01(10)(a), Florida Statutes (1988 supp.), which provide: (2) "Abuse" means any willful act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury…
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Palmer v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 547 So. 2d 981 · 5D88-1368 · 5th DCA 1989
· cited by 40 in all courts
…abuse in a permanent commitment case involving three children, one of whom had suffered no abuse. The court relied upon the definition of "abuse" in section 39.01(2), Fla. Stat. (1981), which contains a future tense element: `Abuse' means any willful act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury that causes…
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Matter of Adoption of Doe 543 So. 2d 741 · SC72593 · Florida Supreme Court 1989
· cited by 48 in all courts
…service in a dependency proceeding shall give rise to a rebuttable presumption of such person's ability to provide for and communicate with the child. § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat. The natural father here filed an acknowledgment of paternity in accordance with section 63.062(1) on 19 September 1986. Thus, his consent was…
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B.C. v. A.P. ex rel. C.P. 538 So. 2d 525 · DCA88-2769 · District Court of Appeal 1989
· cited by 2 in all courts
…(Supp.1988). Certiorari denied. . K.C. concedes that the discovery of the psychiatric and psychological records is not at issue. . Section 39.01(13), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988), states that ‘“[c]ourt,' unless otherwise expressly stated, means the circuit court." Section 39.01(15) defines “department" as…
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In Interest of T.D. 537 So. 2d 173 · 1D88-760 · 1st DCA 1989
· cited by 16 in all courts
…control. See Harden v. Thomas, 329 So.2d 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (incarceration does not, as a matter of law, constitute abandonment under section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes); In the Interest of P.S., 384 So.2d 656 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (Indigency resulting in an inability to provide support does not…
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Dupes v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 536 So. 2d 311 · 1DBR-426 · 1st DCA 1988
· cited by 4 in all courts
…circuit court to order parents to pay "child support" to the adult relative caring for the child, the licensed child/caring agency, or the Department. Section 39.01 was amended by adding the definition of "child support" which is defined as "a court ordered obligation enforced pursuant to ss. 409.2551-409.2597, for…
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Manuel v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 537 So. 2d 1022 · 5D88-271 · 5th DCA 1988
· cited by 3 in all courts
…in this case. Whether "prospective neglect" or even "prospective abandonment" are valid grounds for termination of parental rights pursuant to section 39.01, Florida Statutes, are important legal issues which should be addressed by this court in a proper case. *1023 Had this been such a case, I would have done…
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LeCroy v. State 533 So. 2d 750 · SC69484 · Florida Supreme Court 1988
· cited by 31 in all courts
…years of age, was removed from criminal courts and placed in either juvenile courts or county courts in those counties where no juvenile court existed. §§ 39.01, .02, Fla. Stat. (1951). Section 39.02(6), Florida Statutes (1951), granted discretion to the juvenile court to transfer felony charges against children…
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K.H. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 527 So. 2d 230 · 1D87-1509 · 1st DCA 1988
· cited by 12 in all courts
…committing the child on the ground of neglect lacked a legally sufficient evidentiary predicate. The state has in fact confessed error in this regard. Section 39.01(27), Florida Statutes (1985), defines neglect in part as occurring when the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or legal…
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Smith v. Fernandez 520 So. 2d 654 · 3D86-1439 · 3rd DCA 1988
· cited by 3 in all courts
…A parent who has deserted a child without affording means of identification or who has abandoned a child... ." [2] Chapter 39 provides in relevant part: 39.01 Definitions. When used in this chapter: (1) "Abandoned" means a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent…
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Jones v. In the Interest of A.W. 519 So. 2d 1141 · DCA87-995 · District Court of Appeal 1988
· cited by 1 in all courts
SCHEB, Acting Chief Judge. Deborah Jones, the mother of three young daughters, challenges the trial court’s order adjudicating them dependent under section 39.01(27), Florida Statutes (1985). We agree with the mother that there was insufficient evidence to support the adjudication. We reverse. Deborah Jones and Robert…
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In Interest of R.D.D. 518 So. 2d 412 · 2D86-1534 · 2nd DCA 1988
· cited by 9 in all courts
…neglect in her brief and did so only summarily before the court, we will address the matter in order to provide a complete analysis of this situation. Section 39.01(27), Florida Statutes (1985) defines neglect as follows: "Neglect" occurs when the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or legal…
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In re R.D.D. 518 So. 2d 411 · DCA86-1534 · District Court of Appeal 1988
…neglect in her brief and did so only summarily before the court, we will address the matter in order to provide a complete analysis of this situation. Section 39.01(27), Florida Statutes (1985) defines neglect as follows: “Neglect” occurs when the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or legal…
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In re R.H. 516 So. 2d 324 · DCA87-820 · District Court of Appeal 1987
· cited by 2 in all courts
…R.H. and G.K. were dependent children. We find that the evidence presented to the trial court was insufficient to support a finding of neglect under section 39.01(27), Florida Statutes (1985), and, accordi:..g;y, reverse the order of dependency. Section 39.01(27) provides in part: “Neglect” occurs when the parent or…
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In Interest of T.S. 511 So. 2d 435 · 2D86-2926 · 2nd DCA 1987
· cited by 6 in all courts
…this appeal ensued. Appellants raise three points on appeal: first, that the evidence was insufficient to establish child abuse as defined by section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (1985); second, that the order of adjudication of dependency on the grounds of abuse was in violation of section 39.409, subsections (2) and…
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In Interest of C.W. 490 So. 2d 175 · 5D85-1641 · 5th DCA 1986
· cited by 8 in all courts
…of H.R.S. *176 Under Florida law, a dependent child is one who has been abandoned, abused or neglected by his parents or other custodians. § 39.01(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (1985). Here, there is no contention of abuse or abandonment. "Neglect" is defined by section 39.01(27), Florida Statutes, which states in…
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Webb v. Blancett 473 So. 2d 1376 · 5D84-1241 · 5th DCA 1985
· cited by 9 in all courts
…in a Chapter 39 dependency proceeding applies in adoption proceedings as well, and consequently we do not do so, it is interesting to note that section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (1983) looks to the parent's conduct in determining whether there has been an abandonment when it says: ... If a parent's efforts to…
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In re L.M.H. 462 So. 2d 1210 · DCA84-459 · District Court of Appeal 1985
· cited by 1 in all courts
…All acts being in violation of ... [this court’s] order.” The commitment order adjudicated L.M.H. as having committed a delinquent act in violation of section 39.01(8), Florida Statutes (1983), and committed her to HRS for an indeterminate period of time. Appellee, the Department of Legal Affairs, contends that the court…
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R.C. v. State 461 So. 2d 215 · DCAAY-204 · District Court of Appeal 1984
· cited by 2 in all courts
…petition” rule of section 39.05(6) calls for a factual determination to be made by the trial court. The phrase “taken into custody” is defined in section 39.01(32) as meaning ... the status of a child immediately when temporary physical control over the child is attained by a person authorized by law, pending the…
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Dykes v. Hosemann 743 F.2d 1488 · CA11-83-3347 · 11th Cir. 1984
· cited by 48 in all courts
Panel revived a mother's section 1983 suit over a collusive dependency order entered without notice or hearing, finding triable conspiracy and due process claims against the defendants.
…persistently run away from his parents or legal guardian. (i) Being subject to compulsory school attendance, is habitually truant from school. Fla.Stats. § 39.01(8) (1977). In 1978, the Florida State Legislature revised Chapter 39 and it became known as the Florida Juvenile Justice Act, with new sections effective…
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E.H. v. State 443 So. 2d 1083 · 3D82-1900 · 3rd DCA 1984
· cited by 7 in all courts
…Services. The natural mother prosecutes this appeal raising three alleged errors. We affirm. *1084 First, the natural mother contends that Section 39.01(26), Florida Statutes (1981), under which her child was adjudicated dependent, is unconstitutional because it provides a facially vague standard as a basis for…
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Carnrike v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 442 So. 2d 1093 · DCA83-748 · District Court of Appeal 1983
· cited by 3 in all courts
…rights. 1 The lower court found the children had been “abused, neglected and abandoned.” The record does not support “abandonment” as defined in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (1981). However, it reflects that HRS sustained its burden of showing neglect and abuse by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, while we…
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In Interest of R.V.F. 437 So. 2d 713 · 2D82-2451 · 2nd DCA 1983
· cited by 9 in all courts
…the child; or ... . In the order denying the petition for commitment, the court acknowledged that according to the definition of "abandoned" in section 39.01, Florida Statutes (1981), the father had abandoned R.V.F., Jr. However, the court characterized this as a technical abandonment and relied upon the…
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Gamble v. Wells 436 So. 2d 173 · DCA82-530 · District Court of Appeal 1983
· cited by 2 in all courts
…behalf. Gamble nevertheless maintains that she lacked the capacity to contract on the child’s behalf because the definition of “legal custody” at section 39.01(9), Florida Statutes (1975), does not expressly grant a legal custodian this authority. But this section specifically vests a legal custodian with the right and…
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State v. J.M.Z. 408 So. 2d 1063 · DCAAD-201 · District Court of Appeal 1982
· cited by 4 in all courts
…State, 364 So.2d 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). . Chapter 78-414, Laws of Florida (1978). . Chapter 80-290, Laws of Florida (1980). . Section 39.01(33), Florida Statutes. . Sections 39.01(21) and 39.02(1), Florida Statutes.
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State v. C.B. 401 So. 2d 919 · DCA79-2076 · District Court of Appeal 1981
…of a petition of delinquency within 45 days thereafter, or a total of 48 days from the time of arrest. The pertinent parts of Chapter 39 are as follows: 39.01(33) “Taken into custody” means the status of a child immediately when temporary physical control over the child is attained by a person authorized by law, pending…
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In the Interest of S.M. v. McCormack 398 So. 2d 511 · DCA81-442 · District Court of Appeal 1981
…in a governmental facility after the court has properly ordered the child to be placed in community control. We answer the question in the negative. Section 39.01(10), Florida Statutes (1979), defines “community control” as: “the legal status of probation created by law and court order involving a child who has been found…
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State v. G.D.M. 394 So. 2d 1017 · SC58762 · Florida Supreme Court 1981
· cited by 7 in all courts
…for Broward County, the state asks us to reverse an order dismissing an information against G.D.M., a juvenile, in which the trial judge found that section 39.01, Florida Statutes (1979), is: violative of due process of law in failing to exclude from the definition of “juvenile traffic offense”, [s/c] reckless…
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R.M.P. v. Jones 392 So. 2d 301 · 1DZZ-9 · 1st DCA 1980
· cited by 11 in all courts
…facilities only for the temporary care of children pending delinquency adjudication or court disposition (Senate Bill 409, effective July 1, 1980, amending § 39.01(31), F.S.). Therefore, HRS concludes the Court cannot impose a burden upon HRS which the Legislature has not given HRS power to handle. Specifically, in this…
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In Interest of P.S. v. State 384 So. 2d 656 · 5D79-423/T4-422 · 5th DCA 1980
· cited by 11 in all courts
…of the court, only marginal efforts that do not evince a settled purpose to assume all parental duties, the court may declare the child to be abandoned. § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat. (1979) (emphasis added). In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court apparently construed the statutory definition of…
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R.B.S. v. Capri 384 So. 2d 692 · 3D80-817 · 3rd DCA 1980
· cited by 12 in all courts
…of the State's request to have the child bound over for trial as an adult. [7] Non-secure custody may be provided in a detention home, see Section 39.01(16), Florida Statutes (1979), or in the child's own home, see Section 39.01(14), Florida Statutes (1979). That choice rests not with the court, but with the…
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State v. Cain 381 So. 2d 1361 · SC56528 · Florida Supreme Court 1980
· cited by 99 in all courts
…of age or older after a waiver hearing in which the criteria listed in section 39.09(2)(c)1-8, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978), are considered. §§ 39.02(5)(a) & 39.01(35), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1978). If the juvenile has been previously adjudicated delinquent for certain serious violent offenses and is currently charged with a…
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Solomon v. McLucas 382 So. 2d 339 · 2D79-769 · 2nd DCA 1980
· cited by 26 in all courts
…from natural parents and placed in others whenever the parents' neglect or abuse makes that action necessary for the best interests of the child. Section 39.01(9) and Sections 39.40, et seq., Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978). But grounds which may legally justify depriving a natural parent of custody do not necessarily…
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J.C. v. State 377 So. 2d 731 · 3D79-224 · 3rd DCA 1979
…circumstantial evidence rule. The adjudication of delinquency against the defendant is reversed with directions to discharge him. Reversed. NOTES [1] § 39.01(10), Fla. Stat. (1977). "`Delinquent child' means a child who commits a violation of law... ." [2] § 39.01(27), Fla. Stat. (1977). "`Violation of law' means a…
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J.C. v. State 377 So. 2d 731 · DCA79-224 · District Court of Appeal 1979
· cited by 5 in all courts
…the circumstantial evidence rule. The adjudication of delinquency against the defendant is reversed with directions to discharge him. Reversed. . § 39.01(10), Fla.Stat. (1977). ‘“Delinquent child’ means a child who commits a violation of law . . .” . § 39.01(27), Fla.Stat. (1977). “ ‘Violation of law’ means a…
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D.C.E. v. State 381 So. 2d 1097 · 1DLL-213 · 1st DCA 1979
…delinquency judgment could depend appellant argues not, because that violation "would [not] be a misdemeanor or a felony if committed by an adult," Sections 39.01(27), (10), 775.08, Florida Statutes (1977) the circuit court had jurisdiction to decide that issue. Disposing of the disorderly conduct issue on another ground,…
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In re C.F. 345 So. 2d 709 · SC50729 · Florida Supreme Court 1977
· cited by 1 in all courts
…of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, relating to the authority of the public defender to represent indigent juve *710 niles in proceedings under Section 39.01(11), Florida Statutes. It appears that the question presented herein is determinative of this cause and that it is without controlling precedent in this state. We…
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State v. Robinson 336 So. 2d 437 · 2D75-1506 · 2nd DCA 1976
· cited by 10 in all courts
…is remanded for further proceedings under the outstanding indictment herein. GRIMES and SCHEB, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Rule 8.120, R.J.P. [2] Section 39.01(6), F.S. 1973. [3] Section 39.01(6), F.S. 1975. [4] (Fla. 1974), 297 So.2d 5 . [5] Section 39.02(6)(c), F.S. 1971. [6] See Johnson v. State …
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Johnson v. State 314 So. 2d 573 · SC45764 · Florida Supreme Court 1975
· cited by 42 in all courts
…the withheld adjudication of guilt, and impose any sentence which it may lawfully impose, giving credit for all time in the department. [6] F.S.A., Section 39.01(6). [7] F.S.A., Section 39.01(12). [8] F.S.A., Section 39.02(1). [9] F.S.A., Section 39.02(5)(b). Also see Rule 8.100(b) Florida Rules of Juvenile…
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In Interest of K.S.K. 294 So. 2d 50 · 1DT-302 · 1st DCA 1974
· cited by 2 in all courts
…Although evidence was adduced in overwhelming quantities from disinterested persons showing that the child was a dependent child within the meaning of Section 39.01(10), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the trial court erroneously held that the allegations of the petition for permanent commitment were not sustained. Section…
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In re Interest of R.J.C. 300 So. 2d 54 · DCAU-338 · District Court of Appeal 1974
· cited by 121 in all courts
…be awarded custody? We answer both of these questions in the affirmative. As to the first issue, Chapter 73-231, Section 2, Laws of Florida, which amends § 39.01(10), Florida Statutes, defines a “dependent child”, inter alia, as a child who “is surrendered to the division of family services or a licensed child placing…
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In Interest of J.N. 279 So. 2d 50 · 4D72-333 · 4th DCA 1973
· cited by 5 in all courts
…unusual appeal are the following. On 2 February 1972 the juvenile court entered an order adjudicating J.N. to be a delinquent child within the meaning of § 39.01(11) and (12)(b), F.S. 1971, F.S.A. By the same order the court committed the child under the authority of § 39.11(2)(b), F.S. 1971, F.S.A., to the Division of…
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F. v. Duval County 273 So. 2d 15 · 1DP-371 · 1st DCA 1973
· cited by 10 in all courts
… have appealed a final order rendered by the Juvenile Court of Duval County adjudging them to be children in need of supervision as defined by F.S. Section 39.01(12)(a), F.S.A., and placing them under the supervision of a juvenile counselor of the court. The primary issue presented for our decision is one of procedure and…
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J.D.D. v. State 268 So. 2d 457 · 4D71-954TO71-956 · 4th DCA 1972
…of the evidence. The Florida Statutes define a delinquent child as one who "commits a violation of law, regardless of where the violation occurred". Section 39.01(11), F.S. 1971, F.S.A. A violation of law is a violation of any law of the United States, Florida, another state, or a city or town ordinance. Section…
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In the Interest of J.D.D. v. State 268 So. 2d 457 · DCA71-954TO71-956 · District Court of Appeal 1972
· cited by 11 in all courts
…of the evidence. The Florida Statutes define a delinquent child as one who “commits a violation of law, regardless of where the violation occurred”. Section 39.01(11), F.S. 1971, F.S.A. A violation of law is a violation of any law of the United States, Florida, another state, or a city or town ordinance. Section 39.01(13)…
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State Department of Public Welfare v. Galilean Children's Home 102 So. 2d 388 · DCA242 · District Court of Appeal 1958
· cited by 7 in all courts
…not accept children for care until a license is secured from the State Department of Public Welfare.” In the chapter treating of juvenile courts, Section 39.01(10), Fla.Stat.1955, F.S.A. cites a dependent child as: “A child who, for any reason, is destitute, homeless, dependent upon the public for support, or has not…
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Johns Hopkins All Children's Hospital, Inc. v. Kowalski 2D2024-0382 · 2nd DCA 2025
…was the target of Munchausen syndrome by proxy and did not indicate that Maya was suffering with CRPS. Mr. Kowalski testified that he and 3 Section 39.01(43) defined "[n]ecessary medical treatment" as the "care which is necessary within a reasonable degree of medical certainty to prevent the deterioration of a…
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Y.T. v. Department of Children & Families 3D2025-0900 · 3rd DCA 2025
Dependency adjudication reversed because the father promptly protected the child from the mother's abuse and posed no present threat.
…MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ. PER CURIAM. Appellant, Y.T., the father, appeals an order adjudicating his minor child dependent under section 39.01, Florida Statutes (2024). The base allegations supporting dependency related to abuse the child suffered at the hands of the mother within a…
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E.P. v. Department of Children & Families 1D2024-2901-2 · 1st DCA 2025
Appeal dismissed as moot because the child is now over eighteen and no longer a child under Chapter 39.
…following. The court denies the motion to compel docketed on March 21, 2025. The court grants the motions to dismiss submitted by the appellees. See § 39.01(12), Fla. Stat. (defining “child” and “youth” to mean “any unmarried person under the age of 18 years who has not been emancipated by order of the court”); §…
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S.M. v. Department of Children & Families 3D2023-2213 · 3rd DCA 2024
Appeal treated as certiorari and denied; the court properly approved a substance-misuse condition for return though the mother's consent plea omitted substance use.
…is defined as “a hearing in which the court determines the most appropriate protections, services, and placement for the child in dependency cases.” § 39.01(24), Fla. Stat. In its written disposition order, the trial court is required to address the placement of the child and visitation, as well as the requirements…
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P.N. v. Department of Children & Families 3D2024-0177 · 3rd DCA 2024
Termination of the father's rights affirmed on abandonment grounds, citing authority that termination without a case plan is permitted when abandonment is proven.
… court’s finding of abandonment, explaining that “[s]ection 39.806(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), allows TPR based on abandonment, as defined in s. 39.01(1)”). 2
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Guardian ad Litem Program v. Department of Children & Families 6D23-2724 · 6th DCA 2024
Certiorari petition dismissed because the discharged guardian ad litem was no longer a party and could not seek relief for the child after permanent guardianship.
…that because the GAL had been discharged, it was no longer a party to the case and therefore lacked the authority to seek relief on K.H.’s behalf. See § 39.01(58), Fla. Stat. (2022) (defining “party” in the context of chapter 39 as “the parent or parents of the child, the petitioner, the department, the guardian ad…
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Molina v. Fuenmayor 3D2022-1756 · 3rd DCA 2023
Termination affirmed on abandonment because the mother had not seen the child in about nine years; no reunification effort was required.
…with her. The court further found that M.N., who was 11 years old at the time of the hearing, had not seen her mother 3 Abandonment is defined in § 39.01(1), in relevant part, as follows: (1) “Abandoned” or “abandonment” means a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a …
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K.N. v. Department of Children & Families 4D22-2273-2 · 4th DCA 2023
On rehearing the court certified conflict with the Third District on whether the civil intervention rule applies to dependency proceedings; other motions denied.
…was only a participant and not a party entitled to discovery, relying on section 39.812(5), Florida Statutes (2021). T.R.-B., 335 So. 3d at 733; see also § 39.01(58), Fla. Stat. (2021) (defining “party” as “the parent or parents of the child, the petitioner, the department, the guardian ad litem or the representative of…
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S.M.O. v. Department of Children & Families 3D22-1822 · 3rd DCA 2023
Termination of four children affirmed on egregious conduct for failing to stop sexual abuse; relying on an unpled sexual abuse ground was harmless error.
… child or another child to aggravated child abuse as defined in s. 827.03, sexual battery or sexual abuse as defined in s. 39.01, or chronic abuse. § 39.806(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (2022). 2 This case involves egregious conduct under § 39.805(1)(f). “[I]n cases involving egregious…
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State v. Woodson 5D21-2251 · 5th DCA 2022
…stand between the present moment and an “imminent” event. The First and Fourth Districts have defined an “imminent” risk of child abuse under section 39.01, Florida Statutes, as a danger “about to occur” within a “narrow[] time frame.” E.H. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 147 So. 3d 616, 620 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014);…
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S.H. v. Department of Children & Families 3D21-2445 · 3rd DCA 2022
Termination reversed because neither threat-irrespective-of-services nor case plan noncompliance was supported; the mother had largely complied and her shortfalls stemmed from poverty and shifting visitation.
…significantly remedied to the extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon . . . being returned to the child’s parent.” § 39.01(84), Fla. Stat. (2021). This ground comes with a caveat. “[T]he failure to comply with a case plan may not be used as a ground for termination of parental…
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J.W. v. Department of Children & Families 5D22-0045 · 5th DCA 2022
Dependency affirmed for the youngest child, present and hurt during domestic violence, but reversed for the older siblings lacking evidence of awareness or prospective harm.
…in violent behavior that demonstrated a wanton disregard for the presence of J.W. that could have reasonably resulted in serious injury to the child. See § 39.01(35)(i), Fla. Stat. (2019). We reverse the trial court’s order finding J.W.’s two older sisters dependent. There was no competent evidence that these…
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G.C. v. Department of Children & Families 3D21-1342 · 3rd DCA 2022
Termination affirmed; two years of services, including specialized therapy for her borderline personality disorder, did not yield substantial compliance, and termination was least restrictive.
…not substantially complied with the case plan and that termination of G.C.’s parental rights is the least restrictive means to protect K.C. from harm. See § 39.01(84) Fla. Stat. (2021)(“‘Substantial compliance’ means that the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been significantly remedied to the…
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R.W. v. Department of Children & Families 2D21-0592 · 2nd DCA 2021
Dependency adjudication as to the father was reversed because the evidence did not show substantial risk of imminent neglect or abuse, even by failure to protect.
… 2 Case number 2D21-592. 2 findings. The circuit court's ruling turned on prospective neglect or abuse under section 39.01(15)(f), Florida Statutes (2020). Although there is competent substantial evidence in the record to support that the Child was at a "substantial risk of…
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M.M.W. v. Department of Children & Families 2D21-0589 · 2nd DCA 2021
Dependency adjudication as to the mother was affirmed because competent substantial evidence showed substantial risk of imminent neglect or abuse under her care.
… 2 Case number 2D21-592. 2 findings. The circuit court's ruling turned on prospective neglect or abuse under section 39.01(15)(f), Florida Statutes (2020). Although there is competent substantial evidence in the record to support that the Child was at a "substantial risk of…
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L.C.A. v. Department of Children & Families 3D20-1289 · 3rd DCA 2021
Termination reversed because the domestic violence victim completed her case plan, DCF caused delays, and lack of insight cannot alone justify termination.
…to the extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon the child’s remaining with or being returned to the child’s parent.” § 39.01(84), Fla. Stat. Recognizing “that most families desire to be competent caregivers and providers for their children and that children achieve their…
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L.C.A. v. Department of Children & Families 3D20-1289-2 · 3rd DCA 2021
Termination reversed because the domestic-violence-victim mother completed her case plan, experts supported reunification, and DCF did not prove noncompliance or that termination was least restrictive.
…to the extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon the child’s remaining with or being returned to the child’s parent.” § 39.01(84), Fla. Stat. Recognizing “that most families desire to be competent caregivers and providers for their children and that children achieve their…
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Department of Children & Families v. A.L. 1D20-1002 · 1st DCA 2020
Dismissal of the termination petition was reversed because the court misapplied the directed-verdict standard, wrongly applied least restrictive means, and ignored grounds and single-parent termination.
…parental rights to D.I. and I.L. and named three grounds as to each: 1. The mother and father abandoned the children, as stated in sections 39.806(1)(b) and 39.01(1), Florida Statutes; 2. The mother and father engaged in conduct towards the children that demonstrated that continuing the parent-child relationship threatens…
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R.R. v. New Life Community Church of CMA, Inc. SC18-962 · Florida Supreme Court 2020
…Section 95.11(7) provides: FOR INTENTIONAL TORTS BASED ON ABUSE.— An action founded on alleged abuse, as defined in s. 39.01, s. 415.102, or s. 984.03, or incest, as defined in s. 826.04, may be commenced at any time within 7 years after the age of…
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S.C. v. Department of Children & Families 1D20-0967 · 1st DCA 2020
Termination affirmed; the father's token visits, no support, and minimal case plan engagement over twenty months supported the findings.
…inconsistent visitation demonstrated a marginal effort that was incidental or token, as described by the statutory definition for abandonment. See § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2019). Additionally, the court found Appellant did not make a “significant contribution to the child’s care and maintenance,” nor did he…
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R.L. v. Department of Children & Families 273 So. 3d 1012 · 4D18-3700 · 4th DCA 2019
· cited by 1 in all courts
Termination affirmed on abandonment by the incarcerated father, who barely contacted the child; the serious-bodily-injury ground was struck for lack of evidence.
…contribution to the child’s care and maintenance or has failed to establish or maintain a substantial and positive relationship with the child, or both.” § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2018). Conduct leading to 1 The trial court’s factual findings reflect that the father earned $50 a month, in accordance with the father’s…
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J.D. v. Department of Children & Families 263 So. 3d 60 · 4D18-2432 · 4th DCA 2019
· cited by 3 in all courts
Dependency affirmed because ongoing domestic violence by the boyfriend, whom the mother wished to stay with, posed a present threat of neglect.
…that the standard for “abuse” differs from “neglect,” as domestic violence in the home constitutes child abuse only if the child is present); see also § 39.01(50), Fla. Stat. (2018) (defining “neglect,” in relevant part, to occur “when a child is . . . permitted to live in an environment when such . . . environment…
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R.D.S. v. Department of Children & Families 263 So. 3d 183 · 3D18-988 · 3rd DCA 2018
Dependency and denial of termination affirmed in a diabetes-care case; hospital counsel's presence was harmless error, and the Munchausen evaluation directive was quashed.
…of type I diabetes, a chronic and potentially life-threatening medical condition if not kept under tight control. *187 As pertinent here, section 39.01(47), Florida Statutes (2018), defines "medical neglect" as: the failure to provide or the failure to allow needed care as recommended by a health care…
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C.B. v. Department of Children & Families 257 So. 3d 1078 · 4D18-1732 · 4th DCA 2018
· cited by 5 in all courts
Termination affirmed; completing parenting classes and finding housing was not substantial compliance because the mother never completed required mental health treatment.
…to the extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon the child’s remaining with or being returned to the child’s parent.” § 39.01(78), Fla. Stat. (2018). “Conversely, the lack of substantial compliance means that the circumstances which gave rise to creation of the case plan have not been…
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R.D.S. v. Department of Children & Families 3D18-0939 · 3rd DCA 2018
Dependency and denial of termination affirmed in a diabetes-care case; hospital counsel's presence was harmless error, and the Munchausen evaluation directive was quashed.
…of type I diabetes, a chronic and potentially life-threatening medical condition if not kept under tight control. As pertinent here, section 39.01(47), Florida Statutes (2018), defines “medical neglect” as: the failure to provide or the failure to allow needed care as recommended by a health…
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& SC16-400 Elizabeth White v. Mederi Caretenders Visiting Services of Southeast Florida, LLC., and Americare Home Therapy, Inc., etc. v. Carla Hiles 226 So. 3d 774 · SC16-28 · Florida Supreme Court 2017
· cited by 31 in all courts
…See, e.g., In Re B.R.C.M., 182 So. 3d 749, 752 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015), quashed on other grounds, 215 So. 3d 1219 (Fla. 2017) (interpreting “includes” in section 39.01(47), Florida Statutes (2015), expansively); Childers v. State, 936 So. 2d 585, 597 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (interpreting “includes” in section 1.01(3), Florida…
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In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Report No. 2015-06 195 So. 3d 356 · SC15-1872 · Florida Supreme Court 2016
· cited by 2 in all courts
…of “delinquency,” “dependency,” or “child in need of services” based on the statutory definitions in effect at the time of the alleged offense. See § 39.01 Fla.Stat. - 27 - Give as applicable. § 984.03(9), Fla. Stat. If the allegation involves habitual…
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J.D. v. Department of Children & Families 200 So. 3d 130 · 5D15-4112-2 · 5th DCA 2016
Adjudication of dependency reversed on DCF's concession of no competent evidence of abuse, even though only the father appealed.
…that no competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Appellant and A.D.’s mother subjected A.D. to abuse as defined by section '39.01(2), Florida Statutes (2015). We agree and reverse the order adjudicating A.D. dependent. 1 REVERSED. SAWAYA, BERGER, and WALLIS, JJ., concur. . We note…
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J.D. v. Department of Children & Families 5D15-4112 · 5th DCA 2016
Adjudication of dependency reversed on DCF's concession of no competent evidence of abuse, even though only the father appealed.
…that no competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Appellant and A.D.'s mother subjected A.D. to abuse as defined by section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (2015). We agree and reverse the order adjudicating A.D. dependent.1 REVERSED. SAWAYA, BERGER, and WALLIS, JJ., concur. …
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B.G. v. Department of Children & Families 189 So. 3d 305 · 4D15-3834 · 4th DCA 2016
· cited by 5 in all courts
Order relinquishing jurisdiction after placing the child with an out-of-state father vacated because it evaded the ICPC and denied the mother required dependency procedures.
…parent under the prior Domestic Relations order. By definition, shelter custody is temporary, “pending court disposition before' or after adjudication.” § 39.01(70), Fla. Stat. (2015). In this pre-dispositional posture, the Child’s living status was one of placement. *307 In such circumstances,-the parent’s situation…
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J.M. v. Department of Children & Families 188 So. 3d 94 · 4D15-4785 · 4th DCA 2016
· cited by 1 in all courts
On confession of error, dependency adjudication reversed; no evidence the child was aware of or harmed by domestic violence or the mother's substance use.
…abusive, and chronic use of a controlled substance or alcohol by a parent when the child is demonstrably adversely affected by such usage.’” (quoting § 39.01(32)(g)2., Fla. Stat. (2011))). Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s order adjudicating the Child dependent, and remand for proceedings consistent with this…
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Firestone v. Sholom 183 So. 3d 1225 · 3D14-2453 · 3rd DCA 2016
· cited by 2 in all courts
…of section 95.11(7), which provides: FOR INTENTIONAL TORTS BASED ON ABUSE. — An action founded on alleged abuse, as defined in s. 39.01, s. 415.102, or s. 984.03, or incest, as defined in s. 826.04, may be commenced at any time within 7 years after the age of majority, or…
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N.W. v. Department of Children & Families 184 So. 3d 1179 · 2D15-933 · 2nd DCA 2015
· cited by 1 in all courts
Termination reversed because the trial court retroactively applied the 2014 amendment removing the nexus requirement for egregious conduct toward a sibling; remanded for reconsideration.
…or parents have subjected the child or another child to aggravated child abuse as defined in s. 827.03, sexual battery or sexual abuse as defined in s. 39.01, or chronic abuse."), the court found it unnecessary to render any determination on that ground because section 39.806(1)(f) already justified termination…
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Russell v. Pasik 178 So. 3d 55 · 2D14-5540 · 2nd DCA 2015
· cited by 7 in all courts
…different from cases involving nonparents seeking to establish legal rights to a child" (citing Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996))); see also § 39.01(49), Fla. Stat. (2014) (defining a parent as "a woman who gives birth to a child and a man whose consent to the adoption of the child would be required"). Thus,…
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V.C.B. v. Shakir 145 So. 3d 967 · 4D14-1292 · 4th DCA 2014
· cited by 3 in all courts
…and GROSS, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. § 39.01(30)(e), Fla. Stat. As can be seen, the definition of “abandon” in Chapter 39 is very similar to the definition in Chapter 63. …
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A.M. v. Department of Children & Families 140 So. 3d 696 · 3D14-300 · 3rd DCA 2014
Dependency adjudication affirmed, but remanded to conform the written order to the oral ruling that no parent could stop the child's sexual exploitation.
…trial court’s adjudication of dependency as orally pronounced at the September 30, 2013, hearing, finding the child dependent as to A.M. pursuant to section 39.01(15)(g), Florida Statutes (2013). As noted by the parties, however, the order does not comport with the oral pronouncement. The pertinent written finding is limited…
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Turnier v. Stockman 139 So. 3d 397 · 3D13-1822 · 3rd DCA 2014
· cited by 2 in all courts
…and the legal counsel shall not be the same person. In such actions which involve an allegation of child abuse, abandonment, or neglect as defined in s. 39.01, which allegation is verified and determined by the court to be well-founded, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for the child. The guardian ad…
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D.M.T. v. T.M.H. 129 So. 3d 320 · SC12-261 · Florida Supreme Court 2013
· cited by 37 in all courts
…2333 ; cf. art. I, § 27, Fla. Const, (defining marriage in Florida as “the legal union of *356 only one man and one woman”). 10 For example, section 39.01(49), Florida Statutes, defines “[pjarent” as “a woman who gives birth to a child and a man whose consent to the adoption of the child would be required under s.…
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Slowinski v. Sweeney 117 So. 3d 73 · 1D12-3925 · 1st DCA 2013
· cited by 3 in all courts
…on September 15, 2008. Bradberry v. Slowinski, Case No.2008 DR 001829 (4th Jud. Cir. Clay Cnty.). John Slowinski, the child’s parent as defined in sections 39.01(49), 61.13001(1)(d) and 63.062(1)(b)1., Florida Statutes, executed his consent and that consent was attached to the petition. § 751.03(8)-(9), Fla. Stat. On…
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A.J. v. Department of Children & Families 111 So. 3d 980 · 5D12-4500 · 5th DCA 2013
Dependency adjudication affirmed because the parents missed many appointments for a medically fragile child, endangering her health.
…is necessary within a reasonable degree of medical certainty to prevent the deterioration of a child’s condition or to alleviate immediate pain of a child.” § 39.01(43), Fla. Stat. (2011). The testimony reflected that the parents’ failure to follow up on the child’s medical appointments endangered the child’s health and…
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J.Z. v. Department of Children & Family Services 106 So. 3d 976 · CL4988483 · District Court of Appeal 2013
· cited by 3 in all courts
Evidence supported dependency, but the order was reversed for new findings because it parroted the petition; oral findings cannot cure a defective written order.
…compliance” with the case plan will turn on whether “the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been significantly remedied.” § 39.01(73); cf. N.F. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 82 *979 So.3d 1188, 1192-93 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (reversing termination of parental rights, in part…
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Department of Children & Families v. Interest of B.D. 102 So. 3d 707 · 1D12-3698 · 1st DCA 2012
· cited by 7 in all courts
Certiorari granted because the court reopened a closed permanent guardianship on the mother's motion without an evidentiary hearing or the findings the statute requires.
…of a “permanent guardianship of a dependent child,” unless and until a valid basis for changing the child’s placement is established in the record. See § 39.01(55), Fla. Stat. (2011) (stating that a “permanent guardianship of a dependent child ... is intended to be permanent and self-sustaining”); § 39.6221(5), Fla.…
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A.J. v. Department of Children & Families 126 So. 3d 1212 · 4D12-462 · 4th DCA 2012
Termination as to the sons reversed because abuse of their half-sisters, without evidence the boys were at risk, did not prove least restrictive means.
…raises issues regarding evidentiary rulings. We have reviewed the record and find that there was sufficient evidence that sexual abuse, as defined in section 39.01(67), Florida Statutes (2010), occurred. However, we agree with the parents that DCF did not present sufficient evidence that under the totality of the…
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T.L. v. Department of Children & Families 98 So. 3d 785 · 4D12-947 · 4th DCA 2012
· cited by 1 in all courts
Denial of reunification and permanent guardianship vacated because the mother had completed her case plan and no finding rebutted the presumption of return.
…that the safety, well-being, and physical, mental, and emotional health of the child is not endangered by the return of the child to the home. Section 39.01(73), Florida Statutes (2011), provides that “ ‘[substantial compliance’ means that the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been…
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Department of Children & Family Services v. K.D. 88 So. 3d 977 · 2D10-3474 · 2nd DCA 2012
· cited by 9 in all courts
En banc: denial of termination and sua sponte permanent guardianship reversed; availability of guardianship cannot defeat best interests or least restrictive means after grounds proven.
…parent or parents have subjected the child or another child to aggravated child abuse as defined in s. 827.03, sexual battery or sexual abuse as defined in s. 39.01, or chronic abuse.” When DCF proceeds with termination under these sections, it may file an expedited petition for termination of parental rights without…
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E.R.-J. v. Department of Children & Family Services 86 So. 3d 574 · 2D11-3961 · 2nd DCA 2012
· cited by 1 in all courts
Termination reversed because remaining case plan breaches did not endanger the child and stemmed from poverty and lack of services; the case plan was reinstated.
…to the extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon the child’s remaining with or being returned to the child’s parent.” § 39.01(73). In order to terminate parental rights, the Department must prove the allegations in its petition by clear and convincing evidence. See R.C. v. Dep’t of…
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S.M. v. R.M. 82 So. 3d 163 · 4D11-3632 · 4th DCA 2012
· cited by 1 in all courts
Certiorari granted because the family court judge entered a sua sponte shelter order giving custody to the father without letting the mother be heard.
…by initiating a dependency proceeding, so she decided sua sponte to initiate such a proceeding by issuing an order to take the child into custody. Section 39.01(68), Florida Statutes (2011), defines "shelter" as " placement with a relative or a nonrelative, or in a licensed home or facility ..." (Emphasis added.) Section…
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R.B. v. Department of Children & Families 80 So. 3d 1078 · 4D11-2613 · 4th DCA 2012
· cited by 1 in all courts
Termination affirmed; findings met Padgett and evidence supported threat-to-child and abandonment grounds, with one judge dissenting on abandonment.
…all of the majority opinion except for the determination that the evidence supports the termination of parental rights because R.B. abandoned A.N.B. Section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2010), provides: “Abandoned” or “abandonment” means a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child ... while being able, …
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J.C. v. Department of Children & Family Services 83 So. 3d 883 · 2D11-3659 · 2nd DCA 2012
· cited by 5 in all courts
Certiorari granted: grandparent petitioners had standing, and the court misapplied the Keeping Children Safe Act and treated its presumption as irrebuttable.
…although the grandparents are “essentially” parties they would need some kind of “additional standing” to challenge this order regarding placement. Section 39.01(51), Florida Statutes (2010), defines “party” to include “the petitioner.” Because the grandparents are petitioners in the trial court, they are not “essentially”…
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In re G.M., Jr. 71 So. 3d 924 · 2D11-1511 · 2nd DCA 2011
Termination reversed: the incarcerated father never received his case plan or help and kept communicating with the child, so neither ground was proven.
…failure to complete a case plan within nine months after an adjudication of the child as dependent is evidence of abandonment, abuse, or neglect. Section 39.01(1) provides that "[t]he incarceration of a parent. . . may support a finding of abandonment." Incarceration, however, does not constitute abandonment as a matter…
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G.M. v. Department of Children & Family Services 71 So. 3d 924 · 2D11-1511-2 · 2nd DCA 2011
· cited by 3 in all courts
Termination reversed: the incarcerated father never received his case plan or help and kept communicating with the child, so neither ground was proven.
…failure to complete a case plan within nine months after an adjudication of the child as dependent is evidence of abandonment, abuse, or neglect. Section 39.01(1) provides that “[t]he incarceration of a parent ... may support a finding of abandonment.” Incarceration, however, does not constitute abandonment as a matter…
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Parrish v. State 66 So. 3d 1030 · 1D10-5606 · 1st DCA 2011
· cited by 4 in all courts
…of the child, as evidenced by a discernable and substantial impairment in the ability to function within the normal range of performance and behavior.” § 39.01, Fla. Stat (2010); see DuFresne v. State, 826 So.2d 272, 278-79 (Fla.2002) (reading chapter 39 in pari materia with section 827.03 to supply…
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D.G. v. Department of Children & Families 77 So. 3d 201 · 4D10-4124 · 4th DCA 2011
· cited by 18 in all courts
Termination affirmed: after three years neither parent substantially completed the case plan, and drug use, poor judgment and continuing danger persisted.
…by the mother’s positive drug tests. The mother asserts that her drug tests should be ignored, because “substantial compliance” is defined in section 39.01(73) *208 to mean that the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been significantly remedied to the extent that the child will not be…
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Burrows v. State 62 So. 3d 1258 · 3D10-37 · 3rd DCA 2011
· cited by 6 in all courts
…because the term ‘mental injury’ is adequately defined in another related statute” — Chapter 39, which is titled “Proceedings Relating to Children.” Section 39.01(42), Florida Statutes (2008), defines “mental injury” as “an injury to the intellectual or psychological capacity of a child as evidenced by a discernible and…
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AH v. Department of Children & Families 63 So. 3d 874 · 1D11-1466 · 1st DCA 2011
· cited by 4 in all courts
Termination affirmed on the abuse ground, but the sexual predator ground struck: only a sentencing court can designate a parent a sexual predator.
… in which he observed: [One] thing to consider about the [section 39.806](l)(d)2 text lies in the term, “the court.” Under the definition in section 39.01(18) “the court,” unless otherwise expressly stated, refers to the court exercising power in a chapter 39 proceeding. Yet there is no provision in the Criminal…
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M.S. v. Department of Children & Families 60 So. 3d 573 · 3D10-3052 · 3rd DCA 2011
· cited by 1 in all courts
Neglect-based dependency reversed: no evidence of drug sales from the home, the child could not reach the weapons, and no harm was shown.
…caused the child harm. DCF contends that the trial court’s ruling is supported by competent and substantial evidence. We agree with the mother. Section 39.01(44), Florida Statutes (2010), defines “neglect” as occurring when “a child is permitted to live in an environment when such ... environment causes the child’s…
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C.J. v. State 58 So. 3d 392 · 1D10-5174 · 1st DCA 2011
Dismissal of a private dependency petition reversed because the petition's allegations, taken as true, sufficiently alleged dependency and the court relied on unsworn allegations.
…contained within the four corners of the pleading, when construed in favor of appellants, are legally sufficient to prove dependency pursuant to section 39.01(15), Florida Statutes (2010). See Dep't of Children & Families v. R.V., 917 So.2d 334 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (noting that motions to dismiss filed pursuant…
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C.J. v. State 58 So. 3d 392 · 1D10-5174-2 · 1st DCA 2011
· cited by 1 in all courts
Dismissal of a private dependency petition reversed because the petition's allegations, taken as true, sufficiently alleged dependency and the court relied on unsworn allegations.
…contained within the four corners of the pleading, when construed in favor of appellants, are legally sufficient to prove dependency pursuant to section 39.01(15), Florida Statutes (2010). See Dep’t of Children & Families v. R.V., 917 So.2d 334 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (noting that motions to dismiss filed pursuant to…
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I.Z. v. B.H. 53 So. 3d 406 · 4D10-3372 · 4th DCA 2011
· cited by 5 in all courts
Termination sought by guardians reversed; evidence did not prove abandonment, threatening conduct, or continuing abuse, and mental illness alone was insufficient.
…efforts and incidental or token visits or communications are not sufficient to establish or maintain a substantial and positive relationship with a child. § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). The trial court found that the mother was incarcerated from February 2009 until November 2009, and that during that period, there were…
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A.B.E. v. Department of Children & Families 47 So. 3d 347 · 4D10-2140 · 4th DCA 2010
· cited by 4 in all courts
Termination of both parents affirmed; the mother abused the child after reunification, the father failed his case plan, and the niece's home was unsuitable.
…The trial court found abandonment, because the mother had not even inquired into the welfare of the child after the second removal. We agree. Section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2009), defines “abandonment” as: [A] situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child ... while being able, makes no…
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Department of Children & Families v. K.D. 45 So. 3d 46 · 5D09-4639 · 5th DCA 2010
· cited by 1 in all courts
Youth's Road to Independence eligibility order reversed; foster care means licensed foster care, and constitutionality could not be raised sua sponte; question certified.
…funds. Although we are powerless to address this policy issue, we recommend it to the Florida Legislature for consideration. 2 . Section 39.01(31), Florida Statutes (2009), defines "foster care” as “care provided a child in a foster family or boarding home, group home, agency boarding home, child care…
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A.V.C. v. Department of Children & Family Services 41 So. 3d 1116 · 3D10-887 · 3rd DCA 2010
… Karla A. Perkins, Children Legal Services Appellate Counsel, for appellee. Before GERSTEN, CORTIÑAS and ROTHENBERG, JJ. PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 39.01(15)(f), Fla. Stat. (2009); C.J. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 968 So.2d 121 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
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SM v. Department of Children & Families 33 So. 3d 837 · 4D10-838 · 4th DCA 2010
… This court hereby holds that the maternal grandmother in the present case is not a party, and thus, has no standing to bring the instant appeal. §§ 39.01(51), 39.501(1), 39.815(1), Fla. Stat. (2009). E.g., In re K.M., 978 So.2d 211 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). The grandmother’s reliance on In re…
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R.A. v. Department of Children & Families 30 So. 3d 722 · 5D09-2687 · 5th DCA 2010
· cited by 4 in all courts
Termination reversed because the father was making a determined effort to rehabilitate and DCF did not prove least restrictive means; case plan reinstated.
…to the extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon the child’s remaining with or being returned to the child’s parent.” § 39.01(71), Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added); see E.R. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 937 So.2d 1196, 1198 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). “[T]he…
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In re E.C. 33 So. 3d 710 · 2D08-3544 · 2nd DCA 2010
Termination affirmed: failure to file the case plan was not fundamental error because the parents knew of it and never objected over three years; dissent.
…extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon the child's remaining with or *720 being returned to the child's parent." § 39.01(71) (emphasis added); see also R.F. v. Dep't of Children Family Servs., 22 So.3d 650, 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); E.R. v. Dep't of Children Family Servs., …
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R.C. v. Department of Children & Family Services 33 So. 3d 710 · 2D08-3544-2 · 2nd DCA 2010
· cited by 12 in all courts
Termination affirmed: failure to file the case plan was not fundamental error because the parents knew of it and never objected over three years; dissent.
…extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon the child’s remaining with or *720 being returned to the child's parent.” § 39.01(71) (emphasis added); see also R.F. v. Dep’t of Children Family Servs., 22 So.3d 650, 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); E.R. v. Dep’t of Children Family Servs., …
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A.B. v. Department of Children & Family Services 19 So. 3d 450 · 2D08-6148 · 2nd DCA 2009
Dependency adjudication based on prospective harm reversed on DCF's concession that the evidence was insufficient; remanded to reassess placement with the father.
…order adjudicating his child, S.B., to be dependent as to him based on the imminent risk of prospective abuse or neglect. 1 See § 39.01(15)(f), Fla. Stat. (2008). The Department of Children and Family Services properly concedes error based on the insufficiency of the evidence presented at trial to…
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B.T. v. Department of Children & Families 16 So. 3d 940 · 5D09-774 · 5th DCA 2009
· cited by 1 in all courts
Dependency adjudication affirmed, but the abandonment finding was reversed because DCF offered only the father's incarceration and nothing on his contact or support efforts.
…only witness who testified. He admitted that he is currently serving a ninety-six month prison sentence, with a release date of July 4, 2011. Section 39.01 (1), Florida Statutes (2008) defines abandonment as follows: (1) “Abandoned” or “abandonment” means a situation in which the parent or legal custodian…
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Department of Children & Families v. S.E. 12 So. 3d 902 · 4D08-993 · 4th DCA 2009
Section 57.105 fee award against DCF reversed because medical team opinions supported the dependency petition throughout; cost award affirmed.
…DCA 2001) (holding that section 57.105 fees are recoverable from the point at which the suit becomes frivolous). *904 Pursuant to section 39.01(14)(f), Florida Statutes (2006), a child can be found dependent if he or she is “at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect.” In its initial and…
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P.I. v. Department of Children & Families 14 So. 3d 1173 · 3D08-2831 · 3rd DCA 2009
· cited by 2 in all courts
Termination affirmed because the mother knowingly failed to protect her children from severe abuse by the stepfather and could not protect them in the future.
…father’s treatment of the child but was never able to stop it. Here, DCF met its burden of presenting evidence to support the court’s finding that sections 39.01 and 39.806 were satisfied. This opinion shall become effective immediately, notwithstanding the filing of any motion for rehearing. Affirmed.
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Andre v. State 13 So. 3d 103 · 4D08-1403 · 4th DCA 2009
· cited by 5 in all courts
… Cason ex rel. Saferight v. Hammock, 908 So.2d 512 , 517 n. 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005), “found a definition of the term ‘legal guardianship’ in section 39.01(34), Florida Statutes (2003), which provides that the term ‘means a judicially created relationship between the child and caregiver which is intended to be…
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In re Ll-R. 9 So. 3d 707 · 2D08-2554 · 2nd DCA 2009
Termination for abandonment reversed because the incarcerated father communicated with the child as soon as located and was never offered a case plan.
…had not voluntarily consented to the termination and proceeded to conduct a trial on the department's allegation of abandonment. The 2006 version of section 39.01(1) defines abandonment as: a situation in which the parent ..., while being able, makes no provision for the child's support and makes no effort to communicate…
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J.R. v. Department of Children & Family Services 9 So. 3d 707 · 2D08-2554-2 · 2nd DCA 2009
· cited by 1 in all courts
Termination for abandonment reversed because the incarcerated father communicated with the child as soon as located and was never offered a case plan.
…had not voluntarily consented to the termination and proceeded to conduct a trial on the department’s allegation of abandonment. The 2006 version of section 39.01(1) defines abandonment as: a situation in which the parent ..., while being able, makes no provision for the child’s support and makes no effort to communicate…
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P.S. v. Department of Children & Families 4 So. 3d 719 · 5D08-3140 · 5th DCA 2009
· cited by 4 in all courts
A second dependency adjudication was improper under the statute, but requiring the father to complete a case plan was proper; remanded for a supplemental order.
…hearing. 2 . Section 39.811, Florida Statutes (2008) pertains to termination of parental rights proceedings. 3 . § 39.01(15X0, Fla. Stat. (2008). 4 . Should the father seek to have the children placed with him, the trial court would have to determine, …
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F.B. v. Department of Children & Family Services 4 So. 3d 684 · 2D08-3029 · 2nd DCA 2009
· cited by 2 in all courts
Termination reversed: the order only conclusorily found best interests, and admissible evidence did not prove the incarcerated father abandoned a child he never knew.
…the child’s support and makes no effort to communicate with the child, which situation is sufficient to evince a willful rejection of parental obligations.” § 39.01(1). The Department is required to prove its case with clear and convincing evidence, § 39.809(1), because “[n]atural parents have a fundamental liberty interest…
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M.F. v. Department of Children & Families 992 So. 2d 410 · 1D08-1475 · 1st DCA 2008
· cited by 2 in all courts
Termination of only the mother's rights reversed because the court refused to make the findings section 39.811(6) requires when severing one parent's rights.
…rights based on findings that Appellant consented by failing to appear and/or "abandoned" the child, as that term is defined in sections 39.806(1)(b) & 39.01(1), Florida Statutes. (2007); and that the manifest best interest of the child called for the termination of Appellant's parental rights pursuant to section…
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Justice Administrative Com'n v. Peterson 989 So. 2d 663 · 2D07-6075 · 2nd DCA 2008
· cited by 16 in all courts
Order making the state pay appointed counsel for a nonparent grandfather custodian quashed because only indigent parents have a right to appointed counsel in dependency.
…counsel. The court shall appoint counsel for indigent parents." This section must be read in conjunction with the definition of the term "parent" in section 39.01(48): "Parent" means a woman who gives birth to a child and a man whose consent to the adoption of the child would be required under s. 63.062(1). If a child has…
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R.H. v. Department of Children & Family Services 994 So. 2d 1153 · 3D08-623 · 3rd DCA 2008
· cited by 1 in all courts
Grandparents' appeal of a placement change to an aunt and uncle dismissed because they were participants, not parties, and lacked standing.
…the parents' failure to comply with the requirements of the dependency. G.O.'s grandparents, R.H. and B.H., were not parties to the proceeding below. See § 39.01(50), Fla. Stat. (2007) (limiting the definition of a "party" under Chapter 39 to "the parent or parents of the child, the petitioner, the department, the guardian…
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T.B. v. Department of Children & Families 985 So. 2d 1210 · 5D08-960 · 5th DCA 2008
Dependency as to the father reversed because incarceration, DCF's paternity-testing delay and a barred contact order did not show abandonment or imminent neglect.
…in the opinion of the court, the parent’s efforts to support and communicate with the child “do not evince a settled purpose to assume all parental duties.” § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). Ordinarily, a finding that a parent has not seen or supported his or her child for eleven months would support a finding of abandonment.…
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E.S. v. Department of Children & Families 984 So. 2d 647 · 1D07-5761 · 1st DCA 2008
· cited by 1 in all courts
Dependency of the four-year-old reversed; one incident of harsh discipline and brief lack of supervision, with no link to the niece's death, was insufficient.
…or environment causes [her] physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly impaired." § 39.01(43), Fla. Stat. (2006). Here, the court found that Appellant failed to adequately supervise S.M., thereby presenting a danger to her, as she was too young to care…
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B.A. v. Department of Children & Family Services 984 So. 2d 618 · 2D07-4672 · 2nd DCA 2008
· cited by 3 in all courts
…competent, substantial evidence that the abuse of the half-sister placed J.A. at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by B.A. See § 39.01(14)(f), Fla. Stat. (2007); R.F. v. Fla., Dep’t of Children & Families (In re M.F.), 770 So.2d 1189 (Fla.2000). We agree and reverse those portions of the order…
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C.M. v. Department of Children & Families 981 So. 2d 1272 · 1D07-6508 · 1st DCA 2008
· cited by 5 in all courts
…by the Department, moved to dismiss this appeal for lack of standing. Because we agree that the appellants were not parties to the proceedings below, see § 39.01(50), Florida Statutes (2007), they lack standing to bring this appeal, see § 39.815(1), Florida Statutes (2007), and we must grant the motion and dismiss the…
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State v. Contreras 979 So. 2d 896 · SC05-1767 · Florida Supreme Court 2008
· cited by 30 in all courts
…(2007), child protection teams are charged with interviewing child victims of sexual abuse and with providing expert testimony in court. Further, section 39.01(13), Florida Statutes (2007), created CPTs for the express purpose of processing child abuse cases, and section 39.306, Florida Statutes (2007), requires CPTs to…
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In re J.E.B. 971 So. 2d 187 · 2D07-2060 · 2nd DCA 2007
· cited by 3 in all courts
Adjudication reversed because DCF proved only the mother's arrest for neglect in a sibling's death, not actual neglect or risk to this child.
…the Department proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the child is "at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent." §§ 39.01(14)(f), .507(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2006); see also S.G. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (In re I.B.), 946 So.2d 650, 652 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Here, the only…
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T.S. v. Department of Children & Families 969 So. 2d 494 · 1D07-2161 · 1st DCA 2007
· cited by 8 in all courts
Termination for abandonment reversed because the father's eight-month jail term left no evidence he was able to support or contact his infant.
…purpose to assume all parental duties, the court may declare the child to be abandoned. . . . [I]ncarceration . . . may support a finding of abandonment." § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2006). The qualifying phrase "while being able" excludes involuntary abandonment. See P.S. v. State, 384 So.2d 656 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). …
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Department of Children & Families v. S.T. 963 So. 2d 314 · 4D07-1798 · 4th DCA 2007
· cited by 1 in all courts
Certiorari denied on the guardian ad litem program's petition, joined by DCF, challenging an order reunifying the children with the mother after domestic violence.
…to the extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon the child's remaining with or being returned to the child's parent." § 39.01(71), Fla. Stat. (2006).
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L.H. v. Department of Children & Family Services 957 So. 2d 714 · 3D06-1380 · 3rd DCA 2007
· cited by 1 in all courts
Termination affirmed because substantial competent evidence showed the mother abandoned the child.
…the mother's parental rights because there is substantial competent evidence in the record to show that she abandoned her minor child as defined by section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (2005). See T.P. v. Dep't. of Children & Family Services, 935 So.2d 621 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)(standard of review for the sufficiency of…
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B.L. v. Department of Children & Families 950 So. 2d 1264 · 5D06-1228 · 5th DCA 2007
· cited by 11 in all courts
Long-term relative placement reversed because the court applied mere case plan completion rather than the statutory substantial compliance standard.
…that the term "substantial compliance," is statutorily defined as something different than merely whether the parents "completed" their case plan. Section 39.01(68), Florida Statutes, contains the applicable definition: "Substantial compliance" means that the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have…
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Hernandez v. State 946 So. 2d 1270 · 2D05-4048 · 2nd DCA 2007
· cited by 30 in all courts
…Children and Family Services] and to provide specialized and supportive services to the program in processing child abuse, abandonment, or neglect cases. " § 39.01(13), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis added). In accordance with the statute, the CPT is required to provide a variety of services. The services that the CPT is…
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C.W. v. Department of Children & Family Services 944 So. 2d 1197 · 3D06-143 · 3rd DCA 2006
· cited by 3 in all courts
Dependency reversed because the father's failure to protect his niece from the mother's abuse lacked a nexus showing imminent harm to his own child.
…neglected, or who is found by a court "[t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians." § 39.01(14)(f), Fla. Stat. (2006). Children who have not been abused may still be found to be at substantial risk of imminent abuse and declared dependant by a court due to…
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In re Baby R.P.S. 942 So. 2d 906 · 2D05-2582 · 2nd DCA 2006
· cited by 1 in all courts
…him. Additionally, J.C.J. is not a "parent" under the Florida Adoption Act. Chapter 63 does not include a definition of parent but rather refers to section 39.01(49), Florida Statutes (2004), which defines a parent as a "man whose consent to the adoption of the child would be required under s. 63.062(1)." By alleging in…
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J.C.J. v. Heart of Adoptions, Inc. 942 So. 2d 906 · 2D05-2582-2 · 2nd DCA 2006
· cited by 6 in all courts
…him. Additionally, J.C.J. is not a “parent” under the Florida Adoption Act. Chapter 63 does not include a definition of parent but rather refers to section 39.01(49), Florida Statutes (2004), which defines a parent as a “man whose consent to the adoption of the child would be required under s. 63.062(1).” By alleging in…
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E.R. v. Department of Children & Family Services 937 So. 2d 1196 · 3D05-2606 · 3rd DCA 2006
· cited by 10 in all courts
Termination reversed: the father substantially complied with his case plan and was bonded with the children, so termination was not least restrictive or best.
…extent that the well-being and safety of the children will not be endangered upon the children remaining with or being returned to the children's parent. § 39.01(68), Fla. Stat. (2003). Here, DCF removed the children from the father's custody on allegations that the father had a drinking problem and neglected the…
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Department of Children & Family Services v. A.Q. 937 So. 2d 1156 · 3D05-1746 · 3rd DCA 2006
· cited by 2 in all courts
Dismissal of the termination petition reversed: the father abandoned the children for years, never completed his case plan, and relatives wished to adopt them.
…his absence to inquire about the children. This was clearly a willful rejection of his parental responsibilities and constitutes abandonment under section 39.01, Florida Statutes (2005). In fact, on January 26, 2005, the trial court entered a Judicial Review Order finding that that father abandoned the children for…
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In re B.C. 936 So. 2d 764 · 2D05-3833 · 2nd DCA 2006
· cited by 4 in all courts
Dependency of the son reversed: the expert found minimal, non-imminent risk, so alleged abuse of a stepsister alone did not prove prospective harm.
…because that is the birthday nearest the date he left the custody of his parents. [2] The definition of a "child who is found to be dependent" in section 39.01(14)(f), Florida Statutes (2003), includes children found "[t]o be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal…
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In re J.B. 923 So. 2d 1201 · 2D04-2134 · 2nd DCA 2006
· cited by 18 in all courts
Termination reversed: no clear and convincing proof of abandonment, threat to the child, or case plan failure, since incarceration alone was the obstacle.
…parental rights. Section 39.806(1)(b) Pursuant to section 39.806(1)(b), the trial court found that J.R. had abandoned his son as defined in section 39.01(1), which states: "The incarceration of a parent, legal custodian, or caregiver responsible for the child's welfare may support a finding of abandonment."…
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H.G. v. Department of Children & Families 916 So. 2d 1006 · 4D04-4617 · 4th DCA 2006
· cited by 2 in all courts
Denial of reunification reversed: the mother substantially complied with the case plan, and tasks never added to it could not count against her.
…physical, mental, and emotional health of the child is not endangered by the return of the child to the home." *1009 § 39.522(2), Fla. Stat. (2003). Section 39.01(68) defines "substantial compliance" as: [T]he circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been significantly remedied to the extent that the…
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D.B. v. Department of Children & Families 932 So. 2d 230 · 4D05-849 · 4th DCA 2005
· cited by 1 in all courts
Termination affirmed for both parents, who failed their case plans and continued cocaine use despite repeated treatment offers, with adoption available.
…the extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon the child's remaining with or being returned to the child's parent." Sec. 39.01(68), Fla. Stat.; 9. The circumstances which resulted in the creation of this case plan stem *233 largely from both parents' drug use. The Drug Abuse…
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K.J. v. Department of Children & Families 906 So. 2d 1183 · 4D04-4299 · 4th DCA 2005
· cited by 9 in all courts
Termination reversed because DCF offered no help after the mother's discharge from drug treatment, and best interests and least restrictive means were unproven.
…resources or the failure of the department to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parent and child. Substantial compliance is defined in section 39.01(68), which states: Substantial compliance means that the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been significantly remedied to the extent…
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Cason ex rel. Saferight v. Hammock 908 So. 2d 512 · 5D04-2111 · 5th DCA 2005
· cited by 7 in all courts
…Fla. Stat. (2003). We have not found a definition of the term "legal guardian." We have found a definition of the term "legal guardianship" in section 39.01(34), Florida Statutes (2003), which provides that the term "means a judicially created relationship between the child and caregiver which is intended to be…
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T.V. v. Department of Children & Family Services 905 So. 2d 945 · 3D04-32 · 3rd DCA 2005
· cited by 14 in all courts
Termination affirmed because the mother's serious mental illness, violent threats and refusal of treatment threatened the children's safety.
…JJ. RAMIREZ, J. T.V., the natural mother, appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights as to her three children, pursuant to section 39.01(45), Florida Statutes (2002). We find clear and convincing evidence that the mother's continuing involvement with the children threaten the children's lives or…
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In re N.S. 898 So. 2d 1194 · 2D04-211 · 2nd DCA 2005
Termination of both parents reversed because DCF proved no ground, including no substantial risk from a prior sibling termination or harm from short incarceration.
…justified termination. Section 39.806(1)(b) provides that termination of parental rights may be undertaken when a child is abandoned as defined by section 39.01. A trial court may consider a parent's criminal history and incarceration as factors when deciding whether or not to terminate on the grounds of abandonment,…
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K.S. v. Department of Children & Family Services 898 So. 2d 1194 · 2D04-211-2 · 2nd DCA 2005
· cited by 7 in all courts
Termination of both parents reversed because DCF proved no ground, including no substantial risk from a prior sibling termination or harm from short incarceration.
…justified termination. Section 39.806(l)(b) provides that termination of parental rights may be undertaken when a child is abandoned as defined by section 39.01. A trial court may consider a parent’s criminal history and incarceration as factors when deciding whether or not to terminate on the grounds of abandonment,…
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O.E.B. v. Department of Children & Family Services 890 So. 2d 450 · 3D04-22 · 3rd DCA 2004
Termination affirmed because competent, substantial evidence showed the father abused and neglected the children.
…evidence in the record to support the trial court’s determination that the minor children at issue were abused and neglected by him as defined in Chapter 39.01, Fla. Stat. (2004). We therefore affirm the judgment terminating his parental rights. See F.A.F. v. Dept. of Children & Family Servcs., 804 So.2d 616 …
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J.J. v. Department of Children & Families 886 So. 2d 1046 · 4D04-762 · 4th DCA 2004
· cited by 8 in all courts
Order reversed because after DCF failed to prove best interests the court could not order a retrial; it had to follow section 39.811 remedies.
…tasks of her case." However, although the parents completed many of their tasks, such completion *1049 does not equate to substantial compliance. Section 39.01(68) states that, "`[s]ubstantial compliance' means that the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been significantly remedied to the…
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M.W. v. Department of Children & Family Services 881 So. 2d 734 · 3D03-2281 · 3rd DCA 2004
· cited by 4 in all courts
Dependency of three daughters affirmed: the father's sexual abuse of their stepsister, with no remorse or treatment, created a substantial risk of imminent abuse.
…a dependent child includes one who is "at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians." Id. § 39.01(14)(f). In making that determination, the trial court is to look at the totality of the circumstances. M.F., 770 So.2d at 1194 . M.W. relies on the M.F. …
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In re E.D. 884 So. 2d 291 · 2D03-1678 · 2nd DCA 2004
· cited by 6 in all courts
Termination affirmed for three children on the threat-of-harm ground despite a flawed incarceration-based abandonment finding; reversed for the oldest because the other parent's rights remained.
…court was of the opinion that the Mother's efforts were only marginal efforts that did not evince a settled purpose to assume all parental duties, see § 39.01(1), its finding of abandonment does not reflect that it was based on any factor other than the Mother's incarceration. Cf. M.A. v. Dep't of Children &…
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L.N. v. Department of Children & Family Services 884 So. 2d 291 · 2D03-1678-2 · 2nd DCA 2004
· cited by 9 in all courts
Termination affirmed for three children on the threat-of-harm ground despite a flawed incarceration-based abandonment finding; reversed for the oldest because the other parent's rights remained.
…court was of the opinion that the Mother’s efforts were only marginal efforts that did not evince a settled purpose to assume all parental duties, see § 39.01(1), its finding of abandonment does not reflect that it was based on any factor other than the Mother’s incarceration. Cf. M.A. v. Dep’t of Children & …
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R.M. v. Department of Children & Families 877 So. 2d 797 · 5D04-130 · 5th DCA 2004
· cited by 2 in all courts
Temporary child support may be ordered after shelter before adjudication, but the father was entitled to notice and a hearing on the amount; remanded.
…cause exists to believe the child is dependent, i.e., "has been abandoned, abused or neglected by the child's parent or parents or legal custodians." § 39.01(14)(a), Fla. Stat. Once such a probable cause finding is made and a lawful basis for sheltering a child is established, any claim that it is somehow a substantive…
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M.B. v. Department of Children & Families 872 So. 2d 948 · 5D03-3045 · 5th DCA 2004
PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See § 39.01(30)(g)l., Fla. Stat. (2002). “Harm” to a child’s health or welfare can occur when any person: (g) Exposes a child to a controlled substance or alcohol. Exposure…
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State v. White 867 So. 2d 594 · 2D03-775 · 2nd DCA 2004
· cited by 1 in all courts
… Section 39.205(6) provides that “[a] person who knowingly and willfully makes a false report of child abuse” is guilty of a third-degree felony. Section 39.01(27) defines “false report” as “a report of abuse, neglect, or abandonment of a child to the central abuse hotline which report is maliciously made” for specified…
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S.J. v. Department of Children & Family Services 866 So. 2d 770 · 4D02-4258 · 4th DCA 2004
· cited by 1 in all courts
Termination affirmed: case plan noncompliance as to one child and untreated, unamenable substance abuse threatening the other child; termination was least restrictive means.
…provide a stable home, and lacked the capacity to care for her children, all of which threaten the children's safety and well-being and may constitute harm. § 39.01(30), Fla. Stat. (2001) (defining harm). Four home studies had established that there is no suitable family placement option. Termination was, as a result, the…
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S.J. v. Department of Children & Family Services 866 So. 2d 770 · 4D02-4258-2 · 4th DCA 2004
· cited by 4 in all courts
Termination affirmed: case plan noncompliance as to one child and untreated, unamenable substance abuse threatening the other child; termination was least restrictive means.
…a - stable home, and lacked the capacity to care for her children, all of which threaten the children’s safety and well-being and may constitute harm. § 39.01(30), Fla. Stat. (2001) (defining harm). Four home studies had established .that there is, no suit-, able family placement option. Termination was, as a result,…
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D.A. v. Department of Children & Family Services 863 So. 2d 1284 · 3D03-2238 · 3rd DCA 2004
PER CURIAM. Affirmed. § 39.01(60), Fla. Stat. (1998); D.P. v. Department of Children & Families, 786 So.2d 600 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).
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J.L. v. G.L. 863 So. 2d 428 · 4D03-1999 · 4th DCA 2003
· cited by 1 in all courts
Denial of post-termination child support affirmed because a father whose rights were terminated is no longer a legal parent obligated to pay support.
…adoptive mother or father of the child. The term does not include an individual whose parental relationship to the child has been legally terminated ... § 39.01(49), Fla. Stat. (2003) (emphasis added). Therefore, because the father’s rights were terminated, he no longer qualifies as a parent and thus no longer has the…
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P.M. v. Department of Children & Families 865 So. 2d 8 · 5D02-3569 · 5th DCA 2003
· cited by 1 in all courts
Foster placement and psychosexual evaluation affirmed, but remanded to clarify whether the child was found dependent as to the legal father given inconsistent rulings.
…by their arguments and the police were called. P.M. also admitted the facts which formed the basis for the allegations of sexual abuse. Under section 39.01(63), "sexual abuse of a child" includes the following: (b) Any sexual contact between the genitals or anal opening of one person and the mouth or tongue of…
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Levy v. Guardianship of Levy 861 So. 2d 99 · 4D02-3240 · 4th DCA 2003
· cited by 1 in all courts
…the provisions of that statute do not automatically preclude Levy from serving as a guardian, because her son was not a “child” within the meaning of section 39.01(12), Florida Statutes (2000) at the time of a July 1992 incident. On remand, the court shall consider the totality of the circumstances to decide whether Levy is…
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S.L. v. Department of Children & Families 852 So. 2d 372 · 5D02-2593 · 5th DCA 2003
· cited by 1 in all courts
Placement of dependent children with the mother and maternal grandparents rather than the father affirmed; the court reasonably found return to him posed safety concerns.
…Family Services, 837 So.2d 1098, 1101-1102 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); § 39.521(1)(b)3, Fla. Stat. "Grandparent" is included in the definition of "relative." § 39.01(48), Fla. Stat. In the instant case, the department had stated, at a previous hearing, that placing the children with the father would require only weekly visits…
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J.M. v. Department of Children & Family Services 851 So. 2d 303 · 4D02-3832 · 4th DCA 2003
Dependency of a runaway foster teen's infant reversed: no jurisdiction or notice, and only hearsay and mere allegation supported any risk of harm.
…in imminent risk of harm. In particular, the court held that "[t]hese activities and/or environments threaten harm to the child as defined in Florida Statutes 39.01(30) and/or caused or are likely to cause the child's physical, mental or emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly…
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D.M. v. Department of Children & Families 849 So. 2d 423 · 1D02-5276 · 1st DCA 2003
Dependency adjudication reversed because the record did not support findings of neglect from leaving the children alone or from alleged substance abuse.
PER CURIAM. Appellant argues that the trial court’s finding of acts constituting abandonment, abuse, and neglect, as defined in section 39.01, Florida Statutes (2002), was not supported by competent substantial evidence. We agree. The record does not support the trial court’s finding that…
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North Fla. Women's Health Services v. State 866 So. 2d 612 · SC01-843 · Florida Supreme Court 2003
· cited by 82 in all courts
…pregnancy will create serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function. (e) "Sexual abuse" has the meaning ascribed in s. 39.01 and refers to the acts of sexual abuse against a minor by a family member as defined in s. 741.28(2). (3) NOTIFICATION REQUIRED. (a) A termination of…
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In re C.M. 844 So. 2d 765 · 2D01-4145 · 2nd DCA 2003
Dependency adjudication of the father's biological children reversed because discipline of his stepchildren showed no nexus to prospective abuse of his own children.
…preponderance of the evidence that the child has been abused, abandoned, or neglected or is at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect. § 39.01(14), Fla. Stat. (2000); In the Interest of D.J.W., 764 So.2d 825 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). In this case, the Department sought to establish that the father's…
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C.M. v. Department of Children & Family Services 844 So. 2d 765 · 2D01-4145-2 · 2nd DCA 2003
· cited by 15 in all courts
Dependency adjudication of the father's biological children reversed because discipline of his stepchildren showed no nexus to prospective abuse of his own children.
…preponderance of the evidence that the child has been abused, abandoned, or neglected or is at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect. § 39.01(14), Fla. Stat. (2000); In the Interest of D.J.W., 764 So.2d 825 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). In this case, the Department sought to establish that the father’s…
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31 Foster Children v. Bush 329 F.3d 1255 · CA11-02-10180 · 11th Cir. 2003
· cited by 336 in all courts
Eleventh Circuit held Adoption Act provisions create no enforceable rights and upheld Younger abstention in a foster children class action, while vacating some claims for mootness or lack of standing.
…the provision of voluntary services through any dependency, foster care, or termination of parental rights proceeding or related activity or process.” Id. § 39.01(11). It must include, among other items, a description of the permanency goal for the child, a description of the type of home or institution in which the child…
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Ryan v. De Gonzalez 841 So. 2d 510 · 4D00-4658 · 4th DCA 2003
· cited by 18 in all courts
…discovered with the exercise of due diligence .... . . . . (7) FOR INTENTIONAL TORTS BASED ON ABUSE.An action founded on alleged abuse, as defined in s. 39.01, s. 415.102, or s. 984.03, or incest, as defined in s. 826.04, may be commenced at any time within 7 years after the age of majority, or within 4 years after…
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D.G. v. Department of Children & Families 835 So. 2d 408 · 2D01-5258 · 2nd DCA 2003
· cited by 4 in all courts
Dependency finding reversed for retrial because the recording of the children's testimony was blank, leaving a critical part of the record unavailable.
…other two for lack of evidence. The trial court ruled the children dependent based on their father’s chronic drug usage, thus causing harm to the children. § 39.01(30)(g)(2), Fla. Stat. (2001). D.G. admitted some recent illegal drug use and testified that he had attended three different residential rehabilitation programs in his…
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C.A.H. v. Department of Children & Families 830 So. 2d 939 · 4D02-1193 · 4th DCA 2002
· cited by 10 in all courts
Termination affirmed on abandonment: the mother's repeated jailings, no support and missed hearings supported it, and no reunification case plan was required.
…of the court, only marginal efforts that do not evince a settled purpose to assume all parental duties, the court may declare the child to be abandoned. § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2001). The trial judge's finding of abandonment is supported by the record. The mother contends that the order of termination must be reversed…
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D.P. v. Department of Children & Families 830 So. 2d 904 · 5D02-724 · 5th DCA 2002
PER CURIAM. See § 39.01(3)(i), Fla. Stat. (2001); F.R. v. Dep’t of Children and Families, 826 So.2d 449 (Fla. 5th OCA 2002) and D.D. v. Dep’t Children and Families, 773 So.2d 615…
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B.L. v. Department of Children & Families 830 So. 2d 904 · 5D02-631 · 5th DCA 2002
PER CURIAM. See § 39.01(8)(i), Fla. Stat. (2001); F.R. v. Dep’t of Children and Families, 826 So.2d 449 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) and D.D. v. Dep’t Children and Families, 773 So.2d 615…
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A.S. v. Biddle 829 So. 2d 1004 · 2D02-3538 · 2nd DCA 2002
· cited by 1 in all courts
Prohibition granted; the court exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering the mother to give grandparents overnight visits and evaluations without any finding the children were dependent.
…is a compelling state interest that justifies state intrusion on the right. Id. The legislature has provided a lengthy definition of harm in section 39.01(30), Florida Statutes (2002). Through chapter 39, the legislature has also supplied the framework for state action when children are subject to or threatened with…
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Y.G. v. Department of Children & Families 830 So. 2d 212 · 5D02-1535 · 5th DCA 2002
· cited by 6 in all courts
Dependency adjudication on prospective neglect affirmed, but remanded to conform the written order, which wrongly found abuse, to the court's oral ruling.
… *214 acts of domestic violence that took place in the children’s presence and by the mother’s refusal to end her troubled relationship with the paramour. § 39.01(45), Fla. Stat. (2001); D.D. v. Department of Children and Families, 773 So.2d 615 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). The adjudication of dependency is affirmed, but…
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Davis v. Monahan 832 So. 2d 708 · SC01-1157 · Florida Supreme Court 2002
· cited by 72 in all courts
…discovered with the exercise of due diligence .... .... (7) FOR INTENTIONAL TORTS BASED ON ABUSE.An action founded on alleged abuse, as defined in s. 39.01, s. 415.102, or s. 984.03, or incest, as defined in s. 826.04, may be commenced at any time within 7 years after the age of majority, or within 4 years after…
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L.W. v. Department of Children & Family Services 829 So. 2d 938 · 3D01-847 · 3rd DCA 2002
· cited by 2 in all courts
Dependency affirmed as to the mother on neglect evidence, and as to the father because notice to his counsel supported his default; one judge dissented.
…neglect as the child was permitted to live in an environment that could significantly impair or endanger the child's mental, physical or emotional health. § 39.01(45), Fla. Stat. (2000); V.G.. We also affirm the order adjudicating the child dependent as to the father. "[W]here counsel has been appointed for the…
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Department of Children & Families v. B.B. 824 So. 2d 1000 · 5D01-2606 · 5th DCA 2002
· cited by 46 in all courts
Termination affirmed for the abused child; refusal to terminate as to siblings reversed and remanded, since egregious abuse requires no prior services.
…basis, the statute requires the child to be "at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians." § 39.01(14)(f), Fla. Stat. (1999); M.F.; Denson. A similar approach historically was taken by Florida's courts in termination cases involving the prior abuse or neglect…
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B.A.L. v. Department of Children & Families 824 So. 2d 241 · 4D01-766 · 4th DCA 2002
· cited by 1 in all courts
Dependency of all children affirmed; the father's untreated sexual abuse of a stepdaughter and the mother's refusal to protect showed substantial risk to siblings.
…itself constitute proof that the parent poses a substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect to the child’s siblings.” 770 So.2d at 1194 ; see also § 39.01(11), Fla. Stat. (2001). The court held that the prior act is relevant but that all the surrounding circumstances should be considered. 770 So.2d at 1194 . Such…
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In re D.N.O. 820 So. 2d 1064 · 2D01-3364 · 2nd DCA 2002
Denial of termination reversed with directions to terminate; the mother's last-minute parenting class could not outweigh her long noncompliance, neglect and the child's best interests.
…may be appropriate where the parent evinces a settled purpose to assume parental duties, the record before us does not support such a conclusion. See § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat. *1067 (2000); Webb v. Blancett, 473 So.2d 1376, 1378 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). Because DCFS proved by clear and convincing evidence that…
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Department of Children & Family Services v. L. 820 So. 2d 1064 · 2D01-3364-2 · 2nd DCA 2002
· cited by 3 in all courts
Denial of termination reversed with directions to terminate; the mother's last-minute parenting class could not outweigh her long noncompliance, neglect and the child's best interests.
…may be appropriate where the parent evinces a settled purpose to assume parental duties, the record before us does not support such a conclusion. See § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat. *1067 (2000); Webb v. Blancett, 473 So.2d 1376, 1378 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). Because DCFS proved by clear and convincing evidence that…
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L.D. v. Department of Children & Families 818 So. 2d 706 · 5D01-2520 · 5th DCA 2002
PER CURIAM. Appeal No. 5D01-2520 AFFIRMED. See § 39.01(30)(i), Fla Stat. (2000); D.D. v. D.C.F., 773 So.2d 615 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Appeal No. 5D01-2521 DISMISSED. See N.S.H. v. Department of Children and Family…
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V.G. v. Department of Children & Families 813 So. 2d 298 · 5D01-3016 · 5th DCA 2002
· cited by 5 in all courts
Dependency affirmed: the mother delayed several days in seeking care for her infant's broken arm and gave an implausible account the court did not believe.
…or a child is permitted to live in an environment which causes a child's physical, mental or emotional health to be significantly impaired or endangered. § 39.01(45), Fla. Stat. The evidence in this case was sufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the child suffered a severe injury which went…
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A.B. v. Department of Children & Families 816 So. 2d 684 · 5D01-370 · 5th DCA 2002
· cited by 13 in all courts
Termination affirmed on the prior-sibling-termination ground, held constitutional with a least-restrictive-means finding; abandonment was not yet a statutory ground when the petition was filed.
…at the time of the filing of this petition, "abandonment" was not a statutory ground for termination of parental rights. "Abandonment" as defined in section 39.01(1) was not added to section 39.806(1)(b) until July 2000. The other legal ground for termination is contained in section 39.806(1)(i): "when the parental…
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W.W. v. Department of Children & Families 811 So. 2d 791 · 4D01-3182 · 4th DCA 2002
· cited by 14 in all courts
Termination reversed: the father's remaining sentence was not a substantial portion of the children's minority, and no criminal court had designated him a sexual predator.
…when the TPR case begins. The second thing to consider about the subsection (1)(d)2 text lies in the term, "the court." Under the definition in section 39.01(18) "the court," unless otherwise expressly stated, refers to the court exercising power in a chapter 39 proceeding. Yet there is no provision in the Criminal…
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L.O. v. Department of Children & Family Services 807 So. 2d 810 · 4D01-3359 · 4th DCA 2002
· cited by 4 in all courts
Termination based on the mother's consent in a criminal plea reversed because no adjudicatory hearing was held at which she could challenge the consent.
…hearing at which the court is to determine "whether or not the facts support the allegations stated in the petition" for terminating parental rights. §§ 39.01(4), 39.809, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998); Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.525. At the adjudicatory hearing, the court must consider the elements required for termination, each of…
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J.M.H. v. Department of Children & Families 805 So. 2d 1061 · 5D00-3188 · 5th DCA 2002
PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). THOMPSON, C.J., SHARP, W. and HARRIS, JJ., concur.
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K.C. v. Department of Children & Families 800 So. 2d 676 · 5D01-712 · 5th DCA 2001
· cited by 1 in all courts
Dependency reversed: the court relied on its memory of a half-sibling's separate case, and DCF showed no nexus to imminent harm to this child.
…does not, by itself, constitute proof that the parent poses a substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect to the child's sibling, as is required by section 39.01(11) of the Florida Statutes to establish dependency. The Court went on to hold that, while evidence concerning the commission of such an act may be "highly…
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S.D. v. Department of Children & Families 805 So. 2d 10 · 3D00-3086 · 3rd DCA 2001
· cited by 9 in all courts
Termination affirmed on the mother's chronic cocaine use, repeated drug-exposed births, and abandonment, despite the guardian's contrary recommendation; the child stays with the father.
…& F custody to the extent that the Child's well-being and safety would not be endangered if the Court were to place the Child in the Mother's custody. Section 39.01(68), Fla. Stat. (1999). k. The Child is at risk of harm in that the Mother has a history of engaging in acts of domestic violence. The Mother was the…
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McGillis v. Department of Children & Family Services 826 So. 2d 1028 · 3D01-1370 · 3rd DCA 2001
…his status as a participant in the cases of three others. See McGillis v. Department of Children & Family Servs., 719 So.2d 967 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); § 39.01(50), Fla. Stat. (2000). See generally, Gott v. Department of Children, Youth & Families, 723 So.2d 936 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); L.B. v. C.A., 738 So.2d 425 …
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S.L. v. Department of Children & Families 787 So. 2d 973 · 5D00-2832 · 5th DCA 2001
· cited by 3 in all courts
Dependency adjudication based on spanking with a belt was reversed because the order lacked adequate factual findings, as the Department conceded.
…of the injury, and the type of trauma inflicted. It also must result in the types of injuries set forth by law, such as significant bruises or welts. § 39.01(30)(a)(4), Fla. Stat. (2000). This court is aware of the delicate balance between the fundamental rights of parents to raise and discipline their children and the…
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M.B. v. Department of Children & Families 785 So. 2d 1240 · 5D00-2722 · 5th DCA 2001
· cited by 2 in all courts
Dependency and disposition orders vacated: the feeding setback was inexperience, not neglect, and the court skipped required case plan, report and home study steps.
…a temporary set-back as a result of the mother's lack of education and experience, rather than through the neglect and mistreatment prohibited by section 39.01(14)(a), Florida Statutes. There is no indication that A.F. could not have been monitored at home to ensure M.B. would comply with a case plan and feeding program. …
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G.C. v. Department of Children & Families 791 So. 2d 17 · 5D99-2227 · 5th DCA 2001
· cited by 21 in all courts
Dependency affirmed as to the father's sexual abuse but reversed on the mother's mental abuse; child testifying outside parents' presence and denied postponement upheld.
…sexual abuse. However, the court did find that the mother's conduct after the alleged abuse justified a finding that the mother mentally abused H.C. Section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (1997), defines abuse, in pertinent part, as: ... any willful act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury that causes or is…
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Johnson v. Sackett 793 So. 2d 20 · 2D99-2514 · 2nd DCA 2001
…information provided to her by law enforcement. Instead, she investigated whether there was evidence that the child *25 was dependent as defined in section 39.01(10), Florida Statutes (1987), and also decided whether the evidence was sufficient to support the filing of her sworn petition for dependency. Ms. Sackett's role…
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In re C.W.W. 788 So. 2d 1020 · 2D00-1127 · 2nd DCA 2001
· cited by 54 in all courts
Termination of a cocaine-exposed newborn's mother reversed as speculative; no reunification case plan was offered, no egregious conduct found, and termination was not least restrictive.
…or offered as a case plan from a child welfare agency. In this case, the Department established that the Mother had harmed the child as a matter of law. § 39.01(30)(g), Fla.Stat. (1999) (defining "harm" as including exposing a child to a controlled substance during pregnancy so that the child is adversely affected at birth).…
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J.C.G. v. Department of Children & Families 780 So. 2d 965 · 5D00-1964 · 5th DCA 2001
· cited by 13 in all courts
Abandonment-based dependency order vacated because it stated no factual findings; the evidence challenge and vagueness attack on the abandonment definition were rejected.
…by the trial court, the evidence which was presented at the hearing would be sufficient to support a finding of dependency. The father's argument that section 39.01(1) of the Florida Statutes which defines "abandonment" is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad is also rejected. Accordingly, we vacate the instant…
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Monahan v. Davis 781 So. 2d 436 · 4D00-1982 · 4th DCA 2001
· cited by 5 in all courts
…92-102, Laws of Florida, sections 1 & 2, the legislature created section 95.11(7), which applies to actions "founded on alleged abuse, as defined in s. 39.01, s. 415.102, or s. 984.03, or incest, as defined in s. 826.04." That section did not apply to the cause of action in Hearndon. 767 So.2d at 1186 . [2] …
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M.B. v. Department of Children & Family Services 770 So. 2d 733 · 4D00-1417 · 4th DCA 2000
· cited by 1 in all courts
Dependency adjudication affirmed: the order contained adequate factual findings and the record showed past neglect and ongoing risk of future abuse or neglect.
…record support for the conclusion that the children were significantly impaired as a result of Appellant’s conduct such as to constitute neglect under section 39.01, Florida Statutes (1997). The record includes evidence of past abuse and neglect as well as evidence supporting a conclusion of an ongoing and substantial…
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Hearndon v. Graham 767 So. 2d 1179 · SC92665 · Florida Supreme Court 2000
· cited by 93 in all courts
…case. Section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1999), provides that: For intentional torts based on abuse.An action founded on alleged abuse, as defined in s. 39.01, s. 415.102, or s. 984.03, or incest, as defined in s. 826.04, may be commenced at any time within 7 years after the age of majority, or within 4 years after…
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State v. Fuchs 769 So. 2d 1006 · SC96766 · Florida Supreme Court 2000
· cited by 32 in all courts
…a delinquent act" is defined in sections 984.03(11) and 985.03(9), Florida Statutes (1997); a "child who is found to be dependent" is defined in sections 39.01(11) and 984.03(12), Florida Statutes (1997); and a "child in need of services" is defined in sections 984.03(9) and 985.03(8), Florida Statutes (1997). Moreover,…
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S.C. v. Department of Children & Families 767 So. 2d 579 · 5D99-2810 · 5th DCA 2000
· cited by 2 in all courts
Dependency based on abandonment reversed: the mother's regular calls and visit requests, with no support ever requested, fell short of willful rejection of parental duties.
…in chapter 984. The incarceration of a parent, legal custodian, or caregiver responsible for a child's welfare may support a finding of abandonment. § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). Here, there simply is no evidence which would support a finding that the mother had engaged in conduct which evinced a willful rejection…
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Kitts v. State 766 So. 2d 1067 · 5D98-2957 · 5th DCA 2000
· cited by 8 in all courts
…There are relevant statutes which do include the breasts as "intimate parts" and thus are of importance to the law governing behavior. For instance section 39.01(63)(d), Florida Statutes (1997) governs child welfare proceedings and defines "sexual abuse of a child," in relevant part, as follows: "The intentional touching of…
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Louis v. State 764 So. 2d 930 · 4D98-1372 · 4th DCA 2000
· cited by 4 in all courts
…of scoring victim injury. In determining what sexual contact encompasses, the court looked at other legislative pronouncements: [f]or instance section 39.01(63)(d), Florida Statutes (1997) governs child welfare proceedings and defines "sexual abuse of a child," in relevant part, as follows: "The intentional touching of…
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Tobin v. Damian 772 So. 2d 13 · 4D98-3229 · 4th DCA 2000
…tort, except as provided in subsections (4), (5), and (7).... (7) FOR INTENTIONAL TORTS BASED ON ABUSE.An action founded on alleged abuse, as defined in s. 39.01, s. 415.102, or s. 984.03, or incest, as defined in s. 826.04, may be commenced at any time within 7 years after the age of majority, or within 4 years after…
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M.J.S. v. State 764 So. 2d 825 · 2D99-4898 · 2nd DCA 2000
· cited by 27 in all courts
…of the evidence that the child has been abused, abandoned, or neglected or .is at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect. See §§ 39.01(14), 39.507(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999). 1 Because the trial court is responsible for resolving disputes in the evidence and making findings of fact, the trial…
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M.F. v. Department of Juvenile Justice 782 So. 2d 402 · 4D99-2711 · 4th DCA 2000
· cited by 2 in all courts
Dismissal affirmed of a mother's dependency petition alleging neglect by the juvenile justice department, which is not a parent or legal custodian under Chapter 39.
…a child dependent under Chapter 39, I agree with the lower court's conclusion that the petition for adjudication of dependency had to be dismissed. See § 39.01, Fla. Stat. (1997). However, I believe an alternative basis to affirm lies in the doctrine of separation of powers. Article II, section 3, of the Florida…
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B.B. v. Department of Children & Families 731 So. 2d 30 · 4D98-3711 · 4th DCA 1999
· cited by 5 in all courts
…place for the temporary care of a child who is alleged to be or who has been found to be dependent, pending court disposition before or after adjudication." § 39.01(64), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998).
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G.L.S. v. Department of Children & Families 724 So. 2d 1181 · SC91 · Florida Supreme Court 1998
· cited by 9 in all courts
…an adjudicatory hearing, the court "determine[s] whether or not the facts support the allegations stated in the petition" for terminating parental rights. § 39.01(4), Fla. Stat. (1995). The circuit judge must "enter a written order with the findings of fact and conclusions of law." § 39.467(5), Fla. Stat. (1995). Further,…
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J.L.O. v. State 721 So. 2d 440 · 5D97-3456 · 5th DCA 1998
…program that led to the higher placement, but the child's need for a secure facility as evidenced by her prior history in the juvenile system. Section 39.01(59)(d), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), provides that: "High-Risk ResidentialYouth assessed and classified for this level of placement require close supervision in a…
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J.L.O. v. State 721 So. 2d 440 · DCA97-3456 · District Court of Appeal 1998
· cited by 13 in all courts
…program that led to the higher placement, but the child’s need for a secure facility as evidenced by her prior history in the juvenile system. Section 39.01(59)(d), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), provides that: “High-Risk Residential — Youth assessed and classified for this level of placement require close supervision in…
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In re M.K.S. 726 So. 2d 309 · 2D97-04882 · 2nd DCA 1998
…concerns. *312 The core issue is whether the evidence produced justified a finding of dependency based on abandonment of M.K.S. by her father. Section 39.01, Florida Statutes (1995), defines abandonment as: [A] situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child, ... while being able, makes no provision…
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M.S. v. Phelps 726 So. 2d 309 · DCA97-04882 · District Court of Appeal 1998
· cited by 6 in all courts
…concerns. *312 The core issue is whether the evidence produced justified a finding of dependency based on abandonment' of M.K.S. by her father. Section 39.01, Florida Statutes (1995), defines abandonment as: [A] situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child, ... while being able, makes no provision…
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M.F.G. v. Department of Children & Families 723 So. 2d 290 · 3D97-3539 · 3rd DCA 1998
· cited by 22 in all courts
…or environment causes the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly impaired." § 39.01(36), Florida Statutes (1997). See also Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. P.H., 659 So.2d 1375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
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Porter v. Department of Children & Families 718 So. 2d 382 · 2D98-15 · 2nd DCA 1998
…court placed all the children in foster care. Porter was incarcerated for half the time that the children were being supervised by the Department. Section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (1997), defines abandonment as a situation in which a parent, being able, fails to provide support for a child, and evinces a willful…
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Henry v. Migdal 720 So. 2d 568 · 4D97-3544 · 4th DCA 1998
· cited by 13 in all courts
…JJ., concur. NOTE: SHAHOOD, J., did not participate in oral argument, but has had the opportunity to review the entire proceeding. NOTES [1] Section 39.01(64), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996), defines a "shelter" as [A] place for the temporary care of a child who is alleged to be or who has been found to be…
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State v. S.C.W. 718 So. 2d 320 · 2D98-00540 · 2nd DCA 1998
… § 985.211(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997); § 39.038(2)(a), Fla. Stat.(1995). [6] See § 39.049(7), Fla. Stat.(1995). [7] § 985.03(53), Fla. Stat. (1997); § 39.01(70), Fla. Stat. (1995).
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State v. S.C.W. 718 So. 2d 320 · 2D98-00540-2 · 2nd DCA 1998
· cited by 3 in all courts
…§ 985.21 l(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997); § 39.038(2)(a), Fla. Stat.(1995). . See § 39.049(7), Fla. Stat.(1995). . § 985.03(53), Fla. Stat. (1997); § 39.01(70), Fla. Stat. (1995).
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Ponton v. Tabares 711 So. 2d 125 · 3D96-3067 · 3rd DCA 1998
· cited by 9 in all courts
…been legally terminated, or an alleged or prospective parent, unless the parental status falls within the terms of either § 39.4051(7) or § 63.062(1)(b). § 39.01(48), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996)(emphasis added). The clear and unambiguous language of this statute can lead to only one conclusion; the husband in this case ceased…
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Hearndon v. Graham 710 So. 2d 87 · 1D92-3842 · 1st DCA 1998
· cited by 7 in all courts
…of abuse. As a result, subsection (7) now provides, as follows: FOR INTENTIONAL TORTS BASED ON ABUSE. An action founded on alleged abuse, as defined in s. 39.01 or s. 415.102, or incest, as defined in s. 826.04, may be commenced at any time within 7 years after the age of majority, or within 4 years after the injured…
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Department of Juvenile Justice v. C.M. 704 So. 2d 1123 · 4D97-0847 · 4th DCA 1998
· cited by 6 in all courts
…that the child did not constitute a CINS because she had a pending juvenile delinquency proceeding, which would disqualify her from CINS status. See § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). Moreover, because C.M.'s parents wanted nothing to do with her, they did not qualify for services under the act, as its purpose is the…
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Eddy v. Department of Children & Family Services 704 So. 2d 734 · 5D97-990 · 5th DCA 1998
· cited by 5 in all courts
…A child may be found dependent if the court finds the child is "at substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect by the parent or parents or the custodian." § 39.01(11)(f), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996). Such a finding may be based on proof of neglect or abuse of other children. Denson v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative…
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L.Y. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 696 So. 2d 430 · 4D96-2384 · 4th DCA 1997
· cited by 4 in all courts
…by reading it in para materia with section 39.40(2), Florida Statutes. Nor do sections 39.41(2)(a)10 and 39.45, Florida Statutes, change our view. Section 39.01(10), Florida Statutes, defines children as individuals under the age of 18. See also Gore v. Chapman, 143 Fla. 438 , 196 So. 840 (1940); Simms v.…
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J.C.C. v. State 694 So. 2d 784 · DCA96-4285 · District Court of Appeal 1997
· cited by 1 in all courts
…committed delinquent acts because section 39.061 does not proscribe escapes from “low-risk residential” commitment facilities, as defined in section 39.01(59)(b), Florida Statutes (1995); and (2) whether the lower court erred in denying defense motions for judgments of acquittal. As to the first issue, we affirm on the…
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Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. M.B. 701 So. 2d 1155 · SC88840 · Florida Supreme Court 1997
· cited by 25 in all courts
…evidence to be generally accepted by a majority of experts in psychology." No issue about such testimony has been raised in this case. [3] Section 39.01(10), Florida Statutes (1993), defines "Child who is found to be dependent" to include one found by the court: (a) To have been abandoned, abused, or neglected…
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S.V.E. v. State 689 So. 2d 1283 · DCA96-2862 · District Court of Appeal 1997
· cited by 1 in all courts
…was insufficient evidence that the facility from which he allegedly absconded was a “residential commitment facility” within the meaning of sections 39.061 and 39.01(59), Florida Statutes (1995). This issue is also not preserved for appellate review as it was not raised below. The child’s final argument challenges the facial…
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T.S. v. State 682 So. 2d 1202 · 4D95-3028 · 4th DCA 1996
…contemplates that the freedom of a delinquent child will be limited by the restriction of the child to noninstitutional quarters or to the child's home. § 39.01(16), Fla.Stat. (1995). Electronic monitoring is a means of enforcing compliance with such a geographical restriction. *1203 By its language authorizing a trial…
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P.W.G. v. State 682 So. 2d 1203 · 1D96-944 · 1st DCA 1996
…School in Marianna, and the Eckerd Youth Development Center in Okeechobee. Those two facilities continue to be the only "training schools" in Florida. § 39.01(74), Fla.Stat. (1995). It is clear that the Manatee Adolescent Treatment Service is not a "training school," as that term is used in either the consent decree or…
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T.S. v. State 682 So. 2d 1202 · DCA95-3028 · District Court of Appeal 1996
· cited by 3 in all courts
…contemplates that the freedom of a delinquent child will be limited by the restriction of the child to noninstitutional quarters or to the child’s home. § 39.01(16), Fla.Stat. (1995). Electronic monitoring is a means of enforcing compliance with such a geographical restrie *1203 tion. By its language authorizing a trial'…
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P.W.G. v. State 682 So. 2d 1203 · DCA96-944 · District Court of Appeal 1996
· cited by 18 in all courts
…School in Marianna, and the Eckerd Youth Development Center in Okeechobee. Those two facilities continue to be the only “training schools” in Florida. § 39.01(74), Fla.Stat. (1995). It is clear that the Manatee Adolescent Treatment Service is not a “training school,” as that term is used in either the consent decree or…
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State v. J.C. 677 So. 2d 959 · 2D95-04399 · 2nd DCA 1996
…were reluctant to bring their children to testify because of the delay. Since appellee was never "taken into custody" within the meaning of section 39.01(51), Florida Statutes (1993), and the delinquency petition was filed approximately seven months after the incident, well within the two-year statute of…
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State v. J.C. 677 So. 2d 959 · DCA95-04399 · District Court of Appeal 1996
· cited by 2 in all courts
…were reluctant to bring their children to testify because of the delay. Since appellee was never “taken into custody” within the meaning of section 39.01(51), Florida Statutes (1993), and the delinquency petition was filed approximately seven months after the incident, well within the two-year statute of…
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C.M. v. State 676 So. 2d 498 · 1D95-851 · 1st DCA 1996
…October 1, 1994. Ch. 94-209, §§ 43, 150, at 1294, 1384, Laws of Fla. Moreover, the definition of the word "parent" did not include a legal guardian. See § 39.01(39), Fla. Stat. (1993) ("`Parent' means the natural father or natural mother of a child. If a child has been legally adopted, the term `parent' means the adoptive…
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C.M. v. State 676 So. 2d 498 · DCA95-851 · District Court of Appeal 1996
· cited by 6 in all courts
…October 1, 1994. Ch. 94-209, §§ 43, 150, at 1294, 1384, Laws of Fla. Moreover, the definition of the word “parent” did not include a legal guardian. See § 39.01(39), Fla. Stat. (1993) (“‘Parent’ means the natural father or natural mother of a child. If a child has been legally adopted, the term ‘parent’ means the adoptive…
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J.E. v. State 676 So. 2d 39 · 3D95-3271 · 3rd DCA 1996
…charge. The level of restrictiveness refers to "the level of custody provided by programs that service the custody and care needs of committed children." § 39.01(59), Fla.Stat. (1995). An increase in the level of restrictiveness therefore does not necessarily indicate an increase in the sanction or the period of…
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J.E. v. State 676 So. 2d 39 · DCA95-3271 · District Court of Appeal 1996
· cited by 5 in all courts
…charge. The level of restrietiveness refers to “the level of custody provided by programs that service the custody and care needs of committed children.” § 39.01(59), Fla.Stat. (1995). An increase in the level of restrictiveness therefore does not necessarily indicate an increase in the sanction or the period of…
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State v. Griffith 675 So. 2d 911 · SC85295 · Florida Supreme Court 1996
· cited by 24 in all courts
…all proceedings against children under eighteen must originate in the juvenile division of the circuit court, jurisdiction being mandatory and exclusive: 39.01 Definitions.When used in this chapter: .... (7) "Child" means any unmarried person under the age of 18 alleged to be dependent or any married or…
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Tolley v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 667 So. 2d 480 · 5D95-1216 · 5th DCA 1996
· cited by 12 in all courts
…the final judgment terminating Tolley's parental rights. *481 Initially, we note that a child may be found dependent because of prospective abuse. Section 39.01(10), Florida Statutes (1993) reads in pertinent part: (10) "Child who is found to be dependent" means a child who, pursuant to this chapter, is found by the…
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Collucci v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 664 So. 2d 1142 · 4D94-1295 · 4th DCA 1995
· cited by 4 in all courts
…neglect of D.C., a special needs child. After the determination of dependency, appellant entered into a performance agreement with HRS, as defined in section 39.01, Florida Statutes. She later requested and received an extension of time in which to perform the agreement. However, she never signed the second performance…
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D.F. v. State 650 So. 2d 1097 · 2D93-03211 · 2nd DCA 1995
· cited by 9 in all courts
… The appellant, D.F., Jr., challenges an order adjudicating him delinquent and sentencing him as a serious or habitual juvenile offender pursuant to section 39.01(46)(a), Florida Statutes (1993). We find no merit in the appellant's contentions and, accordingly, affirm the trial court's adjudication and its determination that…
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Williams v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 648 So. 2d 841 · 5D94-368 · 5th DCA 1995
· cited by 15 in all courts
…concluded the evidence clearly and convincingly showed a likelihood that the children would suffer neglect if they were reunited with their father. See § 39.01(37), Fla. Stat. (1993). [2] We have no basis to gainsay that decision. Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So.2d 780 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). The decision of the lower…
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In re Interest of G.R.S. 647 So. 2d 1025 · 4D93-1737 · 4th DCA 1994
· cited by 10 in all courts
…cannot support a finding of abandonment. This is not to say that an incarcerated person is incapable of voluntarily abandoning his children under section 39.01. However, his efforts, or lack thereof, to assume his parental duties through communicating with and supporting his children must be measured against his…
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In Interest of T.M. 641 So. 2d 410 · SC82291 · Florida Supreme Court 1994
· cited by 39 in all courts
…finding that the following is proven by clear and convincing evidence: ... . (d)1. A performance agreement or permanent placement plan as defined in s. 39.01 has been offered to a parent; or 2. Any of the elements of s. 39.464 is met; and (e) The parent who is offered a performance agreement or permanent…
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In re S.J. 639 So. 2d 183 · DCA93-1209 · District Court of Appeal 1994
· cited by 4 in all courts
…child, the findings of the trial court are amply supported by the record that he failed to evince a settled purpose to assume parental duties, see section 39.01, and that the efforts he did make were marginal at best. The cases cited by appellant are all distinguishable on their facts. We therefore affirm the ruling…
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R.W. v. Soud 639 So. 2d 25 · SC83137 · Florida Supreme Court 1994
· cited by 12 in all courts
…committed a delinquent act," the second sentence makes no distinction between children awaiting adjudication and those whose disposition is pending. Section 39.01(16), Florida Statutes (1993), also defines detention care as "the temporary care of a child in secure, nonsecure, or home detention, pending a court adjudication …
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Wiley v. Roof 641 So. 2d 66 · SC82412 · Florida Supreme Court 1994
· cited by 32 in all courts
…as provided in subsections (4), (5), and (7). ... . (7) FOR INTENTIONAL TORTS BASED ON ABUSE. An action founded on alleged abuse, as defined in s. 39.01 or s. 415.102, or incest, as defined in s. 826.04, may be commenced at any time within 7 years after the age of majority, or within 4 years after the injured…
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M.H. v. State 637 So. 2d 25 · 4D93-0995 · 4th DCA 1994
· cited by 1 in all courts
…by law, pending the child’s release, detention, placement, or other disposition as authorized by law. The term “physical control” referred to in section 39.01(51) does not include police encounters or temporary investigatory detentions. State v. F.T.H., 579 So.2d 911 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). In In the Interest of …
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D.V.S. v. State 632 So. 2d 221 · 5D92-3026 · 5th DCA 1994
…But it appears that a "placement" into community control is in "lieu of" (therefore distinguished from) "commitment to the custody of the department." Section 39.01(12), Fla. Stat. (1991). Therefore, even if section 39.054(4) were otherwise applicable, by its own terms it appears inapplicable to this case. D.V.S. also…
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D.V.S. v. State 632 So. 2d 221 · DCA92-3026 · District Court of Appeal 1994
· cited by 8 in all courts
…But it appears that a “placement” into community control is in “lieu of’ (therefore distinguished from) “commitment to the custody of the department.” Section 39.01(12), Fla.Stat. (1991). Therefore, even if section 39.054(4) were otherwise applicable, by its own terms 'it appears inapplicable to this case. D.V.S. also…
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Herrera v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 631 So. 2d 385 · DCA93-1604 · District Court of Appeal 1994
· cited by 2 in all courts
… See Castellanos v. Department of HRS, 545 So.2d 455 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); see also Padgett v. Department of HRS, 577 So.2d 565, 571 (Fla.1991); § 39.01(10) Fla.Stat. (1993). Accordingly, the order under review is affirmed.
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Salinas v. Mason 627 So. 2d 525 · DCA92-04118 · District Court of Appeal 1993
…669 (1992). Although, the parties have not raised the issue of the definition of abuse, for which section 95.11, Florida Statutes, refers to section 39.01(2) of the Juvenile Justice Act, I perceive a possible constitutional problem because the definition of abuse in the Juvenile Justice Act may be vague and…
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In the Interest of C.D. v. State 624 So. 2d 867 · DCA93-680 · District Court of Appeal 1993
PER CURIAM. Pursuant to a petition for delinquency, C.D. was charged with unlawful escape from Duval House, a halfway house, as defined in section 39.01(25), Florida Statutes (1989). The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to dismiss the escape charge. We reverse. *868…
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Gordon v. Freeman 625 So. 2d 1245 · DCA93-52 · District Court of Appeal 1993
…the issue is cognizable under the fundamental error doctrine, we agree with appellees that subsection 39.464(5) must be read in conjunction with subsection 39.01(50), Florida Statutes (1991), which defines “substantial compliance” with particularity. The present statute has been revised in order to cure the deficiency…
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State v. Y.H. 622 So. 2d 1159 · DCA92-03540 · District Court of Appeal 1993
· cited by 1 in all courts
…the date the child is taken into custody.” The trial court determined that service on Y.H.’s mother of a summons triggered the “speedy file” rule. Section 39.01(51), Florida Statutes (1991), defines “taken into custody”: “Taken into custody” means the status of a child immediately when temporary physical control over…
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Kingsley v. Kingsley 623 So. 2d 780 · 5D92-2430 · 5th DCA 1993
· cited by 64 in all courts
…and convincing. In re D.J.S., 563 So.2d 655 , 662 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). See also Florida Bar v. Hooper, 509 So.2d 289, 290 (Fla. 1987). Section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992), defines abandonment as: a situation in which the parent ... of a child . .., while being able, makes no provision for the…
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In re T.M. 622 So. 2d 589 · DCA92-3596-2 · District Court of Appeal 1993
· cited by 3 in all courts
…upon a finding that the following is proven by clear and convincing evidence: (d)l. A performance agreement or permanent placement plan as defined in s. 39.01 has been offered to a parent; or 2. Any of the elements of s. 39.464 is met; (Emphasis added.) Where termination is based upon § 39.464(3) or (4), as in…
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Roof v. Wiley 622 So. 2d 1018 · 2D91-04243 · 2nd DCA 1993
· cited by 4 in all courts
…except as provided in subsections (4), and (5), and (7). (7) For intentional torts based on abuse. An action founded on alleged abuse, as defined in s. 39.01 or s. 415.102, or incest, as defined in s. 826.04, may be commenced at any time within 7 years after the age of majority, or within 4 years after the injured…
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State v. Davis 619 So. 2d 517 · 4D92-1861 · 4th DCA 1993
· cited by 8 in all courts
…committed delinquent acts or violations of law constitutes escape within the intent and meaning of s. 944.40 and is a felony of the third degree. Section 39.01(61) of the Florida Statutes defined restrictiveness level as: The identification of broad custody categories for committed children, including nonresidential,…
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T.J. v. State 619 So. 2d 425 · 1D93-262 · 1st DCA 1993
…act or violation of law shall be initiated by the state by the filing of a petition for delinquency by the state attorney" (emphasis added). Section 39.01(9) states: "`Child who has been found to have committed a delinquent act' means a child who, pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, is found by a court to…
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T.J. v. State 619 So. 2d 425 · DCA93-262 · District Court of Appeal 1993
· cited by 8 in all courts
…act or violation of law shall be initiated by the state by the filing of a petition for delinquency by the state attorney” (emphasis added). Section 39.01(9) states: “ ‘Child who has been found to have committed a delinquent act’ means a child who, pursuant to the provisions of this chapter,, is found by a court to…
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Jimenez v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 619 So. 2d 405 · DCA92-1580 · District Court of Appeal 1993
…rights. We agree with the trial court that the performance agreement accepted by Jimenez was “hardly the ‘meaningful document’ contemplated by [section 39.01(40), Florida statutes]” because it failed to delineate, with reasonable specificity, the tasks Jimenez had to perform in order to correct the problems or…
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In re T.G. 617 So. 2d 1150 · DCA92-00209 · District Court of Appeal 1993
…and Rehabilitative Services met its burden of establishing the need for termination of parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. See §§ 39.-464(3), 39.01(37), Fla.Stat. (1989); In re J.R.R., 580 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Caso v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 569 So.2d 466 (Fla. 3d DCA…
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R.A.H. v. State 614 So. 2d 1189 · 1D92-2782 · 1st DCA 1993
… [1] A "halfway house" is defined as "a community-based residential program for 12 or more committed delinquents that is operated by the department." § 39.01(25), Fla. Stat. (1991). [2] Section 39.112 provides: 39.112 Escapes from a juvenile facility. An escape from any halfway house, training school, boot…
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R.A.H. v. State 614 So. 2d 1189 · DCA92-2782 · District Court of Appeal 1993
· cited by 30 in all courts
… . A "halfway house” is defined as "a community-based residential program for 12 or more committed delinquents that is operated by the department.” § 39.01(25), Fla.Stat. (1991). . Section 39.112 provides: 39.112 Escapes from a juvenile facility.— An escape from any halfway house, training school, boot camp,…
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In re F.A.K. 613 So. 2d 609 · DCA92-02247 · District Court of Appeal 1993
…alleged the child was at risk due to the parents’ history of neglect, substance abuse, and violent behavior and, therefore, dependent pursuant to section 39.01(10)(a), Florida Statutes (1987). More than two years later, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), who had been awarded the care, custody, and…
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Standard Jury Instructions-Criminal Cases 603 So. 2d 1175 · SC79320 · Florida Supreme Court 1992
· cited by 75 in all courts
…or "child in need of services" based on the statutory definitions in effect at the time of the alleged offense. See F.S. 39.01. Explanation of amendments: The instruction begins on page 163 of the manual. The changes are based on 1990 amendments to F.S. 827.04. [Page A-61] …
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In Interest of S.M.B. 597 So. 2d 848 · 1D91-2771 · 1st DCA 1992
· cited by 5 in all courts
…made in the petitions were based exclusively upon allegations that certain actions of appellant had resulted in emotional abuse to S.B. and S.M.B. Section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990), reads: "`Abuse' means any willful act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury that causes or is likely to cause…
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In Interest of L.S. 592 So. 2d 802 · 4D91-2359 · 4th DCA 1992
· cited by 2 in all courts
…mother remained free to seek a modification of the custody terms. The court's order was, at least in part, founded on the court's interpretation of section 39.01(10), concluding that the statute's use of the plural, "parents," required abuse allegations against both parents. The court did not recognize that this section…
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Wolf v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 588 So. 2d 335 · DCA91-187 · District Court of Appeal 1991
· cited by 2 in all courts
COWART, Judge. A child was adjudicated to be "a child in need of services” because “habitually *336 truant from school” as defined in section 39.01(8), Florida Statutes. Thereafter, an Order for Detention on Shelter Hearing was entered finding probable cause to believe that the child was delinquent and…
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In Interest of R.J. 586 So. 2d 496 · 1D91-227 · 1st DCA 1991
· cited by 8 in all courts
… *498 subsequent to the filing of a petition to terminate parental rights; and (d)1. A performance agreement or permanent placement plan as defined in s. 39.01 has been offered to a parent; or 2. Any of the elements of s. 39.464 is met; and (e) The parent who is offered a performance agreement or permanent…
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In re J.P. 586 So. 2d 485 · DCA91-228 · District Court of Appeal 1991
· cited by 2 in all courts
…39.42, Florida Statutes (1989), which appears in part IV of Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, relating to families and children in need of services. Section 39.01(8), Florida Statutes (1989), defines a “child in need of services” as “a child for whom there is no allegation *487 or suspicion of abuse, neglect, or…
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A.A. v. Rolle 580 So. 2d 282 · 3D91-1167 · 3rd DCA 1991
· cited by 12 in all courts
…Detention care in the juvenile system is ordinarily employed for temporary custody of a child pending adjudication of the petition for delinquency. See § 39.01(16), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990). Under section 39.042, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990), the detention criteria are: (1) All determinations and court orders regarding…
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State v. Hartzog 575 So. 2d 1328 · 1D90-1231 · 1st DCA 1991
· cited by 13 in all courts
…any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer, a firefighter, an intake officer as defined in s. 39.01, or a parking enforcement specialist as defined in s. 316.640, while the officer, firefighter, intake officer, or parking enforcement specialist is engaged in…
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Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Brooke 573 So. 2d 363 · 1D90-2475 · 1st DCA 1991
· cited by 10 in all courts
…discretion to place the child. For instance, earlier in F.B. v. State, 319 So.2d 77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), this court addressed the intent behind section 39.01(9), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1974), which contains language identical to present section 39.41(5). In doing so, the court recognized that although the legislature…
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Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Brooke 573 So. 2d 363 · DCA90-2475 · District Court of Appeal 1991
· cited by 14 in all courts
…discretion to place the child. For instance, earlier in F.B. v. State, 319 So.2d 77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), this court addressed the intent behind section 39.01(9), Florida Statutes (Supp.1974), which contains language identical to present section 39.41(5). In doing so, the court recognized that although the legislature…
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In re C.G. 570 So. 2d 1136 · DCA90-0017 · District Court of Appeal 1990
…abuse. HRS contends that the fourteen day treatment with an over-the-counter medication was enough to meet the definition of neglect abuse found in section 39.01(37), Florida Statutes (1989): “Neglect” occurs when the parent or legal custodian of a child ... deprives a child of, or allows a child to be deprived of,…
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Caso v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 569 So. 2d 466 · 3D89-677 · 3rd DCA 1990
· cited by 9 in all courts
…evidence in its support. In Interest of R.D.D., 518 So.2d 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); see Greenwood v. Oates, 251 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1971). Section 39.01(37), Florida Statutes (1989) states: (37) "Neglect" occurs when the parent or legal custodian of a child ... deprives *468 a child of, or allows a child to be…
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Dixon v. Melton 565 So. 2d 1378 · 1D90-996 · 1st DCA 1990
· cited by 4 in all courts
…results in any ... mental ... injury that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired." s. 39.01(2), Florida Statutes. Because this court has recognized the urgency with which proceedings relating to the child's visitation with her grandparents must be…
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M.F. v. State 562 So. 2d 724 · 3D89-642 · 3rd DCA 1990
…of reducing a charge to an offense which is not necessarily a lesser included offense of the crime charged as the basis for a finding of delinquency. Section 39.01(9), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988), defines a "[c]hild who has committed a delinquent act" as "a child who ... is found by a court to have committed a felony, a…
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G.C. v. State 560 So. 2d 1186 · 3D88-2571 · 3rd DCA 1990
…by section 924.34 in a criminal appeal. In a delinquency appeal, the original adjudication of delinquency is affirmed on an alternative ground. See § 39.01(9), Fla. Stat. (1989). [3] In Harris v. State, 438 So.2d 787 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 963 , 104 S.Ct. 2181 , 80 L.Ed.2d 563 (1984),…
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M.F. v. State 562 So. 2d 724 · DCA89-642 · District Court of Appeal 1990
· cited by 11 in all courts
…of reducing a charge to an offense which is not necessarily a lesser included offense of the crime charged as the basis for a finding of delinquency. Section 39.01(9), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988), defines a "[c]hild who has committed a delinquent act" as "a child who ... is found by a court to have committed a felony, a…
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Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. R.W.K. 556 So. 2d 815 · 5D89-957 · 5th DCA 1990
· cited by 5 in all courts
…v. State, 455 So.2d 582 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). CONDITION STRICKEN and CAUSE REMANDED. DANIEL, C.J., and SHARP, W., J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 39.01(12), Florida Statutes, defines community control as: "Community control" means the legal status of probation created by law and court order in cases involving…
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G.C. v. State 560 So. 2d 1186 · 3D88-2571-2 · 3rd DCA 1990
· cited by 35 in all courts
…by section 924.34 in a criminal appeal. In a delinquency appeal, the original adjudication of delinquency is affirmed on an alternative ground. See § 39.01(9), Fla.Stat. (1989). . In Harris v. State, 438 So.2d 787 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 963 , 104 S.Ct. 2181 , 80 L.Ed.2d 563 (1984),…
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C.C. v. Dept 556 So. 2d 416 · 1D89-1076 · 1st DCA 1989
…So.2d 676 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); and In the Interest of L.T., 464 So.2d 201 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). The statutory definition of abuse is found in section 39.01(2) and means "any willful act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional…
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In Interest of C.C. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 556 So. 2d 416 · DCA89-1076 · District Court of Appeal 1989
· cited by 4 in all courts
…So.2d 676 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); and In the Interest of L.T., 464 So.2d 201 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). The statutory definition of abuse is found in section 39.01(2) and means “any willful act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury that causes or is likely to cause the child’s physical, mental, or emotional…
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Lett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 547 So. 2d 328 · 5D88-295 · 5th DCA 1989
· cited by 5 in all courts
…the state must show abandonment, abuse or neglect by clear and convincing evidence. In the Interest of R.W., 495 So.2d 133 (Fla. 1986). Section 39.01, Florida Statutes, defines these terms as follows: (1) "Abandoned" means a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of…
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In re L.N.S. 546 So. 2d 808 · DCA89-0209 · District Court of Appeal 1989
· cited by 2 in all courts
…interest of the child. See In Interest of J.L.P., 416 So.2d 1250 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); In Interest of R.V.F, 437 So.2d 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); § 39.01(1), Fla.Stat. (1987). ANSTEAD, DELL and STONE, JJ., concur.
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In re Stan. Jury Instr. in Criminal Cases 543 So. 2d 1205 · SC73033 · Florida Supreme Court 1989
· cited by 50 in all courts
…to Judge: Prepare the definition of "delinquency" or of "dependency" based on the statutory definitions in effect at the time of the alleged offense. See F.S. 39.01. 14. Page 216 provides an instruction on bookmaking. Section 849.25, Florida Statutes, was amended by Chapter 87-243, Section 48, Laws of Florida. A revised…
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In Interest of W.P. 534 So. 2d 905 · 2D88-808 · 2nd DCA 1988
· cited by 2 in all courts
…Stat. (1985). We have examined the record and find insufficient evidence to establish that W.P.'s parents "abused" her, as that term is defined in section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (1985). Abuse is defined in the statute as "any willful act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury that causes or is likely…
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Russell v. Wanicka 524 So. 2d 1077 · DCA87-1480 · District Court of Appeal 1988
· cited by 2 in all courts
…committed a felony, a misdemeanor, contempt of court, or a violation of a local penal ordinance and whose case has not been prosecuted as an adult case....” § 39.01(9), Fla.Stat. (1985). A minor who has committed an act that would subject him to a delinquency hearing can be transferred for criminal prosecution under section…
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Southland Corp. v. Bartsch 522 So. 2d 1053 · 5D87-1099 · 5th DCA 1988
· cited by 12 in all courts
…can be charged with a violation of the law. State v. D.H., 340 So.2d 1163 (Fla. 1976); McCray v. State, 424 So.2d 916 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); § 39.01(7), Fla. Stat. (1985). This is consistent with Article I, section 15(b) of the Florida Constitution which provides that a child as defined by the law may be…
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Matter of Adoption of Doe 524 So. 2d 1037 · 5D87-1277 · 5th DCA 1988
· cited by 9 in all courts
…of natural father's parental rights because of pre-birth abandonment). The only statutory definition of "abandonment" in Florida is that found in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (1985): (1) "Abandoned" means a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or legal…
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Roe v. Doe 524 So. 2d 1037 · DCA87-1277 · District Court of Appeal 1988
· cited by 1 in all courts
…of natural father’s parental rights because of pre-birth abandonment). The only statutory definition of “abandonment” in Florida is that found in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (1985): (1) “Abandoned” means a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or legal…
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Williams v. Starnes 522 So. 2d 469 · 2D87-3346 · 2nd DCA 1988
· cited by 10 in all courts
…since they had been in Lee County. Thus, the petition alleged, the husband had abandoned and psychologically abused the children within the meaning of section 39.01, Florida Statutes (1983), and it would be in the best interests of the children if the wife were awarded custody of them. On October 15, 1987, the trial court…
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Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion HRS Nonlawyer Counselor 518 So. 2d 1270 · SC70615 · Florida Supreme Court 1988
· cited by 9 in all courts
…39.40-39.415, Florida Statutes, are the basic legislation giving rise to dependency cases in Florida. A child who is found to be dependent is, under § 39.01, Florida Statute, a minor who has been abandoned, abused, neglected, a runaway, a truant, or an ungovernable child. When HRS receives a report of abuse or…
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Meredith v. Smith 515 So. 2d 1386 · DCA87-392 · District Court of Appeal 1987
· cited by 2 in all courts
…award of temporary custody to the Smiths on that basis is reversed. 4 Furthermore, the trial court erred in determining that Denise was abandoned. Section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986), defines “abandoned” as follows: ‘Abandoned’ means a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the…
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Scott v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 509 So. 2d 1230 · DCA86-2020 · District Court of Appeal 1987
…legal custody of the child, and pick some long ago six month period of non-visitation upon which to find an abandonment as that term was defined in section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (1984). The abandonment must be “at the time of the committment hearing.” See In the Interest of S.N.N., 501 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1st DCA…
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In Interest of J.D. 510 So. 2d 623 · 1DBR-251 · 1st DCA 1987
· cited by 3 in all courts
…that of reviewing administrative proceedings, "not determining in the first instance the appropriateness of a handicapped child's education"). [5] Section 39.01(9). [6] "[O]nce a child has been lawfully declared to be a dependent child, it becomes a ward of the State... ." In re R.I.C., 300 So.2d 54, 58 (Fla.…
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In Interest of C.S. 503 So. 2d 417 · 1DBP-190 · 1st DCA 1987
· cited by 13 in all courts
…this evidence is sufficient to support an adjudication of dependency. The testimony falls short of establishing neglect by a preponderance of the evidence. § 39.01(27), Fla. Stat.; § 39.408(2)(b), Fla. Stat. We are not unmindful of the difficult task faced by the circuit court in this case. The mother unquestionably…
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In re W.L.B. 502 So. 2d 50 · DCABP-41 · District Court of Appeal 1987
· cited by 1 in all courts
…be dismissed with prejudice if it was not filed within 45 days from the date the child was taken into custody. “Taken into custody” is defined by Section 39.01(33), Florida Statutes (1985), as meaning the status of a child immediately when temporary physical control over the child is attained by a person authorized by…
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McCutcheon v. Trettis 501 So. 2d 710 · DCA86-2797 · District Court of Appeal 1987
· cited by 1 in all courts
…Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) filed a petition alleging that McCutcheon’s minor child was a “dependent child” as defined by section 39.01(9), Florida Statutes (1985). Prior to any valid adjudicatory hearing, HRS submitted a “motion for withdrawal of petition,” stating that the disposition HRS was…
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A.T. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 490 So. 2d 155 · 1DBJ-378 · 1st DCA 1986
· cited by 8 in all courts
…Such a determination is impossible from a review of the order before us as its findings of fact are phrased almost entirely in the language of Sections 39.01(27) and 39.41(1)(f), Florida Statutes. Despite the deficiency in the findings, we nevertheless affirm, given the overwhelming evidence supporting permanent…
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White v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 483 So. 2d 861 · 5D85-625 · 5th DCA 1986
· cited by 16 in all courts
…the Interest of D.B., supra ), from admitting acts of child neglect, child abuse or acts of non-support and non-communication (statutory abandonment under § 39.01(1), Fla. Stat.), a parent, before being called on to plead to a dependency petition alleging child abuse, neglect or abandonment, should be advised by counsel…
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In re S.J.W. 480 So. 2d 262 · DCABK-247 · District Court of Appeal 1986
…abandoned the children approximately three months ago. No allegations regarding the mother’s fitness or ability to care for the children were raised. Section 39.01(1) defines “abandoned” as a period of six months or longer during which a parent makes no effort to communicate with the child. Thus, the petition was facially…
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J.M. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 479 So. 2d 826 · 2D85-825 · 2nd DCA 1985
…conclusion that the requirements of Florida Statute section 39.41(1)(f)(1)(a) for permanent commitment were met because abuse was proven as defined in section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (1983). That latter section defines "abuse" as follows: [A]ny willful act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury that…
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Dykes v. Hosemann 776 F.2d 942 · CA11-83-3347-2 · 11th Cir. 1985
· cited by 112 in all courts
En banc court held a juvenile judge who declared a child dependent without serving the mother has absolute judicial immunity from section 1983 damages because he had subject matter jurisdiction.
…from his parents or legal guardian. (i) Being subject to compulsory school attendance, is habitually truant from school. Fla.Stat. Sec. 39.01(8) (1977). In 1978, the Florida State Legislature revised Chapter 39, and it became known as the Florida Juvenile Justice Act, with new sections…
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Weaver v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 478 So. 2d 97 · DCA85-488 · District Court of Appeal 1985
…of HRS. Our examination of the record shows that the evidence supported the trial court's determination that the mother had abandoned the children, section 39.01(1), Florida Statutes (1983), had failed to substantially comply with the performance agreement which she had executed, and that such failure was not beyond her…
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F.B. v. State 474 So. 2d 1221 · DCA85-280 · District Court of Appeal 1985
· cited by 1 in all courts
…petition filed under section 39.404, Florida Statutes, whether the alleged truancy results from nonenrollment or nonattendance after enrollment. (See § 39.01(9)(d) and § 232.19(1) and (3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1984 Supp.)) Such dependency proceedings may be instituted and maintained without regard to whether criminal…
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Petition of Fla. Bar, Rules of Juv. Proc. 462 So. 2d 399 · SC65103 · Florida Supreme Court 1984
· cited by 8 in all courts
…petition is used to be consistent with language in Chapter 39; however, it is understood that dependent children must be placed in shelter facilities only, 39.01(31). Rule 8.520. Application of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act Any pleading filed commencing proceedings as set forth in Rule 8.510 shall be…
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In Interest of L.R.R. 455 So. 2d 598 · 5D83-1640 · 5th DCA 1984
· cited by 3 in all courts
…under HRS custody and ignored the terms of the performance agreement. [1] The court concluded that Russell's conduct amounted to abandonment, see sections 39.01(1), 39.41(1)(f)1, Florida Statutes (1983), and that the best interests and welfare of the children would be served by permanent commitment. [2] Russell argues…
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In Interest of C.B. 453 So. 2d 220 · 5D83-668 · 5th DCA 1984
· cited by 8 in all courts
…parent rights is AFFIRMED. FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr. and SHARP, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 39.08(1), Florida Statutes (1983). [2] Section 39.01(9), Florida Statutes (1983), provides: "Child who is found to be dependent" means a child who, pursuant to this chapter, is found by the court: (a) To have…
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In Interest of W.D.N. 443 So. 2d 493 · 2D83-1426TO83-1428 · 2nd DCA 1984
· cited by 27 in all courts
…a parent's abuse of some of her children may constitute grounds for the permanent commitment of her other children who also live with the parent. Section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes (1981), defines "abuse" as "any willful act that results in any physical, mental or sexual injury that causes or is likely to cause the…
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In re M.S. 429 So. 2d 844 · 1D82-664 · 1st DCA 1983
· cited by 4 in all courts
…of the child or in some other suitable place under such reasonable conditions as the court may direct. A community control program is as defined in s. 39.01(10) and shall include a penalty such as restitution, curfew, revocation or suspension of the driver’s license of the child, or other nonresidential punishment…
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Brown v. State 427 So. 2d 304 · 3D82-1131 · 3rd DCA 1983
· cited by 2 in all courts
… [1] For the trial court's further guidance, we point out that in the event that the defendant, a "child" at the time of the alleged violation, see § 39.01(7), Fla. Stat. (1981), is convicted upon retrial, an adult sentence may not be imposed except pursuant to the disposition procedures set forth in Section…
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V. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 427 So. 2d 1082 · DCAAL-142 · District Court of Appeal 1983
· cited by 5 in all courts
…permanent custody to the foster parents, the trial judge having properly determined that the father had abandoned the children within the meaning of Section 39.01, Florida Statutes (1981). See In the Interest of 413 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). AFFIRMED. BOOTH and NIMMONS, JJ., concur. . Section…
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A.T.P. v. State 427 So. 2d 355 · 5D82-389 · 5th DCA 1983
…for dependency under chapter 39, Florida Statutes (1981), and therefore the dependency petition filed against her was insufficient. We agree. Section 39.01(9), Florida Statutes, (1981), provides in relevant part that: "Child who is found to be dependent" means a child who, pursuant to this chapter, is found by the…
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In the Interest of A.T.P. v. State 427 So. 2d 355 · DCA82-389 · District Court of Appeal 1983
· cited by 9 in all courts
…for dependency under chapter 39, Florida Statutes (1981), and therefore the dependency petition filed against her was insufficient. We agree. Section 39.01(9), Florida Statutes, (1981), provides in relevant part that: “Child who is found to be dependent” means a child who, pursuant to this chapter, is found by the…
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DeBolt v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 427 So. 2d 221 · 1DAL-19 · 1st DCA 1983
· cited by 21 in all courts
… § 39.03, Fla. Stat. (1981). Such detention may be in a "detention home or nonsecure detention program, including home detention and attention homes. ..." § 39.01(14), Fla. Stat. (1981) (e.s.). [2] An "attention home" is defined as "a residence in the community to house one or more, but not exceeding six, children in a…
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In re T.C. 417 So. 2d 775 · DCA81-1469 · District Court of Appeal 1982
· cited by 1 in all courts
…evidence as to the grounds warranting a permanent commitment order; to wit: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect; or (c) abuse, as those terms are defined in Section 39.01, Florida Statutes (1979), was not sufficient, under the clear and convincing standard, to support the order appealed from. In the Interest of D. A. H., …
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B.D. v. State 412 So. 2d 70 · 1DAG-423 · 1st DCA 1982
… (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Rozier v. State, 402 So.2d 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); and Waters v. State, 401 So.2d 1131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). [2] Section 39.01(8).
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B.D. v. State 412 So. 2d 70 · 4DAG-423 · 4th DCA 1982
· cited by 13 in all courts
… (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Rozier v. State, 402 So.2d 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); and Waters v. State, 401 So.2d 1131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). . Section 39.01(8).
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Hubbard v. State 411 So. 2d 1312 · 1DVV-439 · 1st DCA 1982
· cited by 17 in all courts
…comment. Hubbard was seventeen years old and subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system when the crime occurred on July 18, 1977. Section 39.01(4), 39.02, Florida Statutes (1977). At the time, a juvenile could be involuntarily transferred into the adult criminal justice system in two ways: pursuant to a…
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State v. Lisak 409 So. 2d 1149 · DCA80-2119 · District Court of Appeal 1982
· cited by 1 in all courts
…equivalent of an adjudicatory hearing. The fifth district addressed that issue in McCarver v. State, 379 So.2d 979, 980-981 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980): Sec. 39.01(23), F.S., defines “adjudicatory hearing” as “. . . a hearing at which the court makes its findings of fact and enters an appropriate order dismissing the case,…
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State v. M.M. 407 So. 2d 987 · 4D81-1387 · 4th DCA 1981
…pursuant to Section 39.404, Florida Statutes (1981), petitions representing that each of the minors was "a dependent child [within the purview of Section 39.01(9)(d)] for reason of ... persistent truancy" and that the court had jurisdiction because the minors violated Section 232.01(1)(a), by being truant (S.E. on 15…
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State v. M.M. 407 So. 2d 987 · DCA81-1387 · District Court of Appeal 1981
· cited by 6 in all courts
…pursuant to Section 39.404, Florida Statutes (1981), petitions representing that each of the minors was “a dependent child [within the purview of Section 39.01(9)(d)] for reason of . . . persistent truancy” and that the court had jurisdiction because the minors violated Section 232.01(l)(a), by being truant (S. E. on 15…
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Interest of R.D.B. v. State 404 So. 2d 136 · DCA81-110 · District Court of Appeal 1981
· cited by 1 in all courts
…the delinquent to make restitution. Section 39.11(l)(h) authorizes the trial judge to impose restitution “as part of the community control program.” Section 39.01(10) describes “community control” for purposes of Chapter 39: “Community control” means the legal status of probation created by law and court order in cases…
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G.E.J. v. State 401 So. 2d 1325 · SC59943 · Florida Supreme Court 1981
…rules and usage may be considered in construing a statute, they are not conclusive or determinative. We are aware that the 1980 legislature amended section 39.01, Florida Statutes, to include a definition of “training school” and that the Jacksonville center was not among those schools expressly named. See ch.…
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G.A. v. State 391 So. 2d 720 · 1DOO-475 · 1st DCA 1980
…G.A. was taken into custody for purposes of activating the running of various rule and statutory time limits. On the facts of this case, we agree. Section 39.01(33), Fla. Stat., (1978 Supp.) defines "Taken into custody" as the [S]tatus of a child immediately when temporary physical custody over the child is attained…
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G.A. v. State 391 So. 2d 720 · 5DOO-175 · 5th DCA 1980
· cited by 8 in all courts
…G.A. was taken into custody for purposes of activating the running of various rule and statutory time limits. On the facts of this case, we agree. Section 39.01(33), Fla.Stat., (1978 Supp.) defines “Taken into custody” as the [S]tatus of a child immediately when temporary physical custody over the child is attained by…
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G.K.D. v. State 391 So. 2d 327 · DCATT-148 · District Court of Appeal 1980
· cited by 3 in all courts
…violating § 806.13, Florida Statutes, and the action taken by the trial judge was within her power pursuant to Chapter 39, Florida Statutes. See § 39.01(8) and 39.10(2). We accordingly affirm. ERVIN and SHAW, JJ., concur.
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R.P. v. State 389 So. 2d 658 · DCAOO-452 · District Court of Appeal 1980
· cited by 2 in all courts
…of the statute. Appellants have also directed our attention to Chapter 80-290, Section 1, Laws of Florida. By that enactment, the Legislature amended Section 39.01 by adding subsection (36) defining “training school” as specifically named institutions not including the JYDC. This statutory provision became effective on…
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Matter of Adoption of Cottrill 388 So. 2d 302 · 3D79-2258 · 3rd DCA 1980
· cited by 13 in all courts
…from natural parents and placed in others whenever the parents' neglect or abuse makes that action necessary for the best interests of the child. Section 39.01(9) and Sections 39.40, et seq., Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978). But grounds which may legally justify depriving a natural parent of custody do not necessarily…
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Doerr v. State 383 So. 2d 905 · SC52275 · Florida Supreme Court 1980
· cited by 45 in all courts
…. The district court disagreed with Doerr's contention and affirmed the trial court. We agree with the district court's following rationale: Section 39.01(3) defines "taken into custody" to mean "the status of temporary physical control of a child by a person authorized by this chapter, pending his release,…
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McCarver v. State 379 So. 2d 979 · 5D79-276/T4-390 · 5th DCA 1980
· cited by 5 in all courts
…hearing" does not include acceptance of guilty pleas, hence the 14-day inhibition of Sec. 39.02(5)(c), F.S., does not apply. We do not agree. Sec. 39.01(23), F.S., defines "adjudicatory hearing" as "... a hearing at which the court makes its findings of fact and enters an appropriate order dismissing the case,…
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Purvis v. State 377 So. 2d 674 · SC53778 · Florida Supreme Court 1979
· cited by 13 in all courts
…Florida (1868). [4] See State v. Lash, 16 N.J.L. 380 (N.J. 1838). [5] The terms "dependent child" and "delinquent child" are defined in section 39.01, Florida Statutes (1977), as follows: (8) "Dependent child" means a child who: (a) Has been abandoned by his parents or other custodians. (b) For any…
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Johnson v. State 371 So. 2d 556 · 2D79-106 · 2nd DCA 1979
· cited by 31 in all courts
…1978), can be quickly disposed of. Section 39.111 deals with children prosecuted as adults. Within the meaning of Chapter 39, a "child" is defined in Section 39.01(4), Florida Statutes (1977), as "any married or unmarried person under the age of 18 years or any person who is charged with a violation of law occurring prior…
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T.W.C. v. Pate 369 So. 2d 361 · 1DMM-403 · 1st DCA 1979
· cited by 5 in all courts
…weapon, and an order of nonsecure detention, on conditions, entered December 22, 1978. The 21-day period prescribed for an adjudicatory hearing by Sections 39.01 and 39.032(5)(c), Florida Statutes (1977), elapsed January 5, 1979, without an adjudicatory hearing having been held. In the absence of new grounds *362 for…
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In Interest of Peterson 364 So. 2d 98 · 4D78-308 · 4th DCA 1978
· cited by 23 in all courts
…638 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). The grandparents mentioned in that *99 opinion have now suggested the child is a dependent child within the meaning of Section 39.01, Florida Statutes (1977) and seek to have the juvenile division of the circuit court declare her to be such a dependent child. When the petition was brought…
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Doerr v. State 348 So. 2d 938 · 2D76-977 · 2nd DCA 1977
· cited by 18 in all courts
…call, or (2) the officer makes a good faith effort to so advise his parents, is inadmissible in evidence." 336 So.2d at 376 (citations omitted). Section 39.01(3) defines "taken into custody" to mean "the status of temporary physical control of a child by a person authorized by this chapter, pending his release,…
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State v. Saunders 339 So. 2d 641 · SC48438 · Florida Supreme Court 1976
· cited by 78 in all courts
…847 . See also Moffett v. State, 340 So.2d 1155 (Fla. 1976). [4] A delinquent child is defined as "a child who commits a violation of law." Section 39.01(12), Florida Statutes (1975). [5] The first time was in State v. Magee, 259 So.2d 139 (Fla. 1972). See ante, p. 642 n. 3. [6] The United States…
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Interest of R.L.J. 336 So. 2d 132 · 1DZ-475 · 1st DCA 1976
· cited by 6 in all courts
…and sensitive "judicial treatment" of juveniles. That phrase implies a concern for adjudicatory standards and for appropriate ancillary processes. Section 39.01(30) defines "taken into custody," the linchpin phrase of appellant's argument, as "the status of a temporary physical control of a child by a person authorized…
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K.P. v. State 327 So. 2d 820 · 1DZ-343 · 1st DCA 1976
…except a child who commits a juvenile traffic offense and whose case had not been transferred to the circuit court by the court having jurisdiction." (F.S. 39.01(12)) It has been held that "a violation of law, regardless of where the violation occurred", is a violation of any law of the United States, of Florida, of…
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Potvin v. Keller 313 So. 2d 703 · SC46258 · Florida Supreme Court 1975
· cited by 26 in all courts
…and that three days after delivery a hearing was conducted to determine whether Sharon should be adjudicated a "dependent child" within the meaning of section 39.01(10), Fla. Stat. Appellants were both present at the hearing, but they were not at that time advised that they had a right to be represented by counsel, or that if…
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French v. French 303 So. 2d 668 · 4D73-1053 · 4th DCA 1974
· cited by 6 in all courts
…of the law because they are in college. See, Carmody v. Carmody, Fla.App. 1970, 230 So.2d 40 ; Perla v. Perla, Fla. 1952, 58 So.2d 689 ; and Section 39.01(10), F.S. There are many moral obligations both parents have to their children after they become of age, and providing college education when possible may be…
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Bell v. State 289 So. 2d 388 · SC44267 · Florida Supreme Court 1973
· cited by 36 in all courts
…because in charging violation of Section 828.21, count 2 alleged that the minor involved was seventeen. Since delinquent child is described by Section 39.01 to be one under seventeen years of age, the trial judge dismissed count 2. Subsequently, appellant expressed an intent to withdraw his previous plea of not…
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Sedberry v. State 286 So. 2d 237 · DCAS-353 · District Court of Appeal 1973
…children were taken from her custody without a hearing, as being a denial of due process of law. On the appellant’s latter contention, when such [F.S. §§ 39.01(10), 39.06(3) F.S. A.] is authorized by statute, we are not inclined to hold that a juvenile court should be precluded from so acting without a prior noticed…
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In re T.A.F. 252 So. 2d 255 · DCAP-371 · District Court of Appeal 1971
· cited by 5 in all courts
…Juvenile Court of Duval County rendered its final order adjudging the minor children involved herein to be in need of supervision as defined in F.S. section 39.01 (12) (a), F.S.A., and placing them under the supervision of a juvenile counselor, to be thereafter dealt with pursuant to the requirements of law. Throughout…
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State v. R.E.F. 251 So. 2d 672 · 1DO-416 · 1st DCA 1971
· cited by 1 in all courts
…neither charged nor convicted of having committed a crime against the laws of this state but merely with being a delinquent child as defined in F.S. Section 39.01(11), F.S.A., as follows: "`Delinquent child' means a child who commits a violation of law, regardless of where the violation occurs." Appellant points to Article…
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State v. R.E.F. 251 So. 2d 672 · DCAO-416 · District Court of Appeal 1971
· cited by 11 in all courts
…neither charged nor convicted of having committed a crime against the laws of this state but merely with being a delinquent child as defined in F.S. Section 39.01(11), F.S.A., as follows: “‘Delinquent child’ means' a child who commits a violation of law, regardless of where the violation occurs.” Appellant points to Article…
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Holman v. State 203 So. 2d 653 · DCA67-80 · District Court of Appeal 1967
· cited by 1 in all courts
…age and understanding, of the nature thereof, couched in narrative terms and not in the usual language of criminal informa-tions and indictments.” F.S. Sec. 39.01(10) F.S.A. provides: “ ‘Dependent child’ means a child who, for any reason, is destitute, homeless, dependent upon the public for support, or has not proper…
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In re G.K.L. 194 So. 2d 36 · DCA66-954 · District Court of Appeal 1967
…mother of a child appeals an order of the Juvenile Court in and for Monroe County, Florida, which adjudicated the child dependent. See Fla.Stat.1965, § 39.01(10), F.S.A. The Juvenile Court awarded temporary care and custody to the father under the supervision of the State Department of Public Welfare. It is apparent…
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In re S.T.P. 194 So. 2d 29 · DCA66-830 · District Court of Appeal 1967
· cited by 1 in all courts
…and Domestic Relations Court of Dade County, which adjudicated the designated minor children as being dependent children within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 39.01 (10), F. S. A. On this appeal, it is first urged that the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court lacked jurisdiction because the appellant, had been granted…
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In re C.P. 193 So. 2d 33 · DCA66-941 · District Court of Appeal 1966
· cited by 2 in all courts
…for that order, the appellant [natural mother] controverts sufficiency of the evidence to establish that the child was a dependent within the purview of § 39.01(10), Florida Statutes, F.S.A. We agree that the record fails to disclose such substantial, competent evidence to demonstrate the dependency of the minor child…
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In re S.L.T. 180 So. 2d 374 · 2D5070 · 2nd DCA 1965
· cited by 1 in all courts
…of the juvenile court, § 39.02(1) Fla.Stats., F.S.A., remains the same and there has been no change in the statute defining a dependent child. Sec. 39.01(10), Fla. Stat., F.S.A. So for our purposes here the law is the same as it existed at the time of the decisions in Hunt and Rogers. [2] Cf. Conrad v. Rose,…
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In re S.L.T. 180 So. 2d 374 · DCA5070 · District Court of Appeal 1965
· cited by 59 in all courts
…of the juvenile court, § 39.02(1) Fla.Stats., F.S.A., remains the same and there has been no change in the statute defining a dependent child. Sec. 39.01(10), Fla. Stat., F.S.A. So for our purposes here the law is the same as it existed at the time of the decisions in Hunt and Rogers. . Cf. Conrad v. Rose,…
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Conrad v. Rose 173 So. 2d 762 · DCA5895 · District Court of Appeal 1965
· cited by 2 in all courts
…existence at the time of the enactment of said Chapter, or were later created. No such separate juvenile court .is in existence in Charlotte County. Section 39.01(10), F.S.A., defines a dependent child as one “who is neglected as to proper or necessary support or education as required by law * * ” Section .39.02(1), F.S.A.,…
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In re W.S.B. 157 So. 2d 548 · DCA63-519 · District Court of Appeal 1963
· cited by 1 in all courts
…appeal challenges an order of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court finding that the children involved are dependent children within the meaning of § 39.01, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. Appellant urges that such a finding is impossible because it appears from the record that the mother, who has custody of the children, has…
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A.N.E. v. State 156 So. 2d 525 · 1DE-318-E-321 · 1st DCA 1963
…in the court a petition alleging her said child is a delinquent child within the intent and meaning of Chapter 26880, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1951, F.S.A. § 39.01 et seq. Brinkhoff's said petition is in two counts, the first alleging that the said child on July 18, 1963, in St. Augustine, St. Johns County, having…
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A.N.E. v. State 156 So. 2d 525 · DCAE-318-E-321 · District Court of Appeal 1963
· cited by 2 in all courts
…in the court a petition alleging her said child is a delinquent child within the intent and meaning of Chapter 26880, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1951, F.S.A. § 39.01 et seq. Brinkhoff’s said petition is in two counts, the first alleging that the said child on July 18, 1963, in St. Augustine, St. Johns County, having…
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State v. Barone 124 So. 2d 490 · SC30599 · Florida Supreme Court 1960
· cited by 19 in all courts
…Statutes, F.S.A., there is but one place in the statutes of this State where the words "delinquent child" are delimited. That is to be found in Section 39.01, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.: "(6) `Child' means any married or unmarried person under the age of seventeen years, or any person who is charged with a…
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In re C.E.S. 106 So. 2d 610 · 1DA-199 · 1st DCA 1958
…sufficient substantial, competent evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court that the boy was a "dependent" child within the meaning of Section 39.01(10), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and that the best interests of the boy were served by awarding his custody to the appellee Conwell. The record shows that, since…
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In re C.E.S. 106 So. 2d 610 · 2DA-199 · 2nd DCA 1958
· cited by 13 in all courts
…sufficient substantial, competent evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court that the boy was a “dependent” child within the meaning of Section 39.01(10), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and that the best interests of the boy were served by awarding his custody to the ap-pellee Conwell. The record shows that, since…
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State v. J.K. 104 So. 2d 113 · 2D554 · 2nd DCA 1958
…court. The question then arises whether a juvenile court is a trial court. Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides for juvenile courts. Section 39.01 provides that a juvenile court means any court, the name of which includes the word "juvenile", heretofore or hereafter established, and means the county…
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State v. J.K. 104 So. 2d 113 · DCA554 · District Court of Appeal 1958
· cited by 13 in all courts
…court. The question then arises whether a juvenile court is a trial court. Chapter 39,. Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides for juvenile courts. Section 39.01 provides that a juvenile court means any court, the name of which includes the word “juvenile”,, heretofore or hereafter established, and' means the county…
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Ponce v. Children's Home Society of Florida 97 So. 2d 194 · CL7488499 · Florida Supreme Court 1957
· cited by 10 in all courts
…relevant to the case at bar conferred on that court by other statutes. See Secs. 39.-02(7); 39.181; and Chapter 26880, Sec. 3, Laws of Florida 1951, F.S.A. § 39.01 note. The acts which apply to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Dade County (Chapter 19597, Laws of 1939; Chapter 21094, Laws of 1941; and Chapter…
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In re Rouse 66 So. 2d 42 · CL1649354 · Florida Supreme Court 1953
· cited by 14 in all courts
…any such law must be of general and uniform operation in the several counties of the State. Under the provisions of Chapter 26880, Acts of 1951, F.S.A. § 39.01 et seq., which was the general law applicable to every county in the state where a Juvenile Court was established, jurisdiction was only granted over minor…
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In re Amendments to the Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Forms – 12.970(a)-(f) SC21-607 · Florida Supreme Court 2021
…jurisdiction involving one or both of the children’s parents as an adverse party; OR An individual who qualifies as “fictive kin.” As defined in section 39.01, Florida Statutes, fictive kin means a person unrelated by birth, marriage, or adoption who has an emotionally significant relationship, which possesses the…
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In re Amendments to the Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Forms 173 So. 3d 19 · SC15-44 · Florida Supreme Court 2015
· cited by 1 in all courts
… Birth date Age Sex Location/Address 2. Verified allegations of child abuse or neglect as defined in sections 39.01(2) or (45), Florida Statutes, _____ HAVE _____ HAVE NOT been made in this case. 3. The matters before the Court regarding the minor child(ren)…
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Amendments to Approved Family Law Forms 20 So. 3d 173 · SC08-2058-2 · Florida Supreme Court 2009
… _______________ ________________ _________ _________ ____________________ 2. Verified allegations of child abuse or neglect as defined in sections 39.01(2) or (45), Florida Statutes, () HAVE () HAVE NOT been made in this case. 3. The matters before the Court regarding the minor child(ren) are: a. sole/shared…
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Amendments to the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure & Family Law Forms 810 So. 2d 1 · SC99-2 · Florida Supreme Court 2000
· cited by 54 in all courts
…following minor child(ren) is (are) subject to this proceeding: [[Image here]] 2. Verified allegations of child abuse or neglect as defined in section 39.01(2) or (5), Florida Statutes, ( ) HAVE ( ) HAVE NOT been made in this case. 3. The matters before the Court regarding the minor child(ren) are: — a.…
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In re Amendments to the Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Forms 205 So. 3d 1 · SC15-44-2 · Florida Supreme Court 2015
· cited by 1 in all courts
… Birth date Age Sex Location/Address 2. Verified allegations of child abuse or neglect as defined in sections 39.01(2) or (45), Florida Statutes, _____ HAVE _____ HAVE NOT been made in this case. 3. The matters before the Court regarding the minor child(ren)…
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In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure - 2024 Legislation SC2024-1093 · Florida Supreme Court 2024
…8.445. We discuss the more significant amendments below. Section 5 of chapter 2024-70, Laws of Florida, amended the definition of “party” in section 39.01(61), Florida Statutes (2023), by removing the phrase “or the representative of the guardian ad litem program when the program has been appointed.” Thus, we…
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In re Amendments to Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure 214 So. 3d 400 · SC16-978 · Florida Supreme Court 2017
· cited by 10 in all courts
…legal counsel shall not be the same person. In such actions which involve an allegation of child abuse, abandonment, or neglect as defined in s. 39.01, which allegation is verified and determined by the court to be well-founded, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for the child. The…
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Amendments to the Rules of Juvenile Procedure 783 So. 2d 138 · SC00-644 · Florida Supreme Court 2000
· cited by 8 in all courts
…at the time of- disposition for the current offense and who-was adjudicated — and—has been committed — in this proceeding, meefs-fhe-criteria in subsection 39.01(44); -Florida Statutes, for-serious-or-habitual juvenile offender placement in-that-said child was:- -r™ — Adjudicated—or had — adjudication withheld on the…
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In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure 725 So. 2d 296 · SC93-3 · Florida Supreme Court 1998
· cited by 1 in all courts
…proceeding-pursuant to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure. —(d-)-A---- .... performance agreement/permanent placement plan. as defined in section 39.01, Florida Statutes, has been offered-to the-parents. —(e)-The - child(ren-)’s — parents have — failed upon — expiration of — .—a performance agreement…
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In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure 608 So. 2d 478 · SC79591 · Florida Supreme Court 1992
· cited by 8 in all courts
…of an indigent person to be represented by court appointed counsel...; 5. A .. .performance agreement/permanent placement plan..., as defined in section 39.01, Florida Statutes, was offered to the parents; 6. The parents have failed to substantially comply with the .. .plan/agreement_ 7. The need for termination…
No opinion cites this provision by number.
5 admin code rules cite § 39.01
DCF's rules in Chapter 65C, Florida Administrative Code, that cite it or name it as the law they implement.
- Rule 65C-1.006 Provider Requirements. (5)
- Rule 65C-16.001 Definitions. Implements
- Rule 65C-16.002 Adoptive Family Selection. (5)(c)
- Rule 65C-30.001 Definitions. (31)cites (19)
- Rule 65C-35.001 Definitions. (5)cites (11)
No admin code rule cites this provision.
15 CFOPs cite § 39.01
How DCF carries it out. A page opens in the CFOP reader with the citation highlighted.
- CFOP 15-14 Publishing Filing and Distributing Reports Required by Law p. 5
- CFOP 170-1 Florida Child Welfare Practice Model p. 19 (49)p. 93 (66)p. 128 (71)p. 153 (51)p. 154 (24)p. 170 (7)
- CFOP 170-2 Completing Hotline Intake Assessment p. 19
- CFOP 170-4 Child Maltreatment Index p. 1p. 4p. 7p. 10p. 11p. 12p. 14p. 17p. 19p. 23p. 26p. 30p. 37p. 43p. 45p. 48p. 50p. 52p. 55p. 60p. 62p. 65p. 69
- CFOP 170-5 Child Protective Investigations p. 10p. 14p. 18p. 33 (67)p. 34 (36)p. 85 (29)p. 105 (36)
- CFOP 170-6 Child Fatality Response p. 3p. 5 (2), (44)
- CFOP 170-8 Plan of Safe Care for Infants Affected by Prenatal Substance Use p. 4 (35)(g)
- CFOP 170-10 Providing Services and Support for Children in Care and for Caregivers p. 17 (28), (52)p. 18 (73)p. 34
- CFOP 170-11 Placement p. 36
- CFOP 170-13 Child Support in Child Welfare Cases p. 3 (16)p. 4 (16)
- CFOP 170-14 Response to the Human Trafficking of Children p. 1 (15)(g), (69)
- CFOP 170-15 Federal and State Funding Eligibility p. 10 (28)p. 38 (39)p. 86 (29), (51), (73)p. 89 (28), (51), (73)
- CFOP 170-18 Services for Children with MH and Any Co-Occurring SA or DD Treatment Needs p. 31 (62)p. 32 (11)
- CFOP 170-20 Child Care Licensing Program Desk Reference Guide p. 154 (33), (47)
- CFOP 175-19 Administrative Fines and Other Penalties for False Reporting of Abuse Neglect and Abandonment p. 1 (27)p. 4 (27)
No CFOP cites this provision.
Shading shows how often opinions cite each provision: rarely sometimes often most. Click a provision to list the opinions citing it.
(1) “Abandoned” or “abandonment” means a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or legal custodian, the caregiver, while being able, has made no significant contribution to the child’s care and maintenance or has failed to establish or maintain a substantial and positive relationship with the child, or both. For purposes of this subsection, “establish or maintain a substantial and positive relationship” includes, but is not limited to, frequent and regular contact with the child through frequent and regular visitation or frequent and regular communication to or with the child, and the exercise of parental rights and responsibilities. Marginal efforts and incidental or token visits or communications are not sufficient to establish or maintain a substantial and positive relationship with a child. A man’s acknowledgment of paternity of the child does not limit the period of time considered in determining whether the child was abandoned. The term does not include a surrendered infant as described in s. 383.50, a “child in need of services” as defined in chapter 984, or a “family in need of services” as defined in chapter 984. The absence of a parent, legal custodian, or caregiver responsible for a child’s welfare, who is a servicemember, by reason of deployment or anticipated deployment as defined in 50 U.S.C. s. 3938(e), may not be considered or used as a factor in determining abandonment. The incarceration, repeated incarceration, or extended incarceration of a parent, legal custodian, or caregiver responsible for a child’s welfare may support a finding of abandonment.
(2) “Abuse” means any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual abuse, injury, or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired. Abuse of a child includes the birth of a new child into a family during the course of an open dependency case when the parent or caregiver has been determined to lack the protective capacity to safely care for the children in the home and has not substantially complied with the case plan towards successful reunification or met the conditions for return of the children into the home. Abuse of a child includes acts or omissions. Corporal discipline of a child by a parent or legal custodian for disciplinary purposes does not in itself constitute abuse when it does not result in harm to the child.
(3) “Addictions receiving facility” means a substance abuse service provider as defined in chapter 397.
(4) “Adjudicatory hearing” means a hearing for the court to determine whether or not the facts support the allegations stated in the petition in dependency cases or in termination of parental rights cases.
(5) “Adoption” means the act of creating the legal relationship between parent and child where it did not exist, thereby declaring the child to be legally the child of the adoptive parents and their heir at law, and entitled to all the rights and privileges and subject to all the obligations of a child born to the adoptive parents in lawful wedlock.
(6) “Adult” means any natural person other than a child.
(7) “Arbitration” means a process whereby a neutral third person or panel, called an arbitrator or an arbitration panel, considers the facts and arguments presented by the parties and renders a decision which may be binding or nonbinding.
(8) “Attorney ad litem” means an attorney appointed by the court to represent a child in a dependency case who has an attorney-client relationship with the child under the rules regulating The Florida Bar.
(9) “Authorized agent” or “designee” of the department means an employee, volunteer, or other person or agency determined by the state to be eligible for state-funded risk management coverage, which is assigned or designated by the department to perform duties or exercise powers under this chapter.
(10) “Caregiver” means the parent, legal custodian, permanent guardian, adult household member, or other person responsible for a child’s welfare as defined in subsection (57).
(11) “Case plan” means a document, as described in s. 39.6011, prepared by the department with input from all parties. The case plan follows the child from the provision of voluntary services through any dependency, foster care, or termination of parental rights proceeding or related activity or process.
(12) “Child” or “youth” means any unmarried person under the age of 18 years who has not been emancipated by order of the court.
(13) “Child Protection Team” means a team of professionals established by the Department of Health to receive referrals from the protective investigators and protective supervision staff of the department and to provide specialized and supportive services to the program in processing child abuse, abandonment, or neglect cases. A Child Protection Team shall provide consultation to other programs of the department and other persons regarding child abuse, abandonment, or neglect cases.
(14) “Child who has exhibited inappropriate sexual behavior” means a child who has been found by the department or the court to have committed an inappropriate sexual act.
(15) “Child who is found to be dependent” means a child who, pursuant to this chapter, is found by the court:
(a) To have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child’s parent or parents or legal custodians;
(b) To have been surrendered to the department, the former Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, or a licensed child-placing agency for purpose of adoption;
(c) To have been voluntarily placed with a licensed child-caring agency, a licensed child-placing agency, an adult relative, the department, or the former Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, after which placement, under the requirements of this chapter, a case plan has expired and the parent or parents or legal custodians have failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the plan;
(d) To have been voluntarily placed with a licensed child-placing agency for the purposes of subsequent adoption, and a parent or parents have signed a consent pursuant to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure;
(e) To have no parent or legal custodians capable of providing supervision and care;
(f) To be at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians; or
(g) To have been sexually exploited and to have no parent, legal custodian, or responsible adult relative currently known and capable of providing the necessary and appropriate supervision and care.
(16) “Child support” means a court-ordered obligation, enforced under chapter 61 and ss. 409.2551-409.2597, for monetary support for the care, maintenance, training, and education of a child.
(17) “Circuit” means any of the 20 judicial circuits as set forth in s. 26.021.
(18) “Comprehensive assessment” or “assessment” means the gathering of information for the evaluation of a child’s and caregiver’s physical, psychiatric, psychological, or mental health; developmental delays or challenges; and educational, vocational, and social condition and family environment as they relate to the child’s and caregiver’s need for rehabilitative and treatment services, including substance abuse treatment services, mental health services, developmental services, literacy services, medical services, family services, and other specialized services, as appropriate.
(19) “Concurrent planning” means establishing a permanency goal in a case plan that uses reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the parent, while at the same time establishing another goal that must be one of the following options:
(a) Adoption when a petition for termination of parental rights has been filed or will be filed;
(b) Permanent guardianship of a dependent child under s. 39.6221;
(c) Permanent placement with a fit and willing relative under s. 39.6231; or
(d) Placement in another planned permanent living arrangement under s. 39.6241.
(20) “Court,” unless otherwise expressly stated, means the circuit court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under this chapter.
(21) “Department” means the Department of Children and Families.
(22) “Diligent efforts by a parent” means a course of conduct which results in a meaningful change in the behavior of a parent that reduces risk to the child in the child’s home to the extent that the child may be safely placed permanently back in the home as set forth in the case plan.
(23) “Diligent efforts of social service agency” means reasonable efforts to provide social services or reunification services made by any social service agency that is a party to a case plan.
(24) “Diligent search” means the efforts of a social service agency to locate a parent or prospective parent whose identity or location is unknown, initiated as soon as the social service agency is made aware of the existence of such parent, with the search progress reported at each court hearing until the parent is either identified and located or the court excuses further search.
(25) “Disposition hearing” means a hearing in which the court determines the most appropriate protections, services, and placement for the child in dependency cases.
(26) “Expedited termination of parental rights” means proceedings wherein a case plan with the goal of reunification is not being offered.
(27) “False report” means a report of abuse, neglect, or abandonment of a child to the central abuse hotline, which report is maliciously made for the purpose of:
(a) Harassing, embarrassing, or harming another person;
(b) Personal financial gain for the reporting person;
(c) Acquiring custody of a child; or
(d) Personal benefit for the reporting person in any other private dispute involving a child.
The term “false report” does not include a report of abuse, neglect, or abandonment of a child made in good faith to the central abuse hotline.
(28) “Family” means a collective body of persons, consisting of a child and a parent, legal custodian, or adult relative, in which:
(a) The persons reside in the same house or living unit; or
(b) The parent, legal custodian, or adult relative has a legal responsibility by blood, marriage, or court order to support or care for the child.
(29) “Fictive kin” means a person unrelated by birth, marriage, or adoption who has an emotionally significant relationship, which possesses the characteristics of a family relationship, to a child.
(30) “Foster care” means care provided a child in a foster family or boarding home, group home, agency boarding home, child care institution, or any combination thereof.
(31) “Guardian” means a relative, nonrelative, next of kin, or fictive kin who is awarded physical custody of a child in a proceeding brought pursuant to this chapter.
(32) “Guardian ad litem” means a person or an entity that is a fiduciary appointed by the court to represent a child in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding to which the child is a party, including, but not limited to, under this chapter, which uses a best interest standard for decisionmaking and advocacy. For purposes of this chapter, the term includes, but is not limited to, the Statewide Guardian ad Litem Office, which includes all circuit guardian ad litem offices and the duly certified volunteers, staff, and attorneys assigned by the Statewide Guardian ad Litem Office to represent children; a court-appointed attorney; or a responsible adult who is appointed by the court. A guardian ad litem is a party to the judicial proceeding as a representative of the child and serves until the jurisdiction of the court over the child terminates or until excused by the court.
(33) “Guardian advocate” means a person appointed by the court to act on behalf of a drug-dependent newborn under part XI of this chapter.
(34) “Guardianship assistance payment” means a monthly cash payment made by the department to a guardian on behalf of an eligible child or young adult.
(35) “Guardianship Assistance Program” means a program that provides benefits to a child’s guardian on behalf of the child. Benefits may be in the form of a guardianship assistance payment, a guardianship nonrecurring payment, or Medicaid coverage.
(36) “Guardianship nonrecurring payment” means a one-time payment of up to $2,000 made by the department to a guardian to assist with the expenses associated with obtaining legal guardianship of a child who is eligible for the Guardianship Assistance Program pursuant to s. 39.6225.
(37) “Harm” to a child’s health or welfare can occur when any person:
(a) Inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the child physical, mental, or emotional injury. In determining whether harm has occurred, the following factors must be considered in evaluating any physical, mental, or emotional injury to a child: the age of the child; any prior history of injuries to the child; the location of the injury on the body of the child; the multiplicity of the injury; and the type of trauma inflicted. Such injury includes, but is not limited to:
1. Willful acts that produce the following specific injuries:
a. Sprains, dislocations, or cartilage damage.
b. Bone or skull fractures.
c. Brain or spinal cord damage.
d. Intracranial hemorrhage or injury to other internal organs.
e. Asphyxiation, suffocation, or drowning.
f. Injury resulting from the use of a deadly weapon.
g. Burns or scalding.
h. Cuts, lacerations, punctures, or bites.
i. Permanent or temporary disfigurement.
j. Permanent or temporary loss or impairment of a body part or function.
As used in this subparagraph, the term “willful” refers to the intent to perform an action, not to the intent to achieve a result or to cause an injury.
2. Purposely giving a child poison, alcohol, drugs, or other substances that substantially affect the child’s behavior, motor coordination, or judgment or that result in sickness or internal injury. For the purposes of this subparagraph, the term “drugs” means prescription drugs not prescribed for the child or not administered as prescribed, and controlled substances as outlined in Schedule I or Schedule II of s. 893.03.
3. Leaving a child without adult supervision or arrangement appropriate for the child’s age or mental or physical condition, so that the child is unable to care for the child’s own needs, is subjected to obvious danger of which the child’s caregiver knew or should have known, or is unable to exercise reasonable judgment to avoid serious harm to himself or others in responding to any kind of physical or emotional crisis. This subparagraph may not be construed to restrict a caregiver from allowing a child of sufficient maturity and physical condition from engaging in independent unsupervised activities, including, but not limited to, traveling to or from school or nearby locations by bicycle or on foot, playing outdoors, or remaining at home or any other location for a reasonable period of time, unless allowing such activities constitutes conduct that is so reckless as to endanger the health or safety of the child.
4. Inappropriate or excessively harsh disciplinary action that is likely to result in physical injury, mental injury as defined in this section, or emotional injury. The significance of any injury must be evaluated in light of the following factors: the age of the child; any prior history of injuries to the child; the location of the injury on the body of the child; the multiplicity of the injury; and the type of trauma inflicted. Corporal discipline may be considered excessive or abusive when it results in any of the following or other similar injuries:
a. Sprains, dislocations, or cartilage damage.
b. Bone or skull fractures.
c. Brain or spinal cord damage.
d. Intracranial hemorrhage or injury to other internal organs.
e. Asphyxiation, suffocation, or drowning.
f. Injury resulting from the use of a deadly weapon.
g. Burns or scalding.
h. Cuts, lacerations, punctures, or bites.
i. Permanent or temporary disfigurement.
j. Permanent or temporary loss or impairment of a body part or function.
k. Significant bruises or welts.
(b) Commits, or allows to be committed, sexual battery, as defined in chapter 794, or lewd or lascivious acts, as defined in chapter 800, against the child.
(c) Allows, encourages, or forces the sexual exploitation of a child, which includes allowing, encouraging, or forcing a child to:
1. Solicit for or engage in prostitution; or
2. Engage in a sexual performance, as defined by chapter 827.
(d) Exploits a child, or allows a child to be exploited, as provided in s. 450.151.
(e) Abandons the child. Within the context of the definition of “harm,” the term “abandoned the child” or “abandonment of the child” means a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or legal custodian, the caregiver, while being able, has made no significant contribution to the child’s care and maintenance or has failed to establish or maintain a substantial and positive relationship with the child, or both. For purposes of this paragraph, “establish or maintain a substantial and positive relationship” includes, but is not limited to, frequent and regular contact with the child through frequent and regular visitation or frequent and regular communication to or with the child, and the exercise of parental rights and responsibilities. Marginal efforts and incidental or token visits or communications are not sufficient to establish or maintain a substantial and positive relationship with a child. The term “abandoned” does not include a surrendered infant as described in s. 383.50, a child in need of services as defined in chapter 984, or a family in need of services as defined in chapter 984. The incarceration, repeated incarceration, or extended incarceration of a parent, legal custodian, or caregiver responsible for a child’s welfare may support a finding of abandonment.
(f) Neglects the child. Within the context of the definition of “harm,” the term “neglects the child” means that the parent or other person responsible for the child’s welfare fails to supply the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or health care, although financially able to do so or although offered financial or other means to do so; however, the term does not include a caregiver allowing a child to engage in independent and unsupervised activities unless allowing such activities constitutes reckless conduct that endangers the health or safety of the child. Such independent and unsupervised activities include, but are not limited to, traveling to or from school or nearby locations by bicycle or on foot, playing outdoors, or remaining at home or any other location for a reasonable period of time. A parent or legal custodian who, by reason of the legitimate practice of religious beliefs, does not provide specified medical treatment for a child may not be considered abusive or neglectful for that reason alone, but such an exception does not:
1. Eliminate the requirement that such a case be reported to the department;
2. Prevent the department from investigating such a case; or
3. Preclude a court from ordering, when the health of the child requires it, the provision of medical services by a physician, as defined in this section, or treatment by a duly accredited practitioner who relies solely on spiritual means for healing in accordance with the tenets and practices of a well-recognized church or religious organization.
(g) Exposes a child to a controlled substance or alcohol. Exposure to a controlled substance or alcohol is established by:
1. A test, administered at birth, which indicated that the child’s blood, urine, or meconium contained any amount of alcohol or a controlled substance or metabolites of such substances, the presence of which was not the result of medical treatment administered to the mother or the newborn infant; or
2. Evidence of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of a controlled substance or alcohol by a parent to the extent that the parent’s ability to provide supervision and care for the child has been or is likely to be severely compromised.
As used in this paragraph, the term “controlled substance” means prescription drugs not prescribed for the parent or not administered as prescribed and controlled substances as outlined in Schedule I or Schedule II of s. 893.03.
(h) Uses mechanical devices, unreasonable restraints, or extended periods of isolation to control a child.
(i) Engages in violent behavior that demonstrates a wanton disregard for the presence of a child and could reasonably result in serious injury to the child.
(j) Negligently fails to protect a child in his or her care from inflicted physical, mental, or sexual injury caused by the acts of another.
(k) Has allowed a child’s sibling to die as a result of abuse, abandonment, or neglect.
(l) Makes the child unavailable for the purpose of impeding or avoiding a protective investigation unless the court determines that the parent, legal custodian, or caregiver was fleeing from a situation involving domestic violence.
(38) “Impending danger” means a situation in which family behaviors, attitudes, motives, emotions, or situations pose a threat that may not be currently active but that can be anticipated to become active and to have severe effects on a child at any time.
(39) “Institutional child abuse or neglect” means situations of known or suspected child abuse or neglect in which the person allegedly perpetrating the child abuse or neglect is an employee of a public or private school, public or private day care center, residential home, institution, facility, or agency or any other person at such institution responsible for the child’s welfare as defined in subsection (57).
(40) “Judge” means the circuit judge exercising jurisdiction pursuant to this chapter.
(41) “Juvenile sexual abuse” means any sexual behavior by a child which occurs without consent, without equality, or as a result of coercion. For purposes of this subsection, the following definitions apply:
(a) “Coercion” means the exploitation of authority or the use of bribes, threats of force, or intimidation to gain cooperation or compliance.
(b) “Consent” means an agreement, including all of the following:
1. Understanding what is proposed based on age, maturity, developmental level, functioning, and experience.
2. Knowledge of societal standards for what is being proposed.
3. Awareness of potential consequences and alternatives.
4. Assumption that agreement or disagreement will be accepted equally.
5. Voluntary decision.
6. Mental competence.
(c) “Equality” means two participants operating with the same level of power in a relationship, neither being controlled nor coerced by the other.
Juvenile sexual behavior ranges from noncontact sexual behavior such as making obscene phone calls, exhibitionism, voyeurism, and the showing or taking of lewd photographs to varying degrees of direct sexual contact, such as frottage, fondling, digital penetration, rape, fellatio, sodomy, and various other sexually aggressive acts.
(42) “Legal custody” means a legal status created by a court which vests in a custodian of the person or guardian, whether an agency or an individual, the right to have physical custody of the child and the right and duty to protect, nurture, guide, and discipline the child and to provide him or her with food, shelter, education, and ordinary medical, dental, psychiatric, and psychological care.
(43) “Legal father” means a man married to the mother at the time of conception or birth of their child, unless paternity has been otherwise determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. If the mother was not married to a man at the time of birth or conception of the child, the term means a man named on the birth certificate of the child pursuant to s. 382.013(2), a man determined by a court order to be the father of the child, or a man determined to be the father of the child by the Department of Revenue as provided in s. 409.256.
(44) “Licensed child-caring agency” means a person, society, association, or agency licensed by the department to care for, receive, and board children.
(45) “Licensed child-placing agency” means a person, society, association, or institution licensed by the department to care for, receive, or board children and to place children in a licensed child-caring institution or a foster or adoptive home.
(46) “Licensed health care professional” means a physician licensed under chapter 458, an osteopathic physician licensed under chapter 459, a nurse licensed under part I of chapter 464, a physician assistant licensed under chapter 458 or chapter 459, or a dentist licensed under chapter 466.
(47) “Likely to injure oneself” means that, as evidenced by violent or other actively self-destructive behavior, it is more likely than not that within a 24-hour period the child will attempt to commit suicide or inflict serious bodily harm on himself or herself.
(48) “Likely to injure others” means that it is more likely than not that within a 24-hour period the child will inflict serious and unjustified bodily harm on another person.
(49) “Mediation” means a process whereby a neutral third person called a mediator acts to encourage and facilitate the resolution of a dispute between two or more parties. It is an informal and nonadversarial process with the objective of helping the disputing parties reach a mutually acceptable and voluntary agreement. The role of the mediator includes, but is not limited to, assisting the parties in identifying issues, fostering joint problem solving, and exploring settlement alternatives.
(50) “Medical neglect” means the failure to provide or the failure to allow needed care as recommended by a health care practitioner for a physical injury, illness, medical condition, or impairment, or the failure to seek timely and appropriate medical care for a serious health problem that a reasonable person would have recognized as requiring professional medical attention. Medical neglect does not occur if the parent or legal guardian of the child has made reasonable attempts to obtain necessary health care services or the immediate health condition giving rise to the allegation of neglect is a known and expected complication of the child’s diagnosis or treatment and:
(a) The recommended care offers limited net benefit to the child and the morbidity or other side effects of the treatment may be considered to be greater than the anticipated benefit; or
(b) The parent or legal guardian received conflicting medical recommendations for treatment from multiple practitioners and did not follow all recommendations.
(51) “Mental injury” means an injury to the intellectual or psychological capacity of a child as evidenced by a discernible and substantial impairment in the ability to function within the normal range of performance and behavior.
(52) “Necessary medical treatment” means care which is necessary within a reasonable degree of medical certainty to prevent the deterioration of a child’s condition or to alleviate immediate pain of a child.
(53) “Neglect” occurs when a child is deprived of, or is allowed to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment or a child is permitted to live in an environment when such deprivation or environment causes the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly impaired. The foregoing circumstances shall not be considered neglect if caused primarily by financial inability unless actual services for relief have been offered to and rejected by such person. A parent or legal custodian legitimately practicing religious beliefs in accordance with a recognized church or religious organization who thereby does not provide specific medical treatment for a child may not, for that reason alone, be considered a negligent parent or legal custodian; however, such an exception does not preclude a court from ordering the following services to be provided, when the health of the child so requires:
(a) Medical services from a licensed physician, dentist, optometrist, podiatric physician, or other qualified health care provider; or
(b) Treatment by a duly accredited practitioner who relies solely on spiritual means for healing in accordance with the tenets and practices of a well-recognized church or religious organization.
Neglect of a child includes acts or omissions.
(54) “Next of kin” means an adult relative of a child who is the child’s brother, sister, grandparent, aunt, uncle, or first cousin.
(55) “Nonrelative” means a person unrelated by blood or marriage or a relative outside the fifth degree of consanguinity.
(56) “Office” means the Office of Adoption and Child Protection within the Executive Office of the Governor.
(57) “Other person responsible for a child’s welfare” includes the child’s legal guardian or foster parent; an employee of any school, public or private child day care center, residential home, institution, facility, or agency; a law enforcement officer employed in any facility, service, or program for children that is operated or contracted by the Department of Juvenile Justice; or any other person legally responsible for the child’s welfare in a residential setting; and also includes an adult sitter or relative entrusted with a child’s care. For the purpose of departmental investigative jurisdiction, this definition does not include the following persons when they are acting in an official capacity: law enforcement officers, except as otherwise provided in this subsection; employees of municipal or county detention facilities; or employees of the Department of Corrections.
(58) “Out-of-home” means a placement outside of the home of the parents or a parent.
(59) “Parent” means a woman who gives birth to a child and a man whose consent to the adoption of the child would be required under s. 63.062(1). The term “parent” also means legal father as defined in this section. If a child has been legally adopted, the term “parent” means the adoptive mother or father of the child. For purposes of this chapter only, when the phrase “parent or legal custodian” is used, it refers to rights or responsibilities of the parent and, only if there is no living parent with intact parental rights, to the rights or responsibilities of the legal custodian who has assumed the role of the parent. The term does not include an individual whose parental relationship to the child has been legally terminated, or an alleged or prospective parent, unless:
(60) “Participant,” for purposes of a shelter proceeding, dependency proceeding, or termination of parental rights proceeding, means any person who is not a party but who should receive notice of hearings involving the child, including the actual custodian of the child, the foster parents or the legal custodian of the child, identified prospective parents, and any other person whose participation may be in the best interest of the child. A community-based agency under contract with the department to provide protective services may be designated as a participant at the discretion of the court. Participants may be granted leave by the court to be heard without the necessity of filing a motion to intervene.
(61) “Party” means the parent or parents of the child, the petitioner, the department, the guardian ad litem, and the child. The presence of the child may be excused by order of the court when presence would not be in the child’s best interest. Notice to the child may be excused by order of the court when the age, capacity, or other condition of the child is such that the notice would be meaningless or detrimental to the child.
(62) “Permanency goal” means the living arrangement identified for the child to return to or identified as the permanent living arrangement of the child. The permanency goal is also the case plan goal. If concurrent case planning is being used, reunification may be pursued at the same time that another permanency goal is pursued.
(63) “Permanency plan” means the plan that establishes the placement intended to serve as the child’s permanent home.
(64) “Permanent guardian” means the relative or other adult in a permanent guardianship of a dependent child under s. 39.6221.
(65) “Permanent guardianship of a dependent child” means a legal relationship that a court creates under s. 39.6221 between a child and a relative or other adult approved by the court which is intended to be permanent and self-sustaining through the transfer of parental rights with respect to the child relating to protection, education, care and control of the person, custody of the person, and decisionmaking on behalf of the child.
(66) “Physical injury” means death, permanent or temporary disfigurement, or impairment of any bodily part.
(67) “Physician” means any licensed physician, dentist, podiatric physician, or optometrist and includes any intern or resident.
(68) “Preliminary screening” means the gathering of preliminary information to be used in determining a child’s need for further evaluation or assessment or for referral for other substance abuse services through means such as psychosocial interviews; urine and breathalyzer screenings; and reviews of available educational, delinquency, and dependency records of the child.
(69) “Present danger” means a significant and clearly observable family condition that is occurring at the current moment and is already endangering or threatening to endanger the child. Present danger threats are conspicuous and require that an immediate protective action be taken to ensure the child’s safety.
(70) “Preventive services” means social services and other supportive and rehabilitative services provided to the parent or legal custodian of the child and to the child for the purpose of averting the removal of the child from the home or disruption of a family which will or could result in the placement of a child in foster care. Social services and other supportive and rehabilitative services shall promote the child’s developmental needs and need for physical, mental, and emotional health and a safe, stable, living environment; shall promote family autonomy; and shall strengthen family life, whenever possible.
(71) “Prospective parent” means a person who claims to be, or has been identified as, a person who may be a mother or a father of a child.
(72) “Protective investigation” means the acceptance of a report alleging child abuse, abandonment, or neglect, as defined in this chapter, by the central abuse hotline or the acceptance of a report of other dependency by the department; the investigation of each report; the determination of whether action by the court is warranted; the determination of the disposition of each report without court or public agency action when appropriate; and the referral of a child to another public or private agency when appropriate.
(73) “Protective investigator” means an authorized agent of the department who receives and investigates reports of child abuse, abandonment, or neglect; who, as a result of the investigation, may recommend that a dependency petition be filed for the child; and who performs other duties necessary to carry out the required actions of the protective investigation function.
(74) “Protective supervision” means a legal status in dependency cases which permits the child to remain safely in his or her own home or other nonlicensed placement under the supervision of an agent of the department and which must be reviewed by the court during the period of supervision.
(75) “Qualified professional” means a physician or a physician assistant licensed under chapter 458 or chapter 459; a psychiatrist licensed under chapter 458 or chapter 459; a psychologist as defined in s. 490.003(7) or a professional licensed under chapter 491; or a psychiatric nurse as defined in s. 394.455.
(76) “Relative” means a grandparent, great-grandparent, sibling, first cousin, aunt, uncle, great-aunt, great-uncle, niece, or nephew, whether related by the whole or half blood, by affinity, or by adoption. The term does not include a stepparent.
(77) “Reunification services” means social services and other supportive and rehabilitative services provided to the parent of the child, to the child, and, where appropriate, to the relative placement, nonrelative placement, or foster parents of the child, for the purpose of enabling a child who has been placed in out-of-home care to safely return to his or her parent at the earliest possible time. The health and safety of the child shall be the paramount goal of social services and other supportive and rehabilitative services. The services shall promote the child’s need for physical, developmental, mental, and emotional health and a safe, stable, living environment; shall promote family autonomy; and shall strengthen family life, whenever possible.
(78) “Safety plan” means a plan created to control present or impending danger using the least intrusive means appropriate to protect a child when a parent, caregiver, or legal custodian is unavailable, unwilling, or unable to do so.
(79) “Secretary” means the Secretary of Children and Families.
(80) “Sexual abuse of a child” for purposes of finding a child to be dependent means one or more of the following acts:
(a) Any penetration, however slight, of the vagina or anal opening of one person by the penis of another person, whether or not there is the emission of semen.
(b) Any sexual contact between the genitals or anal opening of one person and the mouth or tongue of another person.
(c) Any intrusion by one person into the genitals or anal opening of another person, including the use of any object for this purpose, except that this does not include any act intended for a valid medical purpose.
(d) The intentional touching of the genitals or intimate parts, including the breasts, genital area, groin, inner thighs, and buttocks, or the clothing covering them, of either the child or the perpetrator, except that this does not include:
1. Any act which may reasonably be construed to be a normal caregiver responsibility, any interaction with, or affection for a child; or
2. Any act intended for a valid medical purpose.
(e) The intentional masturbation of the perpetrator’s genitals in the presence of a child.
(f) The intentional exposure of the perpetrator’s genitals in the presence of a child, or any other sexual act intentionally perpetrated in the presence of a child, if such exposure or sexual act is for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, aggression, degradation, or other similar purpose.
(g) The sexual exploitation of a child, which includes the act of a child offering to engage in or engaging in prostitution, or the act of allowing, encouraging, or forcing a child to:
1. Solicit for or engage in prostitution;
2. Engage in a sexual performance, as defined by chapter 827; or
3. Participate in the trade of human trafficking as provided in s. 787.06(3)(g).
(81) “Shelter” means a placement with a relative or a nonrelative, or in a licensed home or facility, for the temporary care of a child who is alleged to be or who has been found to be dependent, pending court disposition before or after adjudication.
(82) “Shelter hearing” means a hearing in which the court determines whether probable cause exists to keep a child in shelter status pending further investigation of the case.
(83) “Sibling” means:
(a) A child who shares a birth parent or legal parent with one or more other children; or
(b) A child who has lived together in a family with one or more other children whom he or she identifies as siblings.
(84) “Social service agency” means the department, a licensed child-caring agency, or a licensed child-placing agency.
(85) “Social worker” means any person who has a bachelor’s, master’s, or doctoral degree in social work.
(86) “Substance abuse” means using, without medical reason, any psychoactive or mood-altering drug, including alcohol, in such a manner as to induce impairment resulting in dysfunctional social behavior.
(87) “Substantial compliance” means that the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been significantly remedied to the extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered upon the child’s remaining with or being returned to the child’s parent.
(88) “Taken into custody” means the status of a child immediately when temporary physical control over the child is attained by a person authorized by law, pending the child’s release or placement.
(89) “Temporary legal custody” means the relationship that a court creates between a child and an adult relative of the child, legal custodian, agency, or other person approved by the court until a more permanent arrangement is ordered. Temporary legal custody confers upon the custodian the right to have temporary physical custody of the child and the right and duty to protect, nurture, guide, and discipline the child and to provide the child with food, shelter, and education, and ordinary medical, dental, psychiatric, and psychological care, unless these rights and duties are otherwise enlarged or limited by the court order establishing the temporary legal custody relationship.
(90) “Victim” means any child who has sustained or is threatened with physical, mental, or emotional injury identified in a report involving child abuse, neglect, or abandonment, or child-on-child sexual abuse.
(91) “Visitor” means a person who:
(a) Provides care or supervision to a child in the home; or
(b) Is 12 years of age or older, other than a child in care, and who will be in the child’s home at least:
1. Five consecutive days; or
2. Seven days or more in 1 month.
History. s. 1, ch. 26880, 1951; ss. 1, 2, ch. 67-585; s. 3, ch. 69-353; s. 4, ch. 69-365; ss. 19, 35, ch. 69-106; s. 1, ch. 71-117; s. 1, ch. 71-130; s. 10, ch. 71-355; ss. 4, 5, ch. 72-179; ss. 19, 30, ch. 72-404; ss. 2, 23, ch. 73-231; s. 1, ch. 74-368; ss. 15, 27, 28, ch. 75-48; s. 4, ch. 77-147; s. 2, ch. 78-414; s. 9, ch. 79-164; s. 2, ch. 79-203; s. 1, ch. 80-290; ss. 1, 17, ch. 81-218; ss. 4, 15, ch. 84-311; s. 4, ch. 85-80; s. 2, ch. 85-206; ss. 73, 78, ch. 86-220; s. 1, ch. 87-133; s. 1, ch. 87-289; s. 12, ch. 87-397; s. 1, ch. 88-319; s. 10, ch. 88-337; s. 2, ch. 90-53; s. 3, ch. 90-208; s. 3, ch. 90-306; s. 2, ch. 90-309; s. 69, ch. 91-45; s. 1, ch. 91-183; s. 1, ch. 92-158; s. 1, ch. 92-170; ss. 1, 4(1st), 14, ch. 92-287; s. 13, ch. 93-39; s. 6, ch. 93-230; s. 1, ch. 94-164; s. 11, ch. 94-209; s. 50, ch. 94-232; s. 1333, ch. 95-147; s. 8, ch. 95-152; s. 1, ch. 95-212; s. 4, ch. 95-228; s. 1, ch. 95-266; ss. 3, 43, ch. 95-267; s. 3, ch. 96-369; s. 2, ch. 96-398; s. 20, ch. 96-402; s. 23, ch. 97-96; s. 158, ch. 97-101; s. 44, ch. 97-190; s. 4, ch. 97-234; s. 111, ch. 97-238; s. 1, ch. 97-276; s. 1, ch. 98-49; s. 176, ch. 98-166; s. 7, ch. 98-280; s. 20, ch. 98-403; s. 15, ch. 99-2; s. 3, ch. 99-168; s. 2, ch. 99-186; s. 4, ch. 99-193; s. 15, ch. 2000-139; s. 2, ch. 2000-188; s. 82, ch. 2000-318; s. 9, ch. 2000-320; s. 14, ch. 2002-1; s. 2, ch. 2006-62; s. 1, ch. 2006-86; s. 4, ch. 2006-194; s. 4, ch. 2007-124; s. 1, ch. 2008-90; s. 1, ch. 2008-154; s. 1, ch. 2008-245; s. 1, ch. 2009-21; s. 3, ch. 2012-105; s. 1, ch. 2012-178; s. 11, ch. 2014-19; s. 14, ch. 2014-160; s. 3, ch. 2014-224; s. 2, ch. 2015-34; s. 1, ch. 2016-24; s. 1, ch. 2016-71; s. 11, ch. 2016-105; s. 2, ch. 2016-241; s. 2, ch. 2017-151; s. 1, ch. 2018-103; s. 11, ch. 2019-3; s. 1, ch. 2019-142; s. 1, ch. 2020-65; s. 3, ch. 2021-51; s. 5, ch. 2024-70; s. 1, ch. 2024-177; s. 2, ch. 2024-213; s. 1, ch. 2025-167; s. 16, ch. 2026-16.