Dependency Law Finder

Florida's dependency statutes, court rules and DCF operating procedures, with the appellate opinions that apply them

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M.P. v. Department of Children & Families230 So. 3d 512 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) · 3D17-1302

Court
3rd DCA
Decided
2017-10-11
Case
TPR
Appellant
Mother
County
Miami-Dade

Affirmed Denial of the mother's motion to vacate a default termination affirmed because she failed to show a meritorious defense to the case plan noncompliance ground.

Issues
Default & consent by nonappearance, Post-judgment relief
Law cited
§ 39.801(3)(d) (now § 39.801(3)(e)) · § 39.806(1)(e), (1)(e)3.

Summary, issues, facts, outcome, and appellant were extracted automatically from the opinion. Check the opinion itself before relying on them.

Court's PDF On CourtListener
FERNANDEZ, J.

M.P., ..the mother, appeals the .trial court’s Order Denying the Motion to Set Aside and Vacate the Final Judgment of Termination of Parental Rights, entered after M.P.’s failure to attend the adjudicatory hearing on the petition.'We affirm the trial court’s denial, finding no abuse of discretion.

After M.P.’s failure to attend the adjudicatory hearing, the trial court entered an implied consent to termination, pursuant to section 39.801(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2016), and proceeded to receive evidence that supported the termination of M.P.’s parental rights, as alleged in the Department of Children and Families’ petition. Thereafter, the trial court entered a final judgment terminating M.P,’s parental rights as to her two minor children. M.P. moved to vacate the default/implied consent judgment, which the trial court denied because M.P. failed to prove a meritorious defense to section 39.806(1)(e)3, Fla. Stat, (2016).

We review the trial court’s order denying M.P.’s Motion to Set Aside and Vacate the Final Judgment of Termination of Parental Rights under an abuse of discretion standard. C.B. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 990 So.2d 520, 522-523 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). A motion to set aside a final judgment of termination of parental rights must establish “due diligence, demonstrate excusable neglect, and demonstrate the existence of a meritorious defense to the termination petition.” Fla. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. v. P.E., 14 So.3d 228, 236 (Fla. 2009), citing to In re A.N.D. 883 So.2d 910, 914 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) and E.S. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 878 So.2d 493, 496 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004).

After the hearing on the motion, the trial court found that M.P. failed to establish a meritorious defense as to Paragraph 20 of the Petition for Termination of Parental Rights, which alleged that the children “have been in care for any .12 of the last 22 months and the Mother has not substantially complied with the ease plan so as to permit reunification.” See § 39.806(1)(e)(3), Fla. Stat. (2016). Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the motion. Finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination of M.P.’s motion, we affirm the order denying M.P.’s Motion to Set Aside and Vacate the Final Judgment of Termination of Parental Rights.

Affirmed.

Opinion text: CourtListener, Free Law Project. Not an official reporter; check the court's version before citing.