Time limitations; continuances.§ 39.0136
Related court rules: Rule 8.240 Computation, continuance, extension, and enlargement of time · Rule 8.255
12 opinions cite § 39.0136
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R.S. v. Department of Children & Families 956 So. 2d 1242 · 4D07-1423 · 4th DCA 2007
· cited by 1 in all courts
Certiorari granted and a 77-day continuance quashed because it violated the statutory limits and extraordinary-circumstances requirement for delaying termination trials.
…Time limitations are a right of the child which may not be waived, extended, or continued at the request of any party except as provided in this section. § 39.0136(1), Fla. Stat. (2006). The statute specifies that: A continuance or extension of time may be granted only for extraordinary circumstances in which it is…
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D.H. ex rel. J.R. v. Department of Children & Families 12 So. 3d 266 · 1D08-3082 · 1st DCA 2009
· cited by 2 in all courts
Termination reversed because the judge's pretrial comments prejudging the mother's mental health required disqualification; remanded for a different judge.
…and that Appellant's counsel's office had not used due diligence and shown good cause, the trial court orally denied the motion for continuance. See § 39.0136(1), (2)(b)1. & (3), Fla. Stat. (2007); R.S. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 956 So.2d 1242 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). At that same pretrial conference, the…
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Department of Children & Families v. Foster Parents of K.J. 3D2024-1958 · 3rd DCA 2025
Order granting foster caregivers limited party status quashed; they lacked the section 39.522(3) presumption because the move would unite the child with a sibling.
…DCA 2023). This is because, among other reasons, “time is of the essence for establishing permanency for a child in the dependency system.” Id. (quoting § 39.0136(1), Fla. Stat.). We have jurisdiction. Turning to the merits, Chapter 39 excludes caregivers from party status, with limited exceptions. See, e.g., §…
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G.C. v. Department of Children & Families 3D21-1342 · 3rd DCA 2022
Termination affirmed; two years of services, including specialized therapy for her borderline personality disorder, did not yield substantial compliance, and termination was least restrictive.
…the last two and a half years, are willing to adopt K.C. See § 39.001(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (2021) (permanent placement should be achieved within one year); § 39.0136(1), Fla. Stat. (stating “time is of the essence for establishing permanency for a child in the dependency system” and time limitations are a right of the…
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A.P. v. Department of Children & Families 1D20-3693 · 1st DCA 2021
Termination of rights to all four children affirmed on two grounds; rehearing on the two older children was proper and best interests supported.
…A.P.’s actions and the stress of uncertainty in their situations shows why public policy favors permanence and security for the children. See §§ 39.001(1)(h), 39.0136, Fla. Stat. (2019). As we stated, in Department of Children & Families v. B.C., 185 So. 3d 716, 720 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016), the least restrictive…
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B.A. v. Department of Children & Families 4D20-1335-2 · 4th DCA 2021
On rehearing, termination affirmed despite the five-month delay in the written order because the mother did not preserve the delay claim or show prejudice.
…arguments in a motion for rehearing. As it stands, the Mother’s requested relief (remand) runs counter to the emphasis on an expeditious process. See, e.g., § 39.0136(1), Fla. Stat. (2019) (“The Legislature finds that time is of the essence for establishing permanency for a child in the dependency system.”); C.M. v. Dep’t of…
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A.M. v. Department of Children & Families 223 So. 3d 312 · 4D17-0699 · 4th DCA 2017
· cited by 13 in all courts
Termination affirmed; due process did not require delaying trial until the mother, found incompetent in an unrelated criminal case, regained competence, and the continuance was properly denied.
…and to the harm that results when permanency is unduly delayed.” J.B. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 170 So. 3d 780, 792 (Fla. 2015); see also § 39.0136(1), Fla. Stat. (2015) (“The Legislature finds that time is of the essence for establishing permanency for a child in the dependency system.”); C.M. v. Dep’t…
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M.L. v. Department of Children & Families 227 So. 3d 142 · 4D16-4087 · 4th DCA 2017
· cited by 4 in all courts
Denial of the biological father's motion to intervene in termination proceedings affirmed because he waited a year and a half to pursue paternity.
…in these cases, and at the time of the prospective biological father’s motion to intervene, the child had spent his entire life in the dependency system. § 39.0136(1), Florida Statutes (2016). He deserved permanency, and the trial-court did not abuse its discretion by not further delaying the proceedings to accommodate a…
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S.L. v. Department of Children & Families 182 So. 3d 744 · 2D15-2770 · 2nd DCA 2015
Termination affirmed as supported by the evidence, but the court rebuked the trial judge for an eight-month delay in ruling after the termination hearing.
…Judicial Administration 2.215(f) and does not comply with Florida's public policy of expediting termination proceedings. See Fla. R. Jud. Adm. 2.215(g); § 39.0136(1), Fla. Stat. (2014) ("[T]ime is of the essence for establishing permanency for a child in the dependency system."). During the eight-month delay, several…
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A.S. v. Department of Children & Families 162 So. 3d 335 · 4D14-3571 · 4th DCA 2015
· cited by 4 in all courts
Termination reversed: a prospective parent cannot abandon a child before paternity is established, his later visits showed regular contact, and least restrictive means was unproven.
…determination, we have considered the legislature’s finding “that time is of the essence for establishing permanency for a child in the dependency system.” § 39.0136(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). Our resolution of this case is not at odds with the legislature’s intent of timely establishing permanency as the trial court and DCF have…
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In re D.J. 9 So. 3d 750 · 2D08-793 · 2nd DCA 2009
· cited by 14 in all courts
Dependency adjudication affirmed because the mother lacked training and equipment for the infant's medical needs; unpleaded medical neglect was tried by consent despite DCF's misconduct.
…by the Department's apparent disregard of the requirement that dependency actions be expedited in all but the most exceptional circumstances. See § 39.0136. The actions and attitudes displayed by the Department in this case are ones we cannot and do not condone. However, when the court finally considered the case…
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In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure - 2019 Fast-Track Report SC19-1818 · Florida Supreme Court 2020
…39.6251(6), 39.701(2)(d), and 39.701(4), Fla. Stat., effective July 1, 2019); ch. 2019-128, §§ 1-4, 6-7, 10, 12, Laws of Fla. (amending §§ 39.001(3), 39.0136, 39.402(18), 39.507(7)(c), 39.522(1), 39.6011(2)(e), 39.6011(4), 39.621(10)(a), and 39.811(5), Fla. Stat., effective Oct. 1, 2019). …
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(1) The Legislature finds that time is of the essence for establishing permanency for a child in the dependency system. Time limitations are a right of the child which may not be waived, extended, or continued at the request of any party except as provided in this section.
(2)(a) All parties and the court must work together to ensure that permanency is achieved as soon as possible for every child through timely performance of their responsibilities under this chapter.
(b) The department shall ensure that parents have the information necessary to contact their case manager. When a new case manager is assigned to a case, the case manager must make a timely and diligent effort to notify the parent and provide updated contact information.
(3) The time limitations in this chapter do not include:
(a) Periods of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the child’s counsel, guardian ad litem, or attorney ad litem, if one is appointed. The court must consider the best interests of the child when determining periods of delay under this section.
(b) Periods of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request of any party if the continuance is granted:
1. Because of an unavailability of evidence that is material to the case if the requesting party has exercised due diligence to obtain evidence and there are substantial grounds to believe that the evidence will be available within 30 days. However, if the requesting party is not prepared to proceed within 30 days, any other party may move for issuance of an order to show cause or the court on its own motion may impose appropriate sanctions, which may include dismissal of the petition.
2. To allow the requesting party additional time to prepare the case and additional time is justified because of an exceptional circumstance.
(c) Reasonable periods of delay necessary to accomplish notice of the hearing to the child’s parent or legal custodian; however, the petitioner shall continue regular efforts to provide notice to the parents during the periods of delay.
(4) Notwithstanding subsection (3), in order to expedite permanency for a child, the total time allowed for continuances or extensions of time, including continuances or extensions by the court on its own motion, may not exceed 60 days within any 12-month period for proceedings conducted under this chapter. A continuance or extension of time may be granted only for extraordinary circumstances in which it is necessary to preserve the constitutional rights of a party or if substantial evidence exists to demonstrate that without granting a continuance or extension of time the child’s best interests will be harmed.
(5) Notwithstanding subsection (3), a continuance or an extension of time is limited to the number of days absolutely necessary to complete a necessary task in order to preserve the rights of a party or the best interests of a child.
History. s. 4, ch. 2006-86; s. 2, ch. 2019-128; s. 9, ch. 2024-70.