Dependency Law Finder

           FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                  STATE OF FLORIDA
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                        No. 1D2025-3337
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L.C., Father of L.M.C., P.A.W., Minor Children,

    Appellant,

    v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,

    Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County. Thomas H. Williams, Judge.

                       September 25, 2026


LONG, J.

     L.C. (“Father”) appeals a final judgment terminating his parental rights.     We address only Father’s argument that competent, substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that a ground for termination existed. On this issue and the others, we affirm.

     The Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) petitioned the trial court to shelter L.M.C. and P.A.W., Father’s children, after P.A.W. tested positive for several illegal drugs at birth. DCF eventually petitioned the court to terminate Father’s and the children’s mother’s parental rights.
     At the termination hearing, two community-based care agency case managers testified that a case plan was made for Father with the goal of reunification. They said that Father, who was incarcerated, had not completed any of his case plan tasks. They also said that they provided Father with cards and envelopes to send letters to the children but that he never sent the children anything. Father testified that he had not spoken with L.M.C. in fifteen months and that he did not know P.A.W.

     The trial court entered a final judgment terminating Father’s parental rights. It found that clear and convincing evidence showed that Father had abandoned the children. It also found that termination was in the manifest best interests of the children and that termination was the least restrictive means of protecting the children from harm. This appeal followed.

     This Court’s review is “‘highly deferential’ and limited to whether competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s judgment and whether we ‘cannot say that no one could reasonably find such evidence to be clear and convincing.’” K.D. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 

 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (quoting J.P. v. Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 

 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)). To terminate parental rights, a trial court must find, among other things, that a ground for termination under section 39.806, Florida Statutes, exists. P.R. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 

, 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022).

     Father argues that the trial court’s finding that he abandoned the children was not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Section 39.806 lists the grounds for termination. Sub- subsection (1)(b) states that abandonment “as defined by s. 39.01(1)” is grounds for termination of parental rights. § 39.806(1)(b), Fla. Stat. Section 39.01(1), Florida Statues, defines “abandonment” as “a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child . . . , while being able, has made no significant contribution to the child’s care and maintenance or has failed to establish or maintain a substantial and positive relationship with the child, or both.” The statute continues:

    For purposes of this subsection, “establish or maintain a
    substantial and positive relationship” includes, but is not
    limited to, frequent and regular contact with the child
    through frequent and regular visitation or frequent and
    regular communication to or with the child, and the
    exercise of parental rights and responsibilities. Marginal
    efforts and incidental or token visits or communications
    are not sufficient to establish or maintain a substantial
    and positive relationship with a child. . . . The
    incarceration, repeated incarceration, or extended
    incarceration of a parent, legal custodian, or caregiver
    responsible for a child’s welfare may support a finding of
    abandonment.

§ 39.01(1), Fla. Stat.

     The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence showed that Father abandoned the children. The court’s finding is supported by competent, substantial evidence. Father testified that he never met P.A.W. He said that he had a relationship with L.M.C. before he was incarcerated, but he also said that he had not spoken with her since she was sheltered fifteen months before the termination hearing. The case managers testified that Father was given cards and envelopes to send letters to the children, but he never sent them anything.          This testimony is competent, substantial evidence that supports the court’s finding. Thus, the court did not err in finding by clear and convincing evidence that Father abandoned the children.

    AFFIRMED.

ROWE and BILBREY, JJ., concur.

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    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
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Ilene F. Tuckfield of Ilene F. Tuckfield, P.A., Coral Gables, for Appellant. Sarah J. Rumph, Appellate Counsel, Children’s Legal Services, Tallahassee, for Appellee Department of Children and Families.

Sara E. Goldfarb, Statewide Director of Appeals; and Mercy Almaguer, Senior Attorney, Appellate Division, Statewide Guardian ad Litem Office, Tallahassee, o/b/o L.M.C. and P.A.W.